World Battlefronts: The Big Apple

The last Japanese defense line on south ern Okinawa, along the Yaeju-Dake escarpment, was no more. A handful of ene my troops had manned its deep caves, hid den artillery and automatic weapons for a few days; then U.S. weight and power col lapsed them.

Yaeju Peak itself, a 560-ft. knob which doughboys dubbed “the Big Apple,” was first scaled at night by Company K of the 381st Infantry (96th Division). Explosive charges sealed off a number of caves, but Company K was forced to retire. Before noon the next day, U.S. artillery and mor tars took more bites out of the Big Apple, and Companies I and L tried the ascent.

They had to toil up a cleft with an So per cent grade near the top. Somehow, they made it. Somehow, tanks mounting both guns and flamethrowers were bulled up the slopes in support.

From Yaeju, the 383rd Infantry jumped off and took Yuza Peak. To the east, the 7th Division was battling for a summit 502 feet high when the enemy gave an assist. Jap artillery shelled Jap troops at the top. When the error was dis covered, and the fire lifted, the Japs on the peak were stunned and the 7th Division veterans were able to swarm all over them.

There was no consistent pattern to the Japs’ behavior. While a few surrendered (see above), and a few more tried to do so, most of the cut-off enemy groups ran around wildly, then blew themselves to bits with grenades. One captured Jap went out (on his parole to return) and brought in twelve others. Major General Pedro A.

del Valle of the ist Marine Division summed it up: “The enemy is beginning to fold up through surrenders, suicides and disorganization. . . . Now it could take from two days to two weeks to take the island. It all depends on how lucky we are.

If we hit their command post, the whole defense might fall to pieces.”

Attacker’s Defense. Lieut. General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. took time out to defend his conduct of the campaign against rear-area criticism (TIME, June 18). He had studied the possibility of an amphibious “end run” around the Japanese lines, to the southern beaches. The idea had been rejected because the reefs and beaches would have made it impossible to supply a large enough force. Such a landing “could have turned into another Anzio beachhead, or worse,” declared Buckner. At his advance headquarters on Guam, Fleet Admiral Nimitz endorsed Buckner’s decisions without qualification.