National Affairs: If Fight We Must

Brisk and smiling, President Truman strode into the House of Representatives this week to face a joint meeting of the Congress and read his annual message on the State of the Union. He was speaking to the critics of his foreign policy—though not always too clearly—and over their heads, more clearly, to the “Soviet imperialists” who were trying to subvert the world with their “destructive works.”

Speaking with a resoluteness and a crisp delivery he had seldom shown before, Harry Truman laid down the course for meeting the Soviet peril “wisely . . . bravely . . . honorably,” as he saw it: economic assistance “where it can be effective,” military assistance “to countries which want to defend themselves,” full support of U.S. obligations under the Atlantic Treaty. Said the President: “Strategically, economically and morally, the defense of Europe is part of our own defense.”

No Appeasement. The need for help was mutual. “If Western Europe were to fall to Soviet Russia it would double the Soviet supply of coal and triple the Soviet supply of steel.” The loss of Asia and Africa to Russia would mean the loss of many raw materials, “including uranium.”

Once in command of Europe and Asia, “the Soviet Union could impose its demands on the world . . . The Soviet Union does not have to attack the United States to secure domination of the world. It can achieve its ends by isolating us and swallowing up our allies. Therefore, even if we were craven enough to abandon our ideals, it would be disastrous for us to withdraw from the community of free nations . . . No one nation can find protection in a selfish search for a safe haven from the storm.”

This did not mean that he had abandoned all hope of peace. “We will support the United Nations . . . We are willing, as we have always been, to negotiate honorable settlements with the Soviet Union. But we will not engage in appeasement.” Korea was an example of that. The U.S. was fighting to keep it from becoming “a slave state.” Korea, he said, “is a symbol.”

The Long Pull. Then he launched into a description of just how the U.S. was preparing to meet its responsibilities.

His State of the Union speech in. 1950 had been a vision of a rosy future—the year 2000 when the national output would be a trillion dollars and the average family income would be $1 2,450. He expressed the conviction then that peace would be achieved not by arms but by an appeal to reason. Now, the future which he laid out was decidedly grey—a future of “the long pull.” Said the President: “We do not know how long Communist aggression will threaten the world.”

The U.S. was building its Army, Navy and Air Force to an active strength of 3,500,000 men—still a far cry from total mobilization. The U.S. must build a great arsenal. “Our stocks of weapons are low. In many cases those on hand are not the most modern.” What he recommended was no explosive outpouring of the nation’s tremendous industrial power but a steady widening of capacity. In 1940, Franklin Roosevelt demanded—and got in 32 months—the miracle of 50,000 planes a year. Harry Truman’s program called for a U.S. “capacity to produce” 50,000 military planes a year (present production: around 3,000), 35,000 tanks a year (present production: a few hundred). “We are not ordering that many planes or tanks,” he said, “and we hope we may never have to but we mean to be able to turn them out if we need them.”

Unanimity Not Expected. He put the needs for the long pull into a ten-point legislative program: new military appropriations; extension and revision of the Selective Service Act; more foreign military and economic aid; “a major increase in taxes”; the means for increasing the number of doctors and nurses; new executive authority to expand production and to stabilize prices, wages and rents.

Even Harry Truman realized that the Fair Deal was no more than a fading echo from the past. He paid his respects to it only in a few short paragraphs calling for “rounding out our system of social insurance,” improved protection “against unemployment and old age,” insurance against sickness and “the high cost of medical care,” educational aid to the states.

To the Congressmen who listened and who had already sharply criticized his policies, he said: “I ask the Congress for unity in these crucial days . . . I do not ask or expect unanimity . . . Let us debate these issues, but let every man among us weigh his words and deeds . . . Let us all stand together as Americans.” For the world he had a final promise: “We will fight, if fight we must.”