ARMY & NAVY: Pacific Bastions

ARMY & NAVY Pacific Bastions

In Berlin, Harry Truman caused many an eyebrow to be raised when he declared: “There is not one piece of territory . . . that we want out of this war.” Last week, in his address to the nation, the President backtracked. He made it clear that he was not talking about military bases “necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace.” The U.S., he said, will have “bases which our military experts deem to be essential.”

The President named none. But a postwar blueprint of U.S. needs in the Pacific has already been drawn. It envisions five main land, sea and air establishments, plus a ring of satellite bases.

Three of the proposed big bases are prewar U.S. possessions: the Panama Canal Zone, the Hawaiian Islands, the Aleutians (probable base: Adak). The others: i) the entire Mariana group (Guam, Saipan, Tinian, 12 smaller islands) which taken together may be the U.S. Navy’s postwar headquarters; 2) a Central Philippines base, probably on Leyte Gulf, which the Filipinos would undoubtedly grant.

Besides these mainstays, the blueprint calls for a network of secondary bases crisscrossing the Pacific: Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Eniwetok, Kwajalein, the Palaus (all paid for in U.S. blood); eastern Samoa, Wake, Midway (already U.S. possessions) ; Truk and Manus.

Of these, only Okinawa, Truk and Manus are suitable for important naval usage. The Jap base at Truk, perhaps the Pacific’s best landlocked anchorage, would presumably be acquired by what Truman called “arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.” Postwar rights to Manus, an Australian mandate in the Admiralties which the Seabees built into a major fleet repair station, would be subject to negotiation, would undoubtedly entail reciprocal rights to one or more U.S. bases.