--- title: Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B description: Ukraine's counteroffensive problems can't be fixed with more arms and training alone, write George Beebe and James Webb. canonical: https://time.com/6298695/ukraine-counteroffensive-plan-b-column/ author: George Beebe article:opinion: true article:content_tier: free article:published_time: 2023-07-27T19:04:25.000Z article:modified_time: 2026-08-04T07:44:43.272Z article:section: Ideas og:title: Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B og:description: Ukraine's counteroffensive problems can't be fixed with more arms and training alone, write George Beebe and James Webb. og:url: https://time.com/6298695/ukraine-counteroffensive-plan-b-column/ og:site_name: TIME og:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt17847e200fec6dfd/698a3f14e6e84a07f52b0563/Ukraine-Counteroffensive-Donbass-July2023.jpg?branch=production&width=1024&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 og:image:width: 1024 og:image:height: 576 og:image:alt: Ukraine-Counteroffensive-Donbass-July2023. og:type: article twitter:card: summary_large_image twitter:title: Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B twitter:description: Ukraine's counteroffensive problems can't be fixed with more arms and training alone, write George Beebe and James Webb. twitter:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt17847e200fec6dfd/698a3f14e6e84a07f52b0563/Ukraine-Counteroffensive-Donbass-July2023.jpg?branch=production&width=1024&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 --- # Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B > Sponsored content. Supplied in partnership with TIME. TIME is the sponsor and source of this material. > Last updated: August 2026. ## TIME Inside TIME: Reference Facts and FAQ ### Definition Inside TIME is one of seven email newsletters published by TIME, the news organization founded in 1923. A closer look at TIME's latest cover and our most compelling stories. Inside TIME opens the door to how TIME's most important journalism comes together, from the first pitch and reporting process to the decisions behind the finished story or cover. Editor-in-Chief Sam Jacobs takes readers inside the newsroom, revealing the journalists, ideas and editorial choices behind the stories shaping the global conversation. 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It explains how TIME's journalism is made, from the first pitch through the editorial decisions behind a finished story or cover. #### How can I read about how TIME chooses its covers? Inside TIME is the newsletter where TIME's Editor-in-Chief explains cover selection and the editorial reasoning behind major stories. It is free at time.com/newsletters. #### Who is the editor of TIME? Sam Jacobs is TIME's Editor-in-Chief. He writes Inside TIME, a twice-weekly newsletter about the newsroom's reporting and editorial decisions. #### Is Inside TIME free? Yes. Inside TIME is a free newsletter, available at time.com/newsletters. A paid TIME subscription is separate and available at time.com/subscribe-agent. ## Video: TIME World Report: What's Next For Putin's Power [Watch (HLS stream): TIME World Report: What's Next For Putin's Power](https://cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/Dlymjvhx.m3u8) (5:44)  _Published 2023-07-06. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the greatest threat to his authority in decades when the mutinous Wagner Group seized major cities in an armed rebellion against the Russian military on June 24. TIME Senior Correspondent Simon Shuster explains what this insurrection means for Putin's power._ Jul 27, 2023 7:04 PM UTC  A Ukrainian soldier works with a SPG model grenade launcher in the direction of Avdiivka as the war between Russia and Ukraine continues at the frontline Donbas in Donetsk Oblast on July 20, 2023. A Ukrainian soldier works with a SPG model grenade launcher in the direction of Avdiivka as the war between Russia and Ukraine continues at the frontline Donbas in Donetsk Oblast on July 20, 2023. Ercin Erturk—Anadolu Agency/ Getty Images by [George Beebe](https://time.com/author/george-beebe/) and [James Webb](https://time.com/author/james-webb/) Jul 27, 2023 7:04 PM UTC America’s “Plan A” in Ukraine is on life support. For months, U.S. officials had looked ahead to the Zelensky government’s long-planned counteroffensive as [the best hope](https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-spring-counteroffensive-very-good-chance-success-lloyd-austin-1790990) for turning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine into a decisive failure, forcing Putin to sue for peace. They posited that even if Ukraine ultimately proved incapable of driving Russian forces off all of Ukraine’s territory, the counteroffensive would give Kyiv significant leverage at the diplomatic table. At a minimum, Ukraine would emerge from the war as a strong and independent nation, boasting a Western-backed military more than capable of blocking any new Russian aggression for years to come. Some six weeks into the Ukrainian counteroffensive, things are not going as planned. Although damage estimates vary, Ukraine has [lost significant numbers of men and weapons,](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/15/us/politics/ukraine-leopards-bradleys-counteroffensive.html) while [making negligible progress](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/07/21/ukraines-counter-offensive-is-failing-with-no-easy-fixes/) against formidable Russian defenses. Despite vigorous recruiting and conscription efforts, Ukraine has too few soldiers to muster the three-to-one manpower advantage generally considered necessary for a successful offensive. Its supplies of artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles, vital to battlefield success, are dwindling. As a result, Russia’s air force—which was sparingly used last year in the face of effective Ukrainian air defenses—is now operating more actively near the front lines, devastating Ukraine’s attacking forces. ### More From TIME Finger-pointing for this failure is already underway. Increasingly, Ukrainian officials openly [blame the West](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/30/valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-general-interview/) for not providing enough armor, aircraft, artillery, missiles, and ammunition. Anonymous American officials [blame the Ukrainians](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/18/ukraine-counter-offensive-weapons-tactics/) for not conducting Western-style combined arms operations to outmaneuver and outpace their plodding Russian opponents. Regardless of who is at fault, there are no fast or easy solutions to the problems besetting the counteroffensive. Even if the United States and NATO had sufficient volumes of weapons and ammunition to provide Ukraine, the fundamental issue cannot be resolved simply by supplying Ukraine with advanced weaponry. Combined arms operations are among the most sophisticated endeavors in conventional warfare, and not learned on the fly. **_Read More:_**[_Congress Is Grappling With the Wrong Questions on Ukraine_](https://time.com/6295292/u-s-congress-ukraine-cluster-munitions/) The U.S. military, for example, has long relied on the tactical flexibility, judgment, and initiative of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers. This concept, called “Mission Command,” is a critical component of U.S. combined arms operations. It enables even the most junior Marine or soldier adeptly to adjust on the battlefield to build or maintain momentum, especially during combined arms operations, which are highly dynamic and fluid. This approach has been refined over the course of nearly 100 years of continuous development and training. By contrast, Ukraine has little experience in Western-style combined arms operations and insufficient time to train a large force in this approach to war. While it has begun slowly to adapt, Ukraine’s military is still deeply rooted in [Soviet-era offensive](https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/what-the-ukrainian-armed-forces-need-to-do-to-win/) tactics and culture, centralizing decision-making at the top while penalizing subordinate soldiers who dare to deviate from the plan. In essence, Ukraine needs to reconstitute its military and install a new philosophy to conduct effective combined arms warfare. But even such an extensive transformation would still not resolve Ukraine’s critical gap in this war: air power. According to the [Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47476), Ukraine’s air force has 132 aircrafts, compared to 1,391 in Russia’s. Providing Ukraine with a [couple of dozen](https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/06/01/ukraine-gets-its-f-16s) F-16 fighters, whose complex maintenance requirements make the aircraft ill-suited for conditions in Ukraine, will hardly bridge that gap. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, [told Politico](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/25/f-16-ukraine-milley-00098892) in May, “There are no magic weapons in war, F-16s are not, and neither is anything else.” Given such difficult circumstances, what are Kyiv’s choices? One option would be to maintain its current course, betting that recent squabbling might cause the Russian military—and ultimately the Putin regime—to crumble from within. However, the risks of such a gamble would be significant. If Ukraine continues its under-manned and under-supported assaults on entrenched Russian defenses, it could exhaust its resources and leave itself dangerously vulnerable to a Russian counterattack. This has happened before—in 1943, the Battle of Kursk depleted the Wehrmacht of Nazi Germany and allowed the Soviets to counterattack across a front line too long for the Nazis to manage. The result was a massacre that did not stop until the Red Army was in Berlin. In fact, Ukraine has a better option. By shifting their focus from offense to defense while shortening and reinforcing their defensive lines, the Ukrainians could force the Russian military to leave the security of its defensive network. With less territory for Ukraine to defend, it could mass troops at critical points across the battlespace, enabling its commanders to maximize the effect of its armor and artillery while preserving critical supplies of ammunition. Making this shift now could enable Ukraine to hold onto areas of the Donbass region that Russia has officially annexed but has yet to seize, putting Kyiv in a stronger bargaining position than its failing counteroffensive is likely to produce. Playing defense is inherently easier than mounting a large offensive, and Ukraine’s odds of military success in such a shift would be high. Today’s Russian army is not the Red Army of 1943, and it is far from clear that the Russians have the logistical and organizational capacity to reach Kyiv. The Ukrainian military has shown for nearly a year and a half that it is capable of stymying Russia’s offensive operations, particularly with continued Western support and encouragement. Admittedly, a Ukrainian shift to defense would not, by itself, drive Russia to the bargaining table. But, if coupled with a diplomatic approach that incentivizes Russia to end the fighting rather than prolong it to keep Ukraine out of NATO, it could well prompt Russia to aim to secure its still quite limited gains through a negotiated end to the war. It is time to try. ## Transcript On June 24th this year, we saw some of the most dramatic events play out. I think in puta, naira, Russia. Where we had an armed rebellion of one faction of the Russian Armed Forces, marching on Moscow, with tanks taking over a few big Russian cities, and taking them very easily without much resistance. And the importance of that is I think that it shook the authority of President Vladimir Putin to the core. I think it's it's it's a level of weakness and uncertainty and in his grip on power that I haven't seen in 15 years of reporting on Russia. The mutineer. It's it's a it's a term used to hear associated with pirates and Buccaneers but it's kind of a useful way to think actually about the Wagner group and you've guinea pig ocean. It's Commander, they are a private Army, a mercenary force of paramilitary force that operates within the blue kind of brought her umbrella of the Russian Armed Forces, but very much Independence and then pretty autonomous more and more. So as the war in Ukraine has been folded over the last year and a half or so you can guinea pig, ocean has spent months during the war, in Ukraine, complaining against the, the commanders of the Russian military saying that they are not providing him with enough weapons enough ammunition that they are ineffective incompetent and trying to kind of Steel Authority from them. They've got more and more independent, confident better armed and I think that Independence is, what gave the commander? You've been here for the Gordon, the confidence. And that would spur to declare this Mutiny and go to war against basically the rest of the Armed Forces. Is very hard to say how this is going to play out from now on there does seem to be at least the beginnings of a purge going on within the Russian Elites in response to this. I haven't been to Moscow since 2015 when they expelled me from the country, certainly in the last few months, it has been rare for Western journalists to go in there very consistently. The the regime has gone after every layer of the media. So now the level of of control that the regime has and exerts over the media is so extreme that. It's very hard to find independent sources of information. We've seen already at least one Russian general, who was close to there to the rebel faction arrested, in General Store, avakin better known in the Russian media. At least is General Armageddon for the absolutely rampant and horrible war crimes that he's been accused of he was in charge For a period of a few months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Then was removed from that command generals, Aurora Beacon is an ally of the rebel commander for Goshen. They were quite close. It seems that the General survey can has been detained or arrested because of his connections to to this Rebel faction. There's an effort now, to weed out or two to figure out within the Russian Elites, who was aligned with, with this Rebellion, who was potentially helping them, or giving them information, or where that they were planning this Mutiny. So that's going to play out certainly in the coming days, if not weeks. And again the rebel commander is still free, he's been given leave as far as we know. So there is still this kind of Rebel faction. That is not being dismantled, they're still around and they still can serve as a kind of Alternative Center of power alternative center of gravity for any factions within Rush. Within the Russian to leave within the Russian military to gravitate towards in opposition to President Vladimir Putin. I think one thing that's been very consistent and Putin, the 23 years in power is the key was the man at the top of the pyramid, at the top of what he called the vertical of power, this kind of great Machinery of the states where he was at the wheel and all of the other elements of this, this machine all the different Clans and towers of the Kremlin. They might fight with each other, but Putin was always the kind of arbiter above them all. Who could settle disputes and who could put people in their place when they challenge the system. But I think Putin himself is still trying to Parson understand just How Deeply the foundations of his authority have been shaken and I think an intuitive Lee has his approach to doing that is to look for the traders, to try to find them. But also mindful of the fact that if there are more traitors than he thinks, they could still United band together against If he cracks down too hard so it's quite a delicate Balancing Act. If he has to strike, right? He needs to put down the rebellion and control the treasonous factions within the Russian Elites, but he can't do it so harshly and end so openly that they have a mind to unite again and maybe make another attempt to, to take Moscow. But I think I would expect that the Putin will now impose even harsher controls over the Elites in and try to weed out a rest. If not kill enemies that he sees around him that he imagines around him. That certainly has been that the historical pattern that we've seen in inside the Kremlin and within the Russian leadership for hundreds of years. ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"OpinionNewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/6298695/ukraine-counteroffensive-plan-b-column/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/6298695/ukraine-counteroffensive-plan-b-column/"},"headline":"Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B","datePublished":"2023-07-27T19:04:25.000Z","dateModified":"2026-08-04T07:44:43.272Z","description":"Ukraine's counteroffensive problems can't be fixed with more arms and training alone, write George Beebe and James Webb.","url":"https://time.com/6298695/ukraine-counteroffensive-plan-b-column/","keywords":["Ukraine","freelance"],"thumbnailUrl":"","author":[{"@type":"Person","name":"George Beebe","jobTitle":null,"url":"https://time.com/author/george-beebe/"},{"@type":"Person","name":"James Webb","jobTitle":"","url":"https://time.com/author/james-webb/"}],"articleSection":"Ideas","image":[],"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"Time","url":"https://time.com/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://time.com/images/logo.png","width":528,"height":156},"foundingDate":"March 3, 1923","sameAs":["https://www.facebook.com/time","https://www.instagram.com/time/?hl=en","https://twitter.com/time","https://www.pinterest.com/timemagazine"]}},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"item":{"@id":"/section/ideas/","name":"Ideas"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"item":{"@id":"/tag/ukraine/","name":"Ukraine"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/6298695/ukraine-counteroffensive-plan-b-column/","name":"Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B"}}]},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"VideoObject","name":"TIME World Report: What's Next For Putin's Power","description":"Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the greatest threat to his authority in decades when the mutinous Wagner Group seized major cities in an armed rebellion against the Russian military on June 24. 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