World: COPING WITH NEW REALITIES IN EUROPE

As the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia entered its third week, the political and military leaders of the West began to grapple with the hard truth that many of their old assumptions and priorities no longer applied. The Soviet Union reacted angrily last week to the U.S. State Department’s judgment that the events of August had drastically altered the balance of power in Europe. The U.S., said Pravda, was merely warmongering. The fact is, however, that the balance of power has indeed been dangerously tipped by the massive infusion of Soviet troops and tanks into Central Europe at a point where NATO and Warsaw Pact borders meet. Even more important, the delicate psychological balance between the two superpowers and their allies has been upset. The Western Europeans are worried. In the U.S., there is a new stiffening of attitudes toward the Communist world (see THE NATION).

From Détente to Defense. Many Western leaders are frankly concerned that the Soviets—because of a power struggle within the Kremlin or growing desperation at the rise of liberal trends in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union—have embarked on a course of aggression that might get out of their own control. As a result, the West had no choice but to reconsider all the efforts of recent years premised on coexistence and peaceful competition with the Communists.

In one capital after another, government discussions turned rapidly from détente to defense. There were some predictable recriminations charging that the free world had been overly optimistic about Soviet aims. Typical of that mood was Nebraska Republican Roman L. Hruska, who said in a Senate speech, “Our belief in the theory of Soviet mellowing has debilitated our entire military strategy.” Many Western military leaders were openly grateful that the Soviets had shaken the politicians out of complacency before NATO was further enfeebled. As retired General Alfred M. Gruenther, a former NATO commander, put it: “The Soviet invasion was a jolt that will reunite NATO.”

Soviet Threats. Soviet ambassadors were under special instruction last week to once more inform the West that Czechoslovakia was a purely domestic affair and that no invasion was under consideration for that other errant East bloc country, Rumania. Even so, Soviet actions were less than reassuring. In addition to tightening their hold on captive Czechoslovakia (see following story), the Soviets kept up the pressure on Rumania by insisting that it open new talks on their bilateral “friendship treaty,” which President and Party Boss Nicolae Ceauşescu had resisted for nearly a year. Ceauşescu last week caved in, and the Soviets immediately came back at him with their other demand—that Rumania allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers to take place on its soil. It was, of course, the same ploy that the Soviets used on Dubcek prior to the invasion. Ceauşescu refused.

Nor was the Soviet attitude toward West Germany conducive to a relaxation of tensions. In a stormy 90-minute conference, Soviet Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin told Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger that Bonn must cease its new Ostpolitik, which aimed at establishing normal diplomatic and trade relations with the East bloc countries. Any West German initiative toward the East bloc would be regarded by Moscow as an aggressive action, said the Russian, and the West Germans would have to bear the consequences. The warning was especially unnerving, since in recent weeks the Soviets have stressed that the Soviet Union, like the other victorious powers in World War II, retains the right under Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter to intervene in West Germany if it feels that the Germans are a threat to peace.

NATO Nightmares. There are now more Soviet combat troops in Central Europe than at any time since 1945. The arrival of 275,000 Soviet soldiers in Czechoslovakia drastically unbalances what for two decades had been a relative parity between the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Furthermore, the new Soviet presence along the Bavarian border of Czechoslovakia turns the flank on NATO’s ground defenses, erected and maintained to meet an attack across the flat plains of East Germany.

For NATO planners, the new situation is fraught with uncertainties. They fear that a Soviet attack on Rumania might spark widespread uprisings in the East bloc that could spill over into a NATO area. The West Germans are most concerned of all. Though most people find it unthinkable that the Soviets would risk the start of World War III by attacking a NATO member, the West Germans nonetheless worry that the Soviet leaders might try to intimidate them with a further show of force that could, perhaps by accident, turn into an invasion. Reports of Soviet tactical nuclear missiles in Czechoslovakia could only increase West German anxiety. Says Helmut Schmidt, the Socialists’ parliamentary leader: “We cannot rule out the possibility that momentum of Soviet propaganda attacks might snowball into armed action.”

European Solution. As a consequence of Czechoslovakia, NATO headquarters is caught up in a flurry of new studies, new reports, new plans. For all the motion, the immediate changes are likely to be fairly small. The U.S. will probably send back to Germany the 35,000 men it pulled out earlier this year, putting them in place on extended maneuvers beginning this fall.

In the long term, however, any major beefing-up of NATO rests not with the U.S. but with the West Europeans themselves. One of the familiar ironies of the nuclear standoff between the superpowers is that it has restored the importance of conventional warfare. While the West Europeans rightfully look to the U.S. for protection from nuclear attack, they can and should look to their own resources for the new manpower necessary to bring NATO’s conventional forces back in balance with its potential Communist antagonists.