World Battlefronts: BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC: Pause for Estimates

Both the U.S. and Japan took stock of the war in the Orient.

Facing certain defeat, the Japs could only take steps to ward off the final assault as long as possible. Example: the Japs decided that their aluminum industry must be re-geared to the use of low-grade ore found in their own islands and in Korea, Manchuria and north China; fine bauxite from Malaya and the islands would soon be cut off by the Allied recapture of the southern islands.

The U.S., confident of ultimate victory, saw its progress seriously retarded by defeats in China. Everywhere, the key question was asked: how long will it take to defeat Japan after V-E day? After picking the best brains in the State, War & Navy Departments and the Federal Economic Administration, the OWI came up with an answer: “One and a half to two years . . . is considered an absolute minimum.” Other U.S. authorities recalled Vice Admiral Frederick J. Home’s warning of a year ago: the U.S. must prepare to fight the war in the Orient until 1949 if need be.

Discounting Future Gains. Why should the U.S. look at the same set of facts as the enemy and also find cause for concern? Basically, it was because the U.S. had always counted on receiving substantial help from General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell’s Chinese legions and Major General Claire L. Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force in reaching the China coast from the east. Now the China coast, and U.S. air bases within 400 miles of it, were being lost, perhaps for the duration. Many a U.S. strategist had taken for granted that soon after General MacArthur fulfilled his promise to return to the Philippines, an entry could be forced into China through a port or ports opposite Luzon (such asHong Kong or Swatow).

Thus the U.S. was concerned over short-term prospects ; Japan was concerned over the long-term outlook. MacArthur’s return to the Philippines had still not been jeopardized. But advances beyond that had been made immeasurably more difficult by Japan’s powerhouse campaign to cut China through the middle.

With no friendly army or air force to give assault forces an assist on the China beaches, it may well be necessary for the U.S. to stage the China coastal operation from Formosa — and Formosa, 225 miles long, mountainous, fortified by the Japs since 1895, can be captured only by a bloody major campaign.

Hirohito’s Hosts. Japan’s Army today is at least as strong as it was on Dec. 7, 1941 — perhaps stronger. Its 4,000,000 soldiers are organized in 70 combat divisions of about 20,000 men each, plus almost twice as many reserves and service troops. The 70 divisions are distributed: eight in the home islands; ten in Burma, Thailand, Indo-China and Malaya; 20 in the Philip pines, the Netherlands Indies and Pacific islands; 32 in China and Manchuria. In southeast Asia the Japs also have 70,000 quisling troops — Burmese, Malays, Thais and a few Indians. Militarily these are an unknown quantity.

But back of its first-line outfits, the Jap Army has 2,000,000 men fit for military service who have not yet been called; it has also 1,500,000 aged 17 to 20 who are not yet subject to the draft (as contrasted with the U.S., already calling up 1 8-year-olds). And its population increase supplies a new class of 200,000 to 250,000 spring-legged fanatical recruits each year —more than enough to cancel combat losses on the 1941-44 scale.

Contrary to popular legend, there is no reason to believe that the Japanese troops who will defend the Philippines, Formosa, China or even Japan proper will be better fighting men than those encountered on thei Pacific islands : the latter have been largely Imperial marines, rated as good as the best of the Jap Army.

But another vital factor will make the going tougher: as Allied forces reach Japan’s inner fortress, they will come up against Jap armies which will be in a position to throw in reserves. On isolated Pacific islands. U.S. naval power cut off all hope of reinforcement. On big islands like Luzon, and in China and Japan, the enemy will be able to make good his initial losses and greatly prolong the fight.

Ships of the Line. The Jap Navy is stronger in battleships but weaker in other categories than at the time of Pearl Harbor. Some authorities credit it with three new battleships mounting nine 16-inch guns; Jane’s Fighting Ships (new edition) credits it with six. That means a Jap battle line of eleven to 14 units. (The OWI struck a compromise, listing ten to 13.) The U.S. has 23 battleships in commission; Britain has at least 15 ; France has one modern ship of the line, the Richelieu, and one veteran; cobelligerent Italy (see FOREIGN NEWS) has two new ships and four modernized oldtimers.

In aircraft carriers, it matters not whether Japan has ten or a dozen, plus a dozen or a score of escort carriers; the U.S. alone has such vast superiority in seaborne air power that the chief problem is how to come to grips with the Japs. In cruisers and destroyers Japan is similarly outclassed.

Of land-based aircraft, Japan may have 5,000 or more first-line planes, and a factory output of as much as 1,500 planes a month — many of which, the Japs admit, are defective when delivered. But only about half the 1,500 are combat types, and U.S. air fleets have destroyed enemy aircraft recently at a rate of better than 750 a month. Japan must hoard air power for defense of its heartland.

Hot Steel. Japan’s war lords know that their upstart industry and slave labor cannot hope to match Allied production. But the war lords are pinning their forlorn hopes on other factors to save them, for years to come: 1) Russian neutrality; 2) geography, which lengthens Allied sup ply lines as it shortens Japan’s; 3) stock piles of vital raw materials, high enough to last up to two years; 4) Allied war weariness, and revulsion against casualties heavier than in Europe.

None of these, nor any combination of these, will serve the enemy for more than a limited time. But to compress the limits on that time will require the expenditure of American and Allied effort out of all proportion to the book strength of the enemy.