Thumb on Windpipe

Before the United Nations forces made last week’s landing at Inchon, this was the situation:

For six weeks the North Koreans around the Pusan perimeter had maintained heavy pressure on Lieut. General Walton Walker’s line. In spite of intensive and thorough bombing and strafing of supply lines from the air, the Reds were still getting enough to the southern front to hold the initiative. The rate of U.S. buildup inside the Pusan perimeter was so slow that, short of a complete North Korean collapse, Walker had little prospect of launching a decisive offensive.

The Inchon invasion was aimed at Seoul, through which runs the only good railroad and the best highway from North Korea to the Pusan perimeter. If the U.N. force could put its thumb on this windpipe of the North Korean forces, the Reds would soon run out of ammunition and other supplies. The Inchon invasion faced the North Korean command with a perilous choice: either pull divisions out of the Pusan perimeter in an effort to hold Seoul, or stay in the south and continue to fight Walker while Red supplies dwindled away.

The Inchon landing was in the great American tradition developed in World War II. It swept around the sea anchor of the enemy flank and struck at his most vulnerable spot. The combined use of land, sea and air power has become the outstanding U.S. military characteristic.

The initial phases of the strike for Seoul were brilliantly successful. Strategic success seemed highly probable; whether victory was far or near depended on whether Walker had enough men in the south to take advantage of his opportunity to seize the initiative.