TIME’S Paris bureau cabled last week: “It is a sober fact that there is only a small chance that France can avoid a limited form of civil war.”
This grim prospect had been brought closer by the galloping inflation, by the political bankruptcy of the Queuille government, and by the Communist-called coal strikes which were costing France $3,000,000 a day—almost exactly as much as she was getting from EGA. Overshadowing these factors was the growing realization of Frenchmen that the world conflict between Russia and the West could not be sidestepped. Frenchmen now applied this new view of the world struggle to their own national problems. The bright fiction of a “third force” between Communism and its opponents was dying hard —but it was dying.
No Miracles. Last week the demoralization of the government was almost complete. At a steel works near Nancy, 300 of the government’s republican security guards were forced to withdraw after a two-hour pitched battle with 6,000 strikers.
Henri Queuille was hoping for a miracle. What he would actually get, if some of his colleagues had their way, would be a stab in the back. A plan was afoot to bring the Communists back into the government. Chief instigator was that old darling of the U.S. press, Edouard Herriot, President of the Assembly. Following Herriot’s lead were about 30 Socialist deputies, a score of M.R.P. deputies and a few Radicals. One of this group explained their ideas:
“We know the Third Force has failed. It is evident there can be no stable majority without either the Communists or De Gaulle. We don’t want to hand all the power over to either, so we are forced to share it. But De Gaulle has condemned us utterly, and will not share power with us. The Communists are more supple, better tacticians, more like politicians with whom you can make a trade. If we can get them into the government without giving them important posts, we can make them our prisoners. Their presence in the government will prevent them from starting strikes and ruining the French economy. When we are prosperous again we can kick the Communists out.”
No Strapontins. So far, the Communist spider had not walked into the fly’s parlor. Communist Boss Maurice Thorez, however, was maneuvering so that he could take full advantage of an offer from Herriot & Co. whenever they were willing to pay his price. His present tactics called for grèves tournantes—revolving strikes —which hit one industry after another, creating enough damage to offset ECA help to France but limited enough to hold the door open to overtures from Herriot & Co.
As the price of going back into the government, Thorez demanded one of the two ministries which would give him an advantage if civil war came—the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior. Said he: “We’ll take no strapontins” (collapsible aisle seats given to standees in French theaters). When told by Herriot that he could have neither ministry, Thorez said: “Talk to me again in three weeks. On verra bien” (We’ll see).
When Charles de Gaulle heard of the Herriot-Thorez discussions, he quickly made his position clear: “If the separatists [the R.P.F. name for Communists] were to enter what is conventionally known as the government of France, from that moment legitimacy would be ended . . . If the wretches were to invite into the government the men who do not play the game of France, then who would dare to say that we would still be in a state of legality?”
No Pushover. De Gaulle was clearly saying that he would try to take power if the Reds were put in charge of the army or the police. Unless Queuille’s miracle happens, France will have to choose between Communism and Gaullism. That choice could come about in three ways:
1) The Communists might return to the government, and De Gaulle decide to take power by force. In this event, De Gaulle could count on most of the army and about half the police. This would be the worst thing that could happen, because De Gaulle would be in the position of the revolutionary. A section of French opinion would be hesitant and confused. Fighting might be protracted, but De Gaulle would win.
2) De Gaulle might return legally to office and the Communists decide to revolt. In this event, De Gaulle would have all the army and most of the police, plus overwhelming support from public opinion. De Gaulle would win quickly.
3) De Gaulle might return and the Communists decide not to revolt, but to launch guerrilla warfare with strikes and sabotage. In this event the Communist Party would be outlawed and might then revolt.
Most Frenchmen finally faced these choices last week, knowing, as one said, that they had been living in a fool’s paradise. Last winter when they put down the Communist strikes they showed that they did not want the Communists in power; but they were not willing to destroy what they were willing to resist. They even left Communists in many key positions. Last week, when France signed with other Western Europe nations a military pact whose sole purpose was protection against Communism, France still had a Communist, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, at the head of her atomic research. This dreamy escapism could not go on forever. It was the Communist Party, not U.S. pressure, which had nudged France awake.
Awake, France was no pushover.
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