Nation: LOW SILHOUETTE RISING

THE presidential soft sell, the lowered voice and the low silhouette had produced the impression of a vacuum in Washington. Now Richard Nixon is reacting against this feeling of drift. Under the pressure of events, he has begun to exhort and to “jawbone.” The pace is still hardly breakneck or the mood galvanic compared with those of more activist Presidents, but Nixon is clearly determined to reassert a sense of leadership.

He is acting on many fronts. He spent a hard-working weekend in the quiet of Camp David. He summoned Secretary of State William Rogers. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and top CIA officials to grapple with a painfully familiar topic: Viet Nam. Back in Washington, Nixon invited reporters into his office and vowed that he intended to stand behind his Supreme Court nominee, Judge Clement Haynsworth, “until he is confirmed.” He accused some of the judge’s critics of “vicious character assassination.” Then Nixon held a two-hour meeting with congressional leaders of both parties to plead for his Administration’s proposals for narcotics legislation.

Nixon had said last January that he did not believe in jawboning with labor or business leaders to get them to hold down prices and wages, but in recent weeks he has adopted a mild version of the technique. He pleaded for restraint through 2,200 personal letters to union and management chiefs. He sent a pointed message to Congress, prodding it to speed up action on his legislative proposals. This week he expects to go into New Jersey and Virginia to provide some purely partisan support for Republican gubernatorial candidates. He also plans a speech outlining new directions in Latin American policy.

The rising presidential silhouette is having its greatest impact on the Viet Nam debate. Nixon’s unusually early announcement two weeks ago that he will deliver a major speech about the war on Nov. 3 has touched off intense speculation. Indeed, some of his severest critics on Capitol Hill were easing up, apparently convinced that something big is stirring. Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said he believed that Nixon “is trying to wind down the war in Viet Nam” and predicted that the speech will demonstrate “his determination to liquidate” it. Fulbright postponed new hearings on the war until after the speech. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said he had moved in the direction of a ceasefire, and urged public support of the President’s efforts.

Republican Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee said he thought that “we might have American troops out of combat within a year.” Vermont’s Senator George Aiken made a similar prediction. Those views were given added weight by House Republican Leader Gerald Ford’s estimate that half of all U.S. troops will be out of Viet Nam by mid-1970. Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott contended that the U.S. is approaching a de facto ceasefire. He urged that the U.S. go a step farther and declare that “on a certain date we will stop firing, and if we are not fired on, a cease-fire will occur.”

Did all the cheery talk mean that these Senators have some secret information about the Administration’s plans? Apparently not. Admitted Baker: “It’s a hope based on little bits of information—a general feeling.” A member of Fulbright’s committee staff put it more wryly: “There’s a feeling that if people say often enough what they hope they’ll be hearing from the President, he’ll end up saying it himself.”

Actually, the Administration moved swiftly to squelch the rising expectations of any dramatic announcement. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, in particular, tried to knock down all the talk about a unilateral ceasefire. He said that it “would not be a successful approach,” because a cease-fire requires the cooperation of both sides and should be the subject of negotiation in Paris.

Breaking Storm. The notion that U.S. troops are under orders that approach any kind of truce was ridiculed by U.S. commanders in Viet Nam. “I’d like to get Mansfield and Scott over here,” scoffed Lieut. Colonel Burton Walrath, a battalion commander at a fire-support base near Cu Chi. “We’re killing the Communists today just like we always have.” The only change, many officers say, is that they send out smaller patrols to find the enemy. Nonetheless, American commanders are emphasizing the policy of “Vietnamization” more vigorously than ever.

That difference in combat perspective between Viet Nam and Washington is something Nixon might well clear up in his speech. If a unilateral cease-fire seems to be ruled out, he may still offer a faster withdrawal schedule for U.S. forces. After all the time he has allowed for speculation, anything short of that could make the speech a dampening disappointment.

For nearly eight months the President’s strategy of low-key persuasion and attempts to let national tensions ease by avoiding political conflict seemed promising, one White House aide contends. But shortly after Nixon’s month-long summer stay at San Clemente, Calif., the troubles piled up. “Then everybody started unloading on him and the storm broke. It’s been forced on him, but now the President sees that he’s going to have to fight.” Fights, of course, are risky—but vacillation and drift at a time of national distress seem more so.