WESTERN EUROPE: Two Schools of Thought

Gingerly the West handed the grenade back to Russia.

At half-hour intervals, charges d’affaires of the U.S., Britain and France called on Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky with replies to the Soviet offer to “neutralize” Germany. Though the notes were identical, Vishinsky gravely heard each one read aloud, as if hearing it for the first time.

It was all very polite, and diplomatically correct. The West expressed doubts that Germany can be unified until free elections include the Soviet zone. The West wondered whether Russia intends to give Germany back the seized lands east of the Oder-Neisse rivers. And the West expressed grave reservations about letting a unified and independent Germany arm itself: arming inside a European army is one thing; arming on its own would be a “backward step.” As France’s Robert Schuman put it the day before: “Never leave Germany to herself is my principle.”

Then the West sat back to wait for West Germany’s response. Well did it know the eagerness that quickens every German’s heart at the prospects of uniting their divided country.*The West, and its good friend Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, are engaged in a great gamble: to give West Germany its independence, and to integrate its troops into a European army before the cries for a free and unified Germany can thwart the plan. So far, 76-year-old Chancellor Adenauer has managed to avoid the accusation that he seeks to keep Germany divided. But his popularity is precarious; the lure of the Soviet siren is strong, and he has but 17 months left in office (if a parliamentary vote of confidence could topple the government in West Germany, Adenauer might well have fallen by now). Last week Adenauer, fighting against time, announced that West Germany would sign a peace “contract” with the Western occupying powers and get its freedom in May.

What did the Russians hope to accomplish in Germany? Though the West spoke with one tongue in its reply, it was actually of two minds.

School No. I believes that Russia’s offer may really be genuine. Most European Socialists belong to this school. So does Walter Lippmann. “We must not .consider the Russian note simply an instrument of propaganda,” said Schuman. “It may mark a change of Russian policy towards Germany.” The argument: fearing West German rearmament, Russia may be willing to surrender its hold on East Germany in return for a unified Germany outside the Western defense system.

School No.1 cautions the West not to reject Russia’s offer solely on grounds which the Russians can do something about, but the West cannot. Thus, Russia might permit free elections, and at a later date hand back the land east of the Oder-Neisse to sweeten the bargain. Then what would the West do? School No. i argues, in effect, that Russia may now be making a tactical retreat.

School No. 2 regards the Russian offer as a phony. The State Department holds this view. The U.S. does not want to get involved in a Four-Power conference with the Russians, believing that a conference would only stalemate Western defense efforts. Remembering Panmunjom, the State Department sees all sorts of catches in Russia’s offer. Thus ‘the existence of organizations hostile to democracy and to the maintenance of peace’ would be prohibited in Germany; in the Soviet satellites of eastern Europe, this reasonable-sounding clause has been interpreted to mean all organizations with Western sympathies.

In their guarded and identical replies, the West managed to avoid, for the moment, a collision between Schools N01 and 2. The next move is Russia’s, and Vishinsky has already telegraphed his punch. Russia says it would consent to Four-Power supervision of Soviet zone elections, but not to U.N. supervision. Four-Power supervision would give Russia a card-staking veto. In this, Russia has a good deal of law on its side, for the Potsdam agreement put Germany not under the U.N. but under the Big Four (although Russia has already violated the Potsdam agreement). Vishinsky’s counteroffer is expected this week.

*One sample of this feeling: West German newspapers frequently refer to the Soviet zone as “Middle Germany,” meaning that East Germany, which Germans eventually hope to get back, is what lies beyond the Oder-Neisse, in satellite Poland.