Nation: VIET NAM: THE NUMBERS GAME

FROM the outset of the presidential campaign, Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon have tiptoed with excruciating care around the issue of the Viet Nam war. Both wished to avoid saying anything that might jeopardize the peace talks in Paris. Conveniently, the negotiations also gave both an excuse to avoid making themselves targets for either hawks or doves in the U.S.

But that unnatural silence could not endure. Last week the issue emerged, noisily if not very clearly, as a crucial point of debate in the race.

Slapped Down. It was Humphrey who, seeking to convince skeptics of his dedication to peace, forced the controversy to the surface. He has experimented with optimistic predictions over the past few weeks. In private Administration meetings, he argued for a bombing halt, somewhat to Lyndon Johnson’s irritation. Twice Humphrey publicly suggested a softening of U.S. war policies—through a bombing pause and troop withdrawals—but each time the President publicly slapped him down.

Last week in Toledo, the Vice President promised that, if elected, he would “reassess the Viet Nam situation in light of the assistance that is required from the U.S.” As the South Vietnamese army improved, he added, he would “move toward a systematic reduction in American troops.” The pledge was hardly startling, since that has been the Pentagon’s goal for some time.

Still, talk of a troop cutback worried Republican strategists. Did Humphrey know something? Was Johnson about to announce a move toward de-escalation that would enhance his Vice President’s chances? To minimize the impact of any such move, Nixon immediately countered that Humphrey is so anxious for a settlement of the war that he would endanger the U.S. negotiating position by promising cutbacks of U.S. combat forces. The next day, Wisconsin’s Melvin Laird, a knowledgeable member of the House subcommittee on defense, accused Humphrey of “loose talk—dangerous, harmful talk —confusing and, in my view, irresponsible talk.” Whereupon he proceeded to indulge in much the same sort of talk. By June, Laird went on to predict, the U.S. will “likely” have 90,000 fewer troops in Viet Nam.

Laird’s motive was to give the impression that any troop reduction would be “in the normal course of events” and would therefore reflect no credit on the Democrats. The Administration quickly denied that any such reduction was envisioned. The U.S., said Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, is still building up to its authorized level of 549,500, and “we intend to continue.”

The politically inspired exchange left in doubt the question of the U.S. troop level and of the course of the war it self. Clifford issued his denial of Laird’s statement only at the President’s orders. Pentagon officers naturally supported the Defense Secretary’s statements. Yet other Administration sources suspect that both Laird and Humphrey may well be correct in their predictions that U.S. combat forces will be reduced.

Leave It Alone. What was clear was that both Republicans and Democrats were playing a misleading and potentially harmful numbers game with the troop-reduction issue. At one point, Laird cried: “It’s time a flailing Humphrey left [the issue] alone!” In fact, Humphrey scheduled a half-hour television speech this week, probably to articulate a more moderate position without divorcing himself entirely from the President’s views. Obviously, neither candidate can—or should—avoid the issue. The problem is that neither will be able to do anything about the war, before next Jan. 20, except to stir hopes and fears, and possibly to complicate things for U.S. negotiators in Paris.