POLICIES & PRINCIPLES: A Balance for Peace

POLICIES & PRINCIPLES

Ferdinand Eberstadt is a wise and hard-headed financier, a wartime vice chairman of the War Production Board. In a recent speech in Seattle, Eberstadt made some wise and hardheaded points about U.S. foreign policy and the state of the world. Said he:

It is easy to blame the whole tragic business on Russia. Without doubt the men in the Kremlin are largely responsible for our predicament. But Russia’s intransigence is only part of the story. We ourselves, I believe, bear a very real share of the responsibility for the present situation because, though inspired by the noblest ideals, we have failed to come to grips with the practical realities of power, and more specifically, to use an old phrase, with the realities of the “balance of power.”

Hard Facts. We ignored, or disregarded, one of the hard facts of international life, namely that, in the absence of overwhelming predominance of one nation (as existed under the Roman Empire and as presently exists in the Western Hemisphere), or of a world organization capable of laying down the rules and of determining and enforcing justice and law and order among nations, a reasonable balance of power amongst the nations is, has been and always will be essential to the maintenance of peace.

To have destroyed that balance before an adequate substitute has been created was to invite aggression and possibly war. That is exactly what we did, and . . . that is the main reason why we are where we are . . . We were disgusted at the past, we longed for something new, something better for the future. Associating the balance of power with the past, we wanted no part of it…

It may not be irrelevant to point out that in both world wars the captains of our ship of state were men probably more concerned with making history than with following its lessons.

Childish Faith. It is in the interest of this country, and of all other peace-and freedom-loving countries, to restore the balance among nations that was so improvidently destroyed. In support of this thesis, permit me to propose a simple question. Suppose that as the war drew to a close, we had offered Mr. Stalin whatever he wanted. What would he have been likely to request?

I submit that his answers would have been about as follows:

1. Destruction of Germany, so that they might communize that state and achieve their objectives in Western Europe and in the Balkans . . .

2. Destruction of Japan, so that they might achieve their aims in the Far East.. .

3. Demobilization of our own powerful military establishment lest we raise effective objections to the course which they intended to pursue . . .

4. Disclosure of the secret of the atom bomb in circumstances where they could build up a stockpile of bombs while we were foreclosed from doing so.

Well, with childish faith and quite unmindful of the consequences, we granted Mr. Stalin three out of four of these requests. We destroyed Germany and thus opened up that country and its former sphere of influence to Russian infiltration . . . We destroyed Japan and thus opened up that part of the world to Russia’s aggressive designs. We demobilized our powerful military establishment.

In a word, by destroying states essential to it, we destroyed the balance of power upon two continents . . . To the cool-headed and skillful manipulations of our calculating former ally, we innocently responded in exactly the way they wanted us to. I submit to you that in the destruction of Germany and Japan and in the headlong demobilization of our military establishment we upset the balance of power to such an extent that unless it can be restored promptly and effectively war with Russia is likely.

Selfish Interests. Germany and Japan . . . should be made into going concerns. If we have in fact adopted the policy of making peace with Germany and Japan, we should make that fact clear to our people and to the world, and we should focus on it—not drift but drive toward it—without wasting too much precious time “exploring possibilities” or fussing with “procedure difficulties.” The urgency is great and the time is short . . .

I would like to distinguish clearly between a program which looks toward rearming Germany and Japan on the basis of opportunism and expediency, and the program which I suggest—which is to restore these two nations to positions of responsibility and respectability in the family of nations. The former is a make shift on the purely military level. The latter is a long-term political program for peace . . .

Does any one seriously believe that under any arrangement the Germans and Japanese will fight our battles for us? Certainly not. But they will fight to defend their own homelands and their own national security and their own interests. To the extent that these are in harmony with our objectives in restraining Russia, they constitute an effective counterweight to the present serious imbalance.

Is it likely that the Korean incident would have occurred if Japan had been restored to a strong and independent condition? How long would the Russian sword hanging over the head of Western Europe continue to dangle if Germany were on her feet?

Open Eyes. Finally, let us consider certain specifications of the peace which I propose. First of all, we should see that Germany is firmly tied into the other nations of Western Europe and becomes a full partner in the North Atlantic pact. The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. We must not permit Germany again to get into a position where she can play the West and East against each other as a preliminary to attacking one after the other. The Schuman plan offers real assurance in this direction. The most effective way to prevent Germany from making another attack against Western Europe is to consolidate her heavy industry in the Ruhr with that of Belgium, France and Luxembourg under an autonomous authority controlled by the nations of Western Europe . . .

During the transition period, while Germany and Japan are recovering to the point where they can protect themselves and their own interests, we should, and in fact will have to maintain strong forces in those two countries—ironically enough, not essentially to punish or control a former enemy, but to restrain a former ally. However, just as soon as Germany and Japan are able to protect their own security and to take care of their own affairs, we should withdraw our troops, retaining only such military forces and establishments as in the interest of mutual security are freely and voluntarily accorded us.

If we restore Germany and Japan, we must do so with our eyes open to the risks involved, but firmly determined that we will not again, as we did before, permit them to build up their military power for aggression, and be prepared, if need arises, to tip the scales against them.

I believe that we should continue to support the United Nations in every possible way. In line with that policy, the restoration of a reasonable balance of power in the world, including the admission of Germany and Japan as full partners in the United Nations with seats on the Security Council, would constitute the greatest practical step forward that could be taken” toward strengthening the United Nations and making it a powerful and effective instrument for the maintenance of peace.