Why India and China Are Finally Starting to Patch Things Up

In June 2020, a bloody border clash broke out between India and China in the Ladakh region—the deadliest since a 1962 war. Relations between the nuclear-armed neighbors plunged to their lowest level in decades. But, after four years of icy ties, the relationship is finally beginning to thaw.

India and China struck a border deal last month that calls for resuming patrols in Ladakh, and for disengaging troops that restore positions to pre-crisis locations. The accord likely paved the way for an Oct. 23 meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping—a first since the 2020 Ladakh clash—on the sidelines of a BRICS summit in Russia. They pledged to strengthen communication and cooperation.

These developments provide a chance to inch ties forward. New Delhi has long insisted the relationship can’t improve until border tensions are eased; that precondition has now been met. The two sides can also leverage the thaw to tap more fully into existing areas of cooperation. Trade ties have remained robust despite deep tensions, and goodwill triggered by the border deal could unlock more Chinese investment in India. New Delhi and Beijing work together in many global forums, from BRICS to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. They share many common interests, from countering terrorism and promoting multilateralism to embracing non-Western economic models—and rejecting what they view as U.S. moral crusading around the world.

A lasting détente between the two Asian giants would have far-reaching consequences, including for Washington’s strategic partnership with New Delhi—which is fueled by the shared goal of countering Chinese power. But it could also serve as a hedge against the unpredictability of President-elect Donald Trump, should he decide to jettison his hardline approach to Beijing and seek his own rapprochement with Xi—a leader Trump has often praised, including as recently as last month.

Yet the significance of the thaw shouldn’t be overstated. That’s because India-China relations are still deeply fraught, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

The Ladakh deal, for instance, does little to resolve a broader India-China border dispute. The countries share a 2,100-mi. frontier, of which 50,000 square miles are disputed—an area equal to the size of Greece. Additionally, mistrust between border troops remains high; traumatic memories of the Ladakh clash—which entailed Indian soldiers getting beaten to death with iron rods, and getting flung to their deaths into icy rivers—still strikes a nerve.

Tensions are high elsewhere, too. The mammoth Chinese Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure project, which New Delhi categorically rejects because it winds through Indian-claimed territory, remains a flashpoint. India also worries about Beijing’s naval power projection in the Indian Ocean, stretching eastward over a massive expanse from a Chinese naval base in Djibouti to what New Delhi believes are Chinese spy ships operating near the Andaman Sea, where India has island territories. Closer to home, New Delhi is concerned about the surveillance risks posed by Chinese technologies in India.

Furthermore, India and China have strong security ties with the other’s main rival. Thanks to a series of foundational defense accords, the Indian and U.S. militaries are cooperating on unprecedented levels, and ramping up arms sales and technology transfers. India has now evolved into a net security provider for the U.S., providing Washington with military equipment and helping its allies counter Chinese provocations. The U.S. has even supplied intelligence to New Delhi at critical moments. For its part, Beijing continues to pursue its longstanding security alliance with Islamabad. It provides significant military aid to Pakistan, including equipment for ballistic missiles (which has produced a flurry of recent U.S. sanctions).

Meanwhile, India and China also have profound differences on core issues. Beijing rejects many Indian policies in Kashmir, the disputed region that’s provoked multiple India-Pakistan wars. India is strengthening ties with Taiwan, which Beijing views as a renegade province of China. The Dalai Lama—the exiled leader of Tibet, who Beijing regards as a dangerous separatist—has long been based in India. India and China are also each part of rival global forums: India participates in the Indo-Pacific Quad, while China leads BRI.

Yet bilateral ties should continue to improve. Continued talks on the border—which have happened regularly since the Ladakh crisis—to discuss other flashpoints, and to reassert mutual commitments to longstanding protocols that forbid the discharge of firearms, could help avert future escalations. The next opportunity for high-level dialogue could come this month, if Modi and Xi attend the G20 leaders summit in Brazil.

The best hope for deeper ties lies with their robust economic partnership (China was India’s top trade partner last year). India’s chief economic advisor is making the case for more Chinese FDI that could accelerate Beijing’s long-term plans to invest in top Indian industries. And China, with its recent economic setbacks, stands to benefit from increasing engagement with the world’s fastest-growing major economy.

The incoming return of Trump could also spur more India-China business bonhomie, if their collective fear of U.S. tariffs prompts them to carve out more commercial space for themselves.

Ultimately, relations will sometimes be cooperative, particularly on the economy, but they’ll remain competitive—and possibly at times even confrontational. Still, even a modest India-China thaw is a good thing. The world is on fire, and it can’t afford yet another crisis—much less a conflict.