National Affairs: THE U.S. GETS A POLICY

This Winter’s Events Fix the Goal and Plot the Course

THE biggest news in the world today is that the U.S. has acquired a positive policy to combat Communism. The goal is becoming clear, the basic decisions have been taken and a strategic outline for the free world set.

These decisions are not contained in any official speech or congressional action or secret military report. They were made as democracies usually make high policy in times of crisis: the people get ahead of their leaders; acceptance precedes proposal; operation outruns plan; event shapes intent.

In its issue of Jan. 15, TIME noted (“Giant in a Snare”) that the misnamed “Great Debate” had gotten tangled in pessimistic, defensive perimeters and loops. But events and decisions were already on the march, and the “Great Debate” petered out like a story told by a man who gradually realizes that nobody is listening.

Policy from Below

At what is supposed to be the “policymaking level,” not much happened this winter. But a lot of policy got made.

In December, the Pentagon generals were saying that nothing could be done until somebody else (not they) decided whether the U.S. Army would try to stay in Korea. They were waiting for a clear-cut directive from the White House. It never came. Yet a firm decision was made, largely by the ist Marine Division. When the marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the “unconquerable Chinese hordes,” and embarked for Pusan with their equipment, their wounded and their prisoners, the war in Asia took on a different look. The news stories, pictures and newsreels of the Hungnam action contributed more to forming U.S. policy than all the words in the “Great Debate.” The nation—and the revitalized Eighth Army—now knows that U.S. fighting men will stay in Korea until a better place and a better opportunity is found to punish Communist aggression.

A proposal to send more U.S. troops to Europe is supposedly under discussion. Actually, that decision was made with the public acceptance of Eisenhower’s reports on his survey. Modestly but unmistakably, Ike said what the U.S. had to do. When no outcry against it arose, the argument was over.

Meanwhile, other events have been shaping policy. America’s allies look a lot better than they did when winter began. Again & again, in the Korea news, highly honorable mention of British, Greek, Turkish, Dutch, French units bobs up. At Lake Success, after weeks of discouraging debate, the U.S. delegation pressed its reluctant friends to a vote. Forty-four nations supported the U.S. resolution, against seven, a sign that strong leadership will bring a strong response. In Indo-China, a single man, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, by an act of will, stopped the rot that undermined resistance to Communism.

Shackles from the Past

Recent weeks have brought reminders that the enemy is vulnerable. Vladimir Clementis, a dedicated Communist since his youth and Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia only two years ago, fled from Prague. Two Italian Communist Deputies broke from the party. Hundreds followed them on the simple issue of the defense of Italy if Russia attacked their country. This question has been present since 1945; the pressure of crisis brought it home, thereby split Red ranks.

In & out of the U.S., resolution grows. The Korean war goes well. European rearmament begins to move. Washington is signing arms contracts measured in billions of dollars. The new draft bill is meeting little public opposition. Operations, in a word, are well in train.

The course on which the U.S. has launched itself and its allies has perils. Not the least of them is that the U.S. & Co. will not grasp quickly enough the implications of commitments already made. That is why it is important to know that a policy was made this winter, and to understand it. The question is no longer what the policy will be; it is simply whether the policy will be so directed that it succeeds.

The tide of decision that began when the Chinese came over the Yalu River will not turn. Those who favor other policies (including the Secretary of State’s containment theory) will be swept up on the beach.

The greatest danger comes from those who insist upon discussing present policy solely in terms of the past mistakes of U.S. leaders in dealing with Communism. No doubt, U.S. muddleheadedness at Yalta, Potsdam and Nanking helped to create the present dangers. No doubt it is the legitimate business of partisan politics, of journalism and of history to call attention to mistakes. But to hold back on clearly indicated present action because of the mistakes is to make the future a prisoner of the past. In an atomic age, virtuous Mrs. Lot, looking back on the sinful past, might be turned into something even less attractive than a pillar of salt.

Under the new policy, the chance of succeeding without war depends on how fast and how effectively the U.S. and its friends can move. If they move slowly, the dangers of both war and defeat are increased.

Light from the East

The U.S. program emerging from this winter’s action is a worldwide program, but an examination of it should start where the fighting and the new policy started—in Korea.

The quality of the Chinese troops who hurled back the Americans in North Korea destroyed forever the illusion that it did not matter whether friend or enemy ruled China. These Chinese armies could conquer Asia, perhaps fight in Europe.

In a few weeks another fact about the Chinese armies appeared. They were not invincible. They could be slaughtered by the thousand. So the U.S. decided to leave 80% of its combat ground forces in Korea—an act that recognizes both the seriousness of the Chinese Communist menace to Asia and the fact that the menace can be dealt with.

The army in Korea depends upon Japan, which is still disarmed. The anti-Communist position in East Asia is equally dependent on keeping Japan’s industry and manpower out of Communist hands. The threat to the Eighth Army’s rear calls for a Japan able to defend itself. To that end, John Foster Dulles began negotiations in Tokyo. As long as Japan is disarmed, the U.S. will have to protect it.

Last summer the U.S. State Department acted as if it was about ready to let Red China into the U.N. and to give it Formosa. Individuals in the department may still favor both concessions. Nevertheless, U.S. policy is setting firmly against them. The Reds themselves have tied up U.N. admission and the possession of Formosa so tightly with their Korean invasion that the U.S. cannot give way without abandoning Korea and, with it, the whole anti-Communist position in Asia. Slowly but certainly, the decision to stay in Korea will lead the U.S. toward cooperation with half a million anti-Communist Chinese on Formosa in an effort to liberate China.

As to Indo-China, that helpless feeling has vanished. There as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the U.S. will give active support to anti-Communist forces.

India’s naive “neutrality” serves as a reminder of how much hard political work needs to be done before Asia is in a position to defend itself against Communism. That the U.S. sees patience as a necessary element in the process is evident from the nation’s sympathy toward Nehru’s request for U.S. grain.

The vast area between India and Europe represents oil, a necessity. Europe cannot defend itself without the oil of the Middle East. As the U.S. becomes increasingly involved in the defense of Europe, it will increasingly recognize that the Middle East must be defended as if it were part of Europe. Using the present strong point, Turkey, as an anchor, it will try to build an effective will to resist Communism in Greece, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia.

Until recently, Africa was the most neglected danger zone, although it contains the world’s best source of uranium and might become a main battleground if either Europe or the Middle East is lost. By establishing a screen of air bases across North Africa (TIME, Feb. 19), the U.S. has given practical recognition to the need for building up the defenses of that continent.

Pressure in the West

Future U.S. policy in Europe seems at first glance to be still obscured by unanswered questions: German rearmament, Spain, Yugoslavia, etc. But here again this winter’s events, decisions and shifts shape the general answers from which specific policies will flow.

During 1950 the U.S. gradually realized that ECA was both successful and inadequate. It made Europe “economically viable” but still defenseless against the Red army and its allies, the Communist Parties of Western Europe. Eisenhower’s trip and its American aftermath settled U.S. acceptance of responsibility for leadership of the military defense of Europe.

Such a defense is impossible and the U.S. commitment a criminal waste of American men unless France is rapidly rearmed. Former U.S. complacency with the foot-dragging of weak French governments cannot be reconciled with the new U.S. commitments to Europe. Washington will have to press the French into rearmament, and when that is begun, French fears of German rearmament are more likely to diminish.

Spain and Yugoslavia have the two largest armies in Europe, outside the Kremlin’s control. Many Americans regard both countries as undesirable “bedfellows.” The Korea experience has made the bedfellow metaphor look silly. Chiang Kai-shek was regarded as an ineligible bedfellow, but a Chiang Kai-shek regime in China today would look mighty desirable to the Americans now fighting Chinese Communists in Korea. As the U.S. begins defense operations in Europe, the unsavory origins and deeds of the Franco regime will seem less & less relevant to the main question: What can Franco contribute to the common cause?

A similar shift has already taken place concerning Yugoslavia. Through 1950, a prime mission of Soviet diplomats and spies in Europe and Washington was to find out what the U.S. would do if the Kremlin’s stooges should invade Yugoslavia. The Russians could not believe the truth: that the U.S. had made no decision. At the “policymaking level,” the decision on Yugoslavia is probably still pending. Yet the West’s attitude is obviously stiffening against the growing threat to Yugoslavia by Russia’s satellites. The British government, which has been in close touch with the U.S. on Yugoslavia, last week issued a semi-official warning to the Kremlin stooges.

The Operational Pull

Just as actual war in Korea is crystallizing U.S. thinking about Asia, so active U.S. leadership in building the defense of Europe will recast U.S. policy there. When several hundred thousand Americans are sitting under the Red army’s guns, the U.S. will hardly turn its back on any chance to weaken the enemy or add to its own strength. It will not be in a position to ignore opportunities to subvert Communist-dominated governments by propaganda and otherwise. If only out of elementary military caution, the U.S. will have to begin insisting that France get its Communist Party under control and off the backs of the NATO forces. Facing the Red army, the U.S. will no longer refuse to form military units from the hundreds of thousands of anti-Communist refugees in Europe.

In other words, operations which have already begun will define a policy and pull the U.S. & Co. along toward a goal.

What goal?

In so far as the U.S. had an aim before this winter, it was containment. This meant that Russian (but not Chinese) Communists would be held to their 1945 bounds. Containment was supposed to continue indefinitely. A distinguished British ambassador and student of Russia hoped that the Kremlin would eventually “learn manners,” like a new boy at a good school. A distinguished American student of Russia hoped that internal dissension would flare up when Stalin dies.

The containment policy sickened as the free world realized that there was more wrong with Communism than its etiquette, and that it was probably strong enough to survive Stalin. Containment was doomed the day Americans realized that the Kremlin could make and deliver atomic bombs.

As long as the U.S. felt more or less safe, it could tolerate the idea of “coexistence” with countries dominated by an ideology the U.S. hates. But Americans are not going in for indefinite coexistence at the price they are now paying: constant dread of atomic bombing, $70 billion a year for defense, and its youth in uniform. When it began to mobilize this winter, the U.S. was not mobilizing for indefinite containment. It was mobilizing to end the present intolerable state of danger.

Conditions for Coexistence

This does not mean that it is necessarily mobilizing for war, much less for the unconditional surrender of the last Communist. The complete extirpation of Communism is a proper object of prayer, but hardly of international policy. The U.S. can readily accept what might be called “conditional coexistence” with Communist governments. The general proviso is that the Communist governments shall not be able to lash out on a campaign of world conquest. Particular conditions would include 1) international inspection and control of atomic arms, 2) dismantling of police and slave states.

All actions to resist or diminish the aggressive power of world Communism are protected by an umbrella—the superiority of the anti-Communist world in atomic bombs and in the long-range ability to equip and sustain modern armies, navies and air forces. The U.S. superiority in atomic bombs is probably at least 10 to 1. The superiority of the free world over the Communist world in steel production is 4 to 1, in oil 10 to 1, in aluminum 6 to 1.

Painful knowledge of this superiority has for five years prevented Russia from unleashing her vastly superior ground forces upon Europe. Both the Kremlin and Washington have long understood (without any official statement) that the West will use its A-bombs if the Red army marches into Western Germany. This winter’s shifts in the U.S. attitude give the Kremlin reason to fear that other flagrant aggressions by the Red army will call forth the full power of U.S. retaliation. But the Kremlin knows it can still start brush fires which the U.S. and its allies will have to handle on a local, not a global, basis. Korea brought home to the U.S. the realization that in the long run it could not build enough fire engines to cope with all the brush fires world Communism could start; eventually, the arsonist’s ability to start fires had to be ended or limited at the source. This, in turn, meant that containment as a U.S. policy was dead and had been replaced by an intention to roll back the power of world Communism.

This makes for increasingly hard choices in the Kremlin. The Russians can strike now, overrun Europe and Asia, and see their own cities destroyed by A-bombs. Or they can build toward effective A-bomb equality while the free world builds the defenses of Europe and Asia.

If the atomic umbrella continues to protect a united free world, if the U.S. strengthens Europe and Asia fast enough, if Communism is rolled back, the West can confront the Kremlin with the conditions for peaceful coexistence.

This is the policy and the goal (both unstated) which were formulated this winter.