THE CAMPAIGN: The Choice

Like most campaigns, the 1952 presidential campaign began with polite debate and an implied treaty of mutual respect. Last week the air waves crackled with television scowls and such words as “bigotry”, “fraud”, and “lies.” In its climax, the 1952 campaign was a strident and bitter conflict.

The conflict was the most predictable result of all. The three months of campaigning were part of a crisis in U.S. history, part of a deep struggle to align the U.S. with the responsibilities, opportunities and dangers of the newest phase of its existence—world leadership in the cold war with Communism. The presidential election would be a fraud itself if it did not somehow reflect this conflict.

The struggle was mirrored in millions of individual voters whom the pollsters classified as “undecided.” Their indecision was not necessarily based on a supposition that the two parties had fought to a draw on the issues. Rather, one party had made headway on one set of issues, the other party on another set. The doubt arises over which set will most influence the voters.

The Republicans have made headway with their case that Ike Eisenhower is better equipped to deal with the Korean war, the Russians and the problem of Communists in Government. The Democrats have made headway with their case that the party of Franklin Roosevelt,

Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson is more likely to be economically good for the individual.

“By well over 2-1,” reported Pollster Elmo Roper this week, “voters feel that they personally would have been worse off financially had the Republicans been in office during the last 20 years. By an identical margin they think they will be better off under the Democrats in the next four years.”

On the other hand, Roper found that two-thirds of the U.S. deplore the Korean war stalemate. By a 3-1 count, this group thinks Eisenhower can solve the problem better than his opponent. “Of all the issues,” Roper wrote, “Korea is clearly Eisenhower’s strongest asset.” Half the people have misgivings over Communist infiltration at home, and think that it is a crucial problem for the next administration. Of these, most (3-1) think the Republicans can best handle it.

On the periphery, corruption in Government is a less important issue than it started out to be (but a majority of those who are worried about it doubt that Stevenson could clean it up). The high cost of living has crept into kitchen doors while big paychecks march in the front: the pollsters think many a housewife is ready to vote Republican to hold down prices and that a larger proportion of women than men will vote for Dwight Eisenhower.

Franklin Roosevelt’s great political achievement was to keep together on election days the most conservative large group in the nation (Southerners) and the least conservative (the big Northern cities). This extraordinary formula subjected the Democratic Party to increasing wear & tear—and the snapping point may have arrived. Eisenhower is obviously going to get the biggest Southern popular vote of any Republican in history, but all of it may be “wasted” if he does not carry a Southern state. It is also obvious that Eisenhower has dented big-city majorities on the Communist and world leadership issues, but he may not have cut in deeply enough to carry the big key states he needs.

Adlai Stevenson has made an eloquent campaign on his party’s politically successful past. It turned out that Truman was, as Truman said, the key to the Democratic campaign, and Stevenson inherits both the liabilities and the assets of the Truman legacy.

Under Dwight Eisenhower’s leadership, his party is more firmly united than it has been for a generation—and that unity, too, has liabilities as well as assets. Since his party has been out of power for 20 years, Eisenhower, in the nature of the case, is running on his own record rather than his party’s.