World: MULTIBAFFLEMENT

THE U.S. today is engaged in not one, but two nuclear arms races. Its first and overriding concern, of course, is to deter Soviet aggression and to be capable of massive retaliation if the Russians should attack the West. Washington’s second aim, however, is less strategic than political; it could be called the theory of the massive placebo, since its primary purpose is not to deter the foes of the U.S. but to mollify its friends and discourage the proliferation of nuclear arms. By last week, U.S. placebo planners had succeeded only in frustrating and perplexing the very allies they hoped to please.

Uneasily aware that the increasingly prosperous and powerful nations of Western Europe would not forever accept total U.S. control of nuclear weapons, the U.S. offered more than two years ago to give them a voice in their disposition and use—but left it to Europe to devise a formula. It was not until the Kennedy Administration canceled the bug-ridden Skybolt missile project last December that the U.S. was forced to take the initiative. In place of Skybolt, the Administration reluctantly offered at Nassau to supply Polaris missiles for an independent British submarine force.

Change of Mind. At the same time, the U.S. insisted that the British subs must be “multinational,” that is, they were to be part of a NATO deterrent in which other allies might in time pool their own strike forces, if and when they acquired nuclear weapons. To placate its other European allies, the Kennedy Administration also proposed a “multilateral” force of Polaris submarines, which would be multimanned-and multifmanced—by the U.S. and its partners, each of whom would have a veto over the use of the missiles.

Then, just as the Europeans began to get interested in this scheme, the U.S. abruptly changed its mind and announced that the multilateral force

(MLF) should consist of Polaris-armed surface vessels instead. Though it would be of little strategic value, a 25-ship surface force would cost only $500 million yearly, far less than a submarine fleet. To most Europeans, the strongest argument for the MLF was that it would give West Germany a voice in nuclear strategy and possibly discourage it from developing nuclear weapons of its own, with or without help from France.

Frankly Interested. To peddle the placebo, the Administration plucked old State Department Hand Livingston Merchant from retirement. To his surprise, MLF met with a surprisingly warm reception. Though some allied statesmen hemmed that its cost would prevent them from meeting U.S. requests to strengthen conventional forces, West Germany, Italy and Belgium were frankly interested. Last month Merchant actually succeeded in extracting a commitment from West Germany to pay 40% of the entire cost of the project.

However, last week, word reached NATO headquarters in Paris that Washington had suddenly lost its enthusiasm for the multilateral force. Its change of mind not only left unsolved the political problems that MLF was devised to solve, but even seemed likely to aggravate them, since the U.S. was now reportedly ready to back the idea of independent multinational forces instead, thus encouraging its allies to build their own bombs.

Even if every NATO ally could afford its own nuclear force—and a scientific breakthrough may yet make that feasible—Europe would have only a minute proportion of the total U.S. nuclear armory. But who can predict how it will turn out? In the brave new world of build-your-own-bang, it could even happen that European hydrogen bombs might not fall on the Soviet Union at all, but on the U.S.