The War: Thin Green Line

Once again the U.S. had to separate fond hope from grim fact. On successive days, the Johnson Administration announced that reinforcements would be sent immediately to South Viet Nam and that the latest rumors about peace feelers from Hanoi had added up to nothing. As if to underscore the news, Communist forces over the weekend launched a savage new offensive across South Viet Nam.

The winter so far has been marked by the familiar progression of incongruities: worldwide speculation about imminent peace talks, yielding to carnage, followed in turn by further hints of negotiations. The most recent talk about talks became intense in late December and early January, when the North Vietnamese said officially that they would agree to discussions if the U.S. stopped bombing North Viet Nam. Washington followed up with a deep probe of Hanoi’s intentions. The chief question throughout was whether Hanoi would give assurances that it would not militarily exploit a bombing cessation. This demand was part of the “San Antonio formula” laid down by Lyndon Johnson in September and later denned as meaning that Hanoi should not increase its infiltration rate of South Viet Nam beyond existing levels.

Fiercely Exasperated. The diplomatic exploration grew in drama and widened in scope. Washington employed a still-anonymous foreign intermediary to sound out officials in Hanoi last month, meanwhile suspending bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong region. Italy’s Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani met with North Vietnamese envoys in Rome, sent Washington a lengthy report of Hanoi’s views. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant jetted to New Delhi, Moscow, London and Paris, arriving back in Manhattan last week. Hanoi made an other gesture—plainly calculated, no matter how welcome—by releasing three captured U.S. flyers.

Johnson, meanwhile, kept repeating that he would begin a conference “tomorrow” if possible and that he would consent to whatever initial agenda the other side might propose. The President also invited Thant to Washington this week to “thank him very much for another try.” In fact, the Administration was fiercely yet helplessly exasperated by Hanoi’s skillful use of inconclusive peace hints as a psychological counterweight to its bloody assaults on South Viet Nam. Furthermore, Communist propagandists in South Viet Nam assiduously spread the word that the U.S. was conniving with the North to sell out the Saigon regime and establish a coalition government that would include the Viet Cong.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk bluntly set the record straight: “At no time has Hanoi indicated publicly or privately that it will refrain from taking military advantage of any cessation of the bombing. Nor has it shown any interest in preliminary negotiations to arrange a general cease-fire.” Lyndon Johnson added at an impromptu press conference at the White House that Hanoi is no more ready “to negotiate today than it was a year ago, two years ago or three years ago,” and the Communists’ attacks throughout South Viet Nam proved it.

New enemy thrusts were under way (see THE WORLD) as Johnson flew to North Carolina and California for a personal goodbye to some of the 10,500 soldiers and Marines being dispatched to Viet Nam. The reinforcements will bring total U.S. military strength in the country to 510,500, allowing General William Westmoreland greater flexibility in deploying his troops to defend the cities and the besieged northern provinces. The new men are being rushed to Asia, said the Pentagon, “for insurance purposes.”

The insurance is doubtless necessary, but the premiums will prove difficult to pay. The extra expense can only heighten the Government’s fiscal difficulties.

Of more pressing concern is the shortage of trained troops. The Administration insisted that reinforcements will not add to the 525,000 total already scheduled to be in Viet Nam by July, but are merely an acceleration of the buildup. Westmoreland has made no official request to exceed the ceiling of 525,000—that is, not yet. However, no one will be surprised if the general does ask for more men, and gets them: he is already strapped for combat-ready ground units.

Ready Baclc-Up. The troops now being sent are from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division and the Marine Corps’ 5th Division—the most mobile and professional outfits remaining in the U.S.-based strategic Reserve. This leaves intact just three regular Army divisions—committed to NATO and not organized for fast deployment to underdeveloped countries—plus most of a Marine division and six Army brigades dispersed from Alaska to the Canal Zone. Many of the men now en route to Viet Nam have been there before, and some have not even enjoyed the usual two-year respite between combat tours. To prevent the thin green line from getting thinner still, the Administration may well have to put major Reserve ground components on active-duty status for the first time since the Berlin crisis of 1961. These forces would not necessarily be sent to Viet Nam, but would serve as a ready back-up in the event of emergency elsewhere.

Many senior officers have believed for some time that the Administration will inevitably have to draw on the Army National Guard and Reserve as well as the Marines’ standby division. The Administration had hoped to avoid this disruptive measure, giving in only last month when it mobilized 14,000 airmen. A call-up of ground elements could well be more painful because a typical Guard division of some 14,000 men, for instance, is concentrated in one state, whereas the smaller air units are well distributed geographically. Among other possible steps to ease the shortage of trained forces would be an extension of tours of duty in Viet Nam and a lengthening of service for two-year draftees. Such proposals now under consideration are politically hazardous, however, especially in an election year and at a time when Congress is increasingly dyspeptic.

Outwitted. The Senate, particularly, continues to scorch the Administration with criticism. Kentucky Republican Thruston Morton last week accused the Administration of “bland and probably inaccurate statements” about the war. By Morton’s count, the number of antiwar Senators has grown from ten to 25 in the past year. One of that number is Illinois Republican Charles Percy, who is now asking a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet Nam, leaving the South Vietnamese government to survive or expire on its own. Ohio Democrat Stephen Young demanded that Westmoreland be replaced by “a more competent general” because he has been “outwitted and outgeneraled.”

On the House side, Wisconsin Republicans Glenn Davis and Vernon Thomson predicted that Westmoreland would be fired by Easter. The general, after four grueling years in Viet Nam, is due for relief, and Johnson does not rule out his return. Nevertheless, the President insisted: “I have no intention of seeing him leave. I have no plan for him to leave.”

Marching Orders. If recent developments in Viet Nam have failed to rally Congress, the public at large seems to be reacting differently. Opinion polls show that approval of Johnson’s handling of the war remains low. Support of the war itself, however, seems to have risen since the Communists’ Tet offensive. The Gallup survey periodically asks people to classify themselves as hawks or doves. Since January, the self-described hawks have increased from 56%, to 61%, and the doves have decreased from 28%, to 23%. The latest Louis Harris survey found that those expressing general support for the war have increased from 61% in December, to 74%. Yet even Johnson, the indefatigable poll watcher, insisted last week that “you can’t run a war by polls.”

Nor can a war be run—or at least well run—as long as the other side can repeatedly determine when and where the action is to be. Johnson responded to Westmoreland’s latest request for help with determination, giving the marching orders just 48 hours after the general’s message arrived. Yet once again the U.S. was on the defensive, reacting to the enemy’s initiative.