U.S. Affairs: Left Wing Triumph

The reverberations of Governor Dever’s keynote speech had scarcely died away, before the Democrats were locked in a bitter struggle. Contests over rival delegations from Texas and Mississippi were made the excuse for the fight—but the cause lay far deeper.

Most of the Southern Democratic leaders resolved many months ago not to encourage a repetition of the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt from the party. Instead, they hoped to mobilize their minority strength in such a way that the majority would listen to their pleas for compromise and consideration on both the platform and the choice of candidates. Their mobilization took two forms: 1) the candidacy of Georgia’s Senator Russell which corralled most of the Southern delegates; 2) moves in various Southern states to leave the way open for revolt if the pressure of Russell’s delegates on the convention was overridden.

The Northern liberals, led by Averell Harriman’s campaign manager, Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., and whooped on by Big Labor, decided to break the Southern bargaining power at the very outset of the convention. They tried to start a fight by proposing a rule (similar to the Republicans’ “fair play” Langlie amendment) which would have prevented the “regular” Texas and Mississippi delegations from voting on which contested delegates should be seated. The Southerners ducked that fight by agreeing to the rule.

The liberals then went much further. Through Michigan’s Senator Blair Moody they offered a resolution refusing seats in the convention to delegations that would not agree to a pledge. The promise: to try “by every honorable” means to see to it that the candidates picked by the national convention were placed on state ballots as Democrats.

Georgia’s Governor Talmadge said flatly that his delegation would make no such pledge because it would be contrary to Georgia statute. Nearly all the Southern delegations, except Alabama and Tennessee, spoke in bitter opposition to the amendment, warning that the party would lose the South to Eisenhower if the liberals persisted in insulting the South.

Even Harry Truman’s warm friend, North Carolina’s Jonathan Daniels, told the convention that the Moody amendment would preclude the party from “the great crusade it is our duty to lead and instead will cause us to godown to almost certain defeat in November.”

Speaking against the Moody resolution, North Carolina’s onetime governor, onetime U.S. Senator Cameron Morrison said that he believed himself to be the oldest man in the convention, “83 in a few days, and a lifelong Democrat.” He concluded: “My God, deliver me from such tyranny as this over the minds and the hearts of the Democrats of this country.”

But F.D.R. Jr. said that he would “guarantee” that if the Moody amendment was adopted “another general will fade away” in November.

The Southerners tried to compromise with a resolution, suggested by Daniels, that all delegates should support the party convention decisions “here and hereafter.” The Northern liberals, out for blood, would have none of it.

Chairman Dever summarily refused a rollcall, ruled the Southern compromise beaten and the Moody amendment carried by voice vote.

The question before the Southerners was whether to lie down gracefully beneath the steamroller or get out of the way with another Southern bolt—either now or in November.

Left wingers did not seem to care whether the Southerners stayed with the party or not. In fact, the C.I.O.’s Walter Reuther had laid down the line in a letter to the resolutions committee. Wrote he: “We do not believe the South will bolt, but if it so chooses, let this happen. Let the realignment of the parties proceed.”