ARMED FORCES: After Korea

With the present holes in Hershey’s draft dragnet, the armed forces had little hope of reaching the 3,000,000 men the President had ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have under arms by next June. When the Korean war began, there were 1,400,000 men & women in the armed forces. Since then, 400,000 draftees, reserves and guardsmen have been called up. But General Omar Bradley estimated that the services would fall short of the June goal by about 10%. Pentagon pessimists thought it would be twice that.

Pessimist or optimist, nobody was talking of cutting back in a post-Korea letdown. Nothing that they saw beyond Korea had changed, and neither had their plans nor the urgency of rearmament. Phase by phase, here is how U.S. preparedness would probably look:

Army: By next June, up from present eleven regular divisions to twelve, plus six regimental combat teams and four full-strength National Guard divisions. The Army had about 591,700 men when the Korean campaign started. Chief of Staff Joe Collins talks of building up to 18 divisions and 1,400,000 men by 1952. Men can be trained 50% faster than they can be provided with modern tanks, self-propelled artillery and radar fire directors. Another Army division will likely be sent to Germany by Christmas; if all goes well, it will probably be a division released from Korea. (Actually, all the Army’s better-trained troops are now committed in Korea, including elements of the 82nd Airborne, and the few armored units.)

Navy: By next June, 500,000 men and more than 900 ships, including ten large carriers, two battleships (the Missouri, now in service, and the New Jersey, now being demothballed), 15 cruisers, 200 destroyers, 75 submarines.

Air Force: From 48 groups and 411,000 men, the pre-Korea strength, to around 60 groups with 568,000 men by June. Distant goal: 95 groups.

Marines: From 74,000 men pre-Korea to 166,000 by June. To be in operation by June: two full-strength divisions, one brigade and 18 air squadrons.

What military leaders feared most was a post-Korean public clamor to release reservists now in the services, and to taper off on the draft. They were dead against such ideas. Another question that worried them (but not nearly so much): How long can you keep a big armed force up to snuff if nothing happens?