World: LEBANON: ARMY AGAINST GUERRILLAS

THE Palestinian guerrillas who are sworn to destroy Israel seem to stand a far better chance of destroying some of the Arab countries that serve as their springboards of operation. Lebanon and Jordan, in particular, know that raids mounted from within their borders will bring harsh Israeli retaliation, but have proved too weak to crack down on their often uninvited guests. Last week an attempt by Lebanon’s army to curb the fedayeen (“men of sacrifice”) brought the country face-to-face with the specter of civil war. The fighting reportedly left 40 guerrillas and 25 soldiers dead, spurred violence in several major cities, prompted Syria to mobilize troops along the border and sent shock waves through the Middle East—and beyond. In the U.S., the State Department warned that a “major tragedy” could be in the making.

The crisis is rooted in Lebanon’s volatile ethnic makeup. Roughly half of its 2,700,000 citizens are Christian, half Moslem. The Lebanese, jealous of their position as the eastern Mediterranean’s pacemakers in commerce and communications, have kept the ethnic conglomerate intact for 26 years by means of a scrupulously observed gentleman’s agreement. It provides that the President of the republic—currently Charles Helou—should always be a Maronite Catholic, the Premier a Sunnite Moslem, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Moslem. Parliament is apportioned on a 6-to-5 ratio favoring Christians, as are the army and the civil service. From time to time, the system has come close to collapse. Until last week, its severest test occurred in 1958, when strife between the sects led President Eisenhower to dispatch the U.S. Sixth Fleet and 14,500 Marines to prevent an Arab takeover.

Crack Down. Whether the Lebanese or the Al-Fatah guerrillas provoked the fighting is unclear. Certainly, the army has long been edgy. Last December, in retaliation for guerrilla actions elsewhere, Israeli commandos carried out a raid on Beirut airport. Lebanon’s generals, humiliated that the nation lost 13 commercial airplanes without being able to strike back, were chafing to crack down on the guerrillas, who were moving across the countryside pretty much at will.

Al-Fatah has also been spoiling for a fight for months. Last spring, army attempts to control the commandos led to street demonstrations in which 17 died. The riots caused the downfall of the government of Rashid Karami, who resigned to avoid a confrontation that would hurt Lebanon, but stayed on as caretaker Premier. After the riots, the guerrillas tacitly agreed to operate only along Lebanon’s border with Israel and to keep away from civilian settlements against which the Israelis could retaliate. Despite the agreement, they have tripled their forces to about 5,400 men and set up new camps deeper inside Lebanese territory. Two weeks ago. apparently without bothering to check with Helou or Karami, the army moved. Arguing that the fedayeen were endangering civilian communities, troops encircled two score guerrillas in the village of Majdel Silm in southern Lebanon. Before the guerrillas could retreat into neighboring Syria, 14 were slain.

Six days later, Al-Fatah avenged what its radio station called “a brutal massacre.” Striking across the Syrian border in a maneuver that could not have been conducted without approval from the far-left regime in Damascus, commandos hit the Lebanese border towns of Masnaa, Arida and Biqeiha. Overpowering police and customs posts, the guerrillas took 24 captives. They were later set free, but only after Al-Fatah bragged that their capture was “full evidence of the revolution’s ability to take any measures it considers appropriate for self-defense.” Al-Fatah, in other words, would move when and where in Lebanon it pleased.

The events produced internal and external crises for Lebanon. Karami resigned as caretaker Premier. Arab leaders called a general strike, and some of the 160,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon fought pitched battles with police in Beirut. In Tripoli, Lebanon’s second city, street battles killed seven and injured scores. Helou was forced to declare a nationwide curfew to prevent further disorders.

Border Troubles. Helou also telephoned Syria’s head of state, Noureddine Atassi, to protest Damascus’ support of the guerrilla raids. Atassi had closed the Syrian-Lebanese border, stranding more than 500 trucks along the 68-mile Beirut-Damascus highway, one of the Middle East’s busiest trade routes. Ignoring Helou’s protests, Syria —or the fedayeen—moved riflemen, armored cars and mortars to the Lebanese frontier. At week’s end some troops were reported to have crossed the border and occupied a village four miles inside Lebanon. The Syrians have traditionally been better at rattling sabers than using them, however, and nobody expected a full-fledged invasion to follow.

Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser expressed “dismay” that “Arab bullets were directed to the wrong target, whatever the reason.” Reportedly on instructions from Premier Golda Meir, Israeli officials said nothing. Only Deputy Premier Yigal Allon broke the silence to warn that Israel would not sit on its hands if the status quo were disturbed.

The U.S. also came under fire, mostly because the State Department had recently expressed its concern over “any threat to Lebanese integrity from any source.” South Yemen broke off diplomatic relations with the U.S. Washington said that it planned to take no retaliatory action. Jordan’s King Hussein, who has toyed with the idea of curbing the guerrillas himself, tried to steer a middle course. He sent no protest to Helou, but told Al-Fatah Leader Yasser Arafat: “It is a shame that a single drop of Arab blood be shed by an Arab hand.” In Baghdad, 250,000 Iraqis demonstrated against Lebanon, as did mobs in Libya.

If Helou’s government is to remain in power, it will probably have to back down and give even freer rein to the guerrillas. The President indicated as much with a message to Arafat, carefully promising that “Lebanon is ready to continue to support the Palestinian struggle within the limits of its ability.” Such a move, however, would invite even more severe Israeli reprisals. Should the government fall, two main possibilities exist: 1) An army-backed takeover if Helou decided to resign or if the generals decided that he could no longer keep order, or 2) a leftwing, Nasserite regime that would abandon Lebanon’s live-and-let-live approach to Israel and intensify fighting along the borders. Whether Israel would tolerate such a development without invading Lebanon is doubtful.

Whatever the outcome, it is plain that the faint hopes for peace in the Middle East were dimmer than ever.