• U.S.

CONFERENCES: The Trouble with Horned Toads

4 minute read
TIME

Sweltering Paris was deserted except for the Boy Scouts, who were holding their first Jamboree (see EDUCATION) since the war, and the economists, who were trying to implement the “Marshall approach.” The Scouts got on fine; their favorite pastime was the barter of their various treasures—scouting insignia, penknives, hats, fountain pens, a flute, a flock of horned toads (brought by delegates from Texas). Essentially, the economists from 16 European nations were engaged in the same activity.

The Hothouse. The Norwegians wanted textiles, offered timber and wood pulp in exchange. Belgium wanted wheat for plate glass. Italy wanted metals for fruit and human labor. Every morning a truck delivered to the economists more than half a ton of paper which by nightfall was covered with figures and graphs recording Europe’s needs and resources. In the glass-topped Grand Palais, which looked and felt like a hothouse, electric fans set small siroccos swirling over the delegates’ heads. The temperature neared 100° F. Sighed a policeman: “It sure takes guts to work in there.”

So far so good. But this week, the conference’s cooperation committee would have to ask the nations to scale down some demands, increase some offers. Nearly all snags had their roots in two commodities—coal and steel.

The Black Valley. Only the black and blasted valley of the Ruhr could produce the coal and steel to make .the Marshall approach work. Other conferences were discussing the Ruhr. If these failed, the 16-nation conference in the Grand Palais could not succeed, and they, in turn, could amount to little unless the Marshall approach actually resulted in a workable program.

A few blocks away from the sweating planners in the hothouse, U.S. Under Secretary of State Will Clayton, U.S. Ambassador to France Jefferson Caffery and U.S. Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas were in secret session with French Foreign Minister Bidault. Their object: to get Bidault’s O.K. for raising the industrial output of the Ruhr. This week, in London, U.S. and British diplomats, meeting more publicly with the French, will try the same thing.

Meanwhile, from Germany itself last week came a news picture showing Germans gathering up potatoes left over by a potato-digging machine (see cut). That picture epitomized the current waste of Europe’s most productive workers; the Marshall approach could not work until such Germans were making agricultural machines instead of gleaning potatoes.

In Washington, U.S. and British experts were discussing ways & means of boosting Ruhr coal production. The Brit ish seemed willing to defer, in the interest of immediate full production, their plan to socialize the Ruhr. In return they wanted a reduction in their share of the occupation bill. Ruhr production cannot be boosted until the Ruhr gets more food, housing, mining equipment, freight cars and locomotives. The British, who have spent 11% of their U.S. loan on German occupation costs, want a better deal than the 50-50 agreement with the U.S. on the cost of running western Germany.

The Circle. At still another conference in Washington, the U.S. and Britain were discussing the British crisis, partly caused by the German occupation costs and other British commitments abroad.

In addition to relief from the 50-50 agreement, the British delegation, headed by Sir William Strang, was expected to ask Washington for relaxation on certain clauses in the loan agreement. The British wanted to continue empire trade preference and to protect dwindling dollar balances by restrictions on the convertibility of sterling into dollars. At best, such concessions could only relieve, not cure, Britain’s economic ills. The circle of economic conferences came back to Paris’ Grand Palais and the Marshall approach because of one appalling fact about the postwar world economy: Britain and other nations last year bought $21 billion worth of goods in the U.S.; the U.S. bought from them only $8 billion worth. No world “dollar famine” existed—yet; but everyone realized that the trade imbalance between the U.S. and the rest of the world would create a disastrous crisis unless the Marshall approach raised production in other countries.

Even the Texas Boy Scouts in Paris knew that it was no good for them to have horned toads unless the other boys had enough penknives to swap.

More Must-Reads from TIME

Contact us at letters@time.com