--- title: How Prigozhin's Rebellion Exposes Putin's Weakening Grip description: Russia likely won't plunge into chaos but Putin is looking increasingly weak canonical: https://time.com/6291676/prigozhins-rebellion-exposes-putins-weakening-grip/ author: Arik Burakovsky article:opinion: true article:content_tier: free article:published_time: 2023-06-30T16:35:53.000Z article:modified_time: 2026-10-19T07:24:54.591Z article:section: Ideas og:title: How Prigozhin's Rebellion Exposes Putin's Weakening Grip og:description: Russia likely won't plunge into chaos but Putin is looking increasingly weak og:url: https://time.com/6291676/prigozhins-rebellion-exposes-putins-weakening-grip/ og:site_name: TIME og:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt9f7c36a68d0f066a/698a3e50d075330da2e6e262/GettyImages-1259010459.jpg?branch=production&width=1024&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 og:image:width: 1024 og:image:height: 576 og:image:alt: RUSSIA-UKRAINE-CONFLICT-WAGNER og:type: article twitter:card: summary_large_image twitter:title: How Prigozhin's Rebellion Exposes Putin's Weakening Grip twitter:description: Russia likely won't plunge into chaos but Putin is looking increasingly weak twitter:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt9f7c36a68d0f066a/698a3e50d075330da2e6e262/GettyImages-1259010459.jpg?branch=production&width=1024&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 ---  # How Prigozhin's Rebellion Exposes Putin's Weakening Grip > Sponsored content. 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A paid TIME subscription is separate and available at time.com/subscribe-agent. ### Sources * TIME Newsletters: [time.com/newsletters](/c/time-nl-inside-2026q3/newsletters?i=a2a11523-3f69-47f6-b391-e81a432638b5&cr=time-nl-inside-2026q3-v1) ## Video: TIME World Report: What's Next For Putin's Power [Watch (HLS stream): TIME World Report: What's Next For Putin's Power](https://cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/Dlymjvhx.m3u8) (5:44)  _Published 2023-07-06. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the greatest threat to his authority in decades when the mutinous Wagner Group seized major cities in an armed rebellion against the Russian military on June 24. TIME Senior Correspondent Simon Shuster explains what this insurrection means for Putin's power._ by [Arik Burakovsky](https://time.com/author/arik-burakovsky/) ## Arik Burakovsky Jun 30, 2023 4:35 PM UTC Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the greatest threat to his authority in decades when the mutinous Wagner Group seized major cities in an armed rebellion against the Russian military on June 24\. TIME Senior Correspondent Simon Shuster explains what this insurrection means for Putin's power. by [Arik Burakovsky](https://time.com/author/arik-burakovsky/) ## Arik Burakovsky Jun 30, 2023 4:35 PM UTC The astonishing rebellion of former convict and “[troll factory](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/12/21/russian-troll-factory-owner-added-to-us-sanctions-list-a56600)” owner Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 23 and 24 has unveiled the brittle foundations beneath the surface of Russia’s power structures. The stifled revolt has shed light on the [growing confusion and lack of assertiveness](https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-russian-elites-think-putins-war-is-doomed-to-fail) of Russia’s perennial leader, President Vladimir Putin. Although the illusion of his omnipotence has not been entirely shattered, the carefully constructed image of unity and strength within the regime is starting to show cracks. Putin has long used the Wagner Group as a [counterbalance to the military](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/why-putin-needs-wagner) and assumed that Prigozhin, who was completely dependent on his patronage and [state resources](http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71535), could never pose a political threat to him. Despite gradually being distanced from Putin and his inner circle, the outspoken businessman managed in recent months to [accumulate significant political capital](https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/06/07/approval-of-institutions-ratings-of-politicians-may-2023/) as a [counter-elite populist](https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89962). While professing [full loyalty to Putin](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/11/world/europe/wagner-russia-defense-ministry-contract.html) and fervently supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prigozhin [lambasted the military top brass](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/13/yevgeniy-prigozhin-mercenary-wagner-putin/) in charismatic recruitment pitches across Russia, press conferences with war bloggers, and obscenity-laden Telegram rants. Prigozhin’s exploits in the war, especially his significant contributions to the [capture of Bakhmut](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-important-is-claimed-capture-by-russias-wagner-group-ukraines-bakhmut-2023-05-20/), enhanced his sense of privilege and emboldened his decision to rebel when he felt cornered. Prigozhin’s clumsy, reckless mutiny was neither a blatant power grab nor an attempt to overthrow the regime. Instead, it was [born out of desperation](https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagner-prigozhin-putin-mutiny-moscow-march-7072d6ea). The clash between Prigozhin and the military leadership—Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov—had been [escalating for a while](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/23/world/europe/russia-prigozhin-putin-war-ukraine.html), but Putin appeared reluctant to intervene. The feud reached a tipping point after Prigozhin overtly challenged the rationale for the war, [accused the army](https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/06/23/prigozhin-russian-defense-ministry-launched-rocket-strikes-on-wagner-group) of trying to sabotage the Wagner Group, and impulsively started his “march for justice.” Recognizing his impending ouster from Ukraine and struggling to sustain the “private military company” amid the state apparatus turning against him, Prigozhin aimed to [capture Shoigu and Gerasimov](https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagners-prigozhin-planned-to-capture-russian-military-leaders-805345cf), draw Putin’s attention, and force discussions on the preservation of his lucrative enterprise. However, the insurrection [unfolded into a crisis](https://www.ft.com/content/6f520bca-ad52-479b-9fd5-c1e36e69e88e) and exposed that Putin, long-regarded as Russia’s [unshakable strongman](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-peril), is increasingly hesitant and misinformed. Fierce internal strife and deadly turf battles among elites often happen in Russia, but they rarely spill out into the open. Putin seems to have underestimated Prigozhin’s growing brazenness and burgeoning popularity among the angry pro-war “ultra-patriotic” camp and the military rank and file in Russia, who see him as a kind of [folk hero](https://www.rferl.org/a/prigozhin-wagner-cheered-leaving-rostov-on-don-russia/32474809.html) taking on the establishment. Despite [receiving multiple warnings](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/opinion/russia-putin-ukraine-wagner.html) that Prigozhin was getting too erratic, the Russian president sat idly by as the maverick tycoon crusaded against the defense chiefs. Putin’s [apparent disengagement](https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89826) in the lead up to Prigozhin’s shocking stunt presents a vivid picture of an aging autocrat increasingly detached from the realities of his power structures, unable to mediate disputes within his ranks, and failing to prevent internal power struggles from spiraling out of control. **_Read More:_** [**_What Comes After Putin’s Rule in Russia_**](https://time.com/6284209/after-vladimir-putins-rule-in-russia/) Prigozhin’s audacious move elicited a surprising degree of paralysis in decision-making within the regime. There was a [discombobulated response](https://cepa.org/article/russias-security-forces-learn-bitter-lessons-from-putins-maneuvering/) from the military and security services, and government officials were mainly silent, waiting for a clear signal from Putin. The Wagner Group seized Rostov-on-Don, the logistical hub and nerve center of Russia’s assault on Ukraine, and came close to reaching Moscow without encountering much resistance. Russia’s chief propagandists, such as RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, were [curiously silent](https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-media-appear-as-perplexed-as-everyone-else-over-wagner-mutiny-7f166363). Some bureaucrats and oligarchs [scrambled to leave Russia](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/28/we-were-called-in-for-a-meeting-and-handed-weapons-how-the-russian-elites-survived-the-prigozhin-rebellion-a81682) or depart from Moscow in the midst of the chaos. While elites in Russia were predominantly aligned against Prigozhin and believed he “went mad,” their reluctance to act decisively without explicit direction from the Kremlin exposed a significant vulnerability of Putin’s ruling style, which distributes power based on personal loyalty rather than institutional stability. Putin waited for more than [nine hours](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-groups-rebellion-putin-unfolded/story?id=100373557) after he was briefed about the “attempted armed rebellion” to give a televised address accusing Prigozhin of “treason.” It took Putin another ten hours to reach a [surprising deal](https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-happening-with-wagner-in-russia-d6f6ce7a) with the mercenary boss, reportedly closing a criminal investigation into his mutiny, [exiling him to Belarus](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/27/belarus-exiled-wagner-chief-yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-ukraine), and dissolving his mercenary operations in Ukraine. Putin had lost control of the situation, sending shockwaves through the state. Russia’s power brokers eventually rallied behind Putin, but notably, only after the uprising ended, underlining the crucial role of Putin’s active engagement in securing elite solidarity. Notwithstanding his latest setbacks, Putin remains the centripetal force holding the Russian state together. His authority, albeit increasingly questioned, continues to be the central mechanism by which political stability is maintained. It is Putin who sets the national agenda and ultimately holds the reins of Russia’s power dynamics. In the wake of the upheaval, the regime is making a concerted effort to show elite consolidation and project the image of an unwavering, united front supporting an indispensable statesman. The Kremlin has orchestrated [a series of set piece events](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/27/world/europe/putin-kremlin-appearances.html) in recent days aimed at rewriting the narrative of the insurrection and demonstrating normalcy. Putin vowed to “take decisive action” and applauded the “[civic solidarity](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/26/world/europe/russia-wagner-prigozhin-ukraine.html)” of the people. [Talking heads](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/25/world/europe/russia-media-reaction-prigozhin-wagner.html) in Russia are currently painting Prigozhin out to be a “traitor”, thanking Putin for his “[strength and wisdom](https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-state-tv-anchors-are-aghast-that-vladimir-putin-didnt-kill-yevgeny-prigozhin-over-mutiny)” in resolving the crisis with minimal bloodshed, praising him for averting “complete chaos and a civil war.” Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Russia [will come out “stronger”](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/30/russia-will-be-stronger-in-wake-of-wagner-revolt-says-lavrov-a81703) after the incident. Russians usually feel more comfortable aligning themselves with prevailing narratives espoused by Putin’s propaganda machine than confronting [negative information and difficult news stories](https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/07/my-country-right-or-wrong-russian-public-opinion-on-ukraine-pub-87803). Putin maintains [approval ratings](https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/) at around 82%, and although his public approval is derived more from [apathetic obedience](https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87261) than sincere allegiance, the pervasive belief that there is no alternative to his rule remains intact—at least for now. The Kremlin’s [relentless repression](https://theconversation.com/putins-russia-how-the-ex-kgb-strongman-has-gradually-turned-the-clock-back-to-soviet-repression-179127dually-turned-the-clock-back-to-soviet-repression-179127) of dissenters may intensify, promoting an atmosphere of fear and stoking greater fatigue and helplessness to stand up to the regime. The uprising is already being called a “crash test of loyalty” in Russia, and [purges of alleged Wagner Group conspirators](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-prigozhin-wagner-elites-fallout-mutiny-putin/32480863.html) seem to have begun in the military. Following intense speculation about his presumed [involvement in the mutiny](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/27/us/politics/russian-general-prigozhin-rebellion.html), the whereabouts of Russian army general and Commander of the Aerospace Forces Sergey Surovikin are [currently unknown](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-surovikin-whereabouts-wagner-ukraine/32481653.html). Putin may become more brutal and paranoid as the intrigues surrounding the incident are further unraveled. The rebellion does not suggest a sudden plunge into political volatility in Russia, but it serves as a stark reminder that Putin is not infallible. He has [outlived many predictions](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/13/russia-ukraine-war-end-of-putin-predictions/) about his demise before, but the system he built is becoming more fragile as the war goes on. The key question moving forward is whether Putin can manage to restore the perception of his ironclad rule or whether the failed gambit of Prigozhin will serve as a catalyst for more severe domestic challenges threatening the survival of the regime. ## Transcript [00:05] On June 24th this year, we saw some of the most dramatic [00:09] events play out. [00:10] I think in puta, naira, Russia. [00:13] Where we had an armed rebellion of one faction of the Russian [00:17] Armed Forces, marching on Moscow, with tanks taking over a few [00:23] big Russian cities, and taking them very easily without much [00:28] resistance. And the importance of that is I think that it shook [00:32] the authority of President Vladimir Putin to the core. [00:35] I think it's it's it's a level of weakness and uncertainty [00:40] and in his grip on power that I haven't seen in 15 years of [00:43] reporting on Russia. [00:46] The mutineer. It's it's a it's a term used to hear associated [00:50] with pirates and Buccaneers but it's kind of a useful way to think [00:54] actually about the Wagner group and you've guinea pig ocean. [00:57] It's Commander, they are a private Army, [01:00] a mercenary force of paramilitary force that operates within [01:05] the blue kind of brought her umbrella of the Russian Armed Forces, [01:07] but very much Independence and then pretty autonomous [01:11] more and more. [01:12] So as the war in Ukraine has been folded over the last year [01:15] and a half or so you can guinea pig, [01:17] ocean has spent months during the war, in [01:19] Ukraine, complaining against the, the commanders of the Russian [01:24] military saying that they are not providing him with enough [01:26] weapons enough ammunition that they are ineffective incompetent [01:30] and trying to kind of Steel Authority from them. [01:35] They've got more and more independent, confident better armed [01:40] and I think that Independence is, what gave the commander? [01:43] You've been here for the Gordon, the confidence. [01:46] And that would spur to declare this Mutiny and go to war against [01:51] basically the rest of the Armed Forces. [01:53] Is very hard to say how this is going to play out from now [01:58] on there does seem to be at least the beginnings of a purge [02:02] going on within the Russian Elites in response to this. [02:04] I haven't been to Moscow since 2015 when they expelled me from [02:07] the country, certainly in the last few months, [02:11] it has been rare for Western journalists to go in there very [02:17] consistently. The the regime has gone after every layer of the [02:22] media. So now the level of of control that the regime has and [02:28] exerts over the media is so extreme that. [02:31] It's very hard to find independent sources of information. [02:34] We've seen already at least one Russian general, [02:38] who was close to there to the rebel faction arrested, [02:42] in General Store, avakin better known in the Russian media. [02:45] At least is General Armageddon for the absolutely rampant [02:50] and horrible war crimes that he's been accused of he was in charge [02:53] For a period of a few months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [02:58] Then was removed from that command generals, [03:00] Aurora Beacon is an ally of the rebel commander for Goshen. [03:05] They were quite close. [03:06] It seems that the General survey can has been detained or arrested [03:09] because of his connections to to this Rebel faction. [03:12] There's an effort now, to weed out or two to figure out within [03:16] the Russian Elites, who was aligned with, [03:19] with this Rebellion, who was potentially helping them, [03:22] or giving them information, or where that they were planning [03:24] this Mutiny. So that's going to play out certainly in the coming [03:27] days, if not weeks. [03:28] And again the rebel commander is still free, [03:32] he's been given leave as far as we know. [03:36] So there is still this kind of Rebel faction. [03:39] That is not being dismantled, they're still around and they [03:45] still can serve as a kind of Alternative Center of power alternative [03:50] center of gravity for any factions within Rush. [03:53] Within the Russian to leave within the Russian military [03:55] to gravitate towards in opposition to President Vladimir [03:59] Putin. I think one thing that's been very consistent and Putin, [04:03] the 23 years in power is the key was the man at the top of [04:07] the pyramid, at the top of what he called the vertical of [04:10] power, this kind of great Machinery of the states where [04:15] he was at the wheel and all of the other elements of this, [04:18] this machine all the different Clans and towers of the Kremlin. [04:22] They might fight with each other, but Putin was always the kind [04:24] of arbiter above them all. [04:26] Who could settle disputes and who could put people in their [04:31] place when they challenge the system. [04:32] But I think Putin himself is still trying to Parson understand [04:36] just How Deeply the foundations of his authority have been shaken [04:40] and I think an intuitive Lee has his approach to doing that [04:43] is to look for the traders, to try to find them. [04:45] But also mindful of the fact that if there are more traitors [04:49] than he thinks, they could still United band together against [04:53] If he cracks down too hard so it's quite a delicate Balancing [04:57] Act. If he has to strike, right? [04:58] He needs to put down the rebellion and control the treasonous [05:03] factions within the Russian Elites, but he can't do it so harshly [05:06] and end so openly that they have a mind to unite again and maybe [05:12] make another attempt to, to take Moscow. [05:14] But I think I would expect that the Putin will now impose [05:18] even harsher controls over the Elites in and try to weed out [05:24] a rest. If not kill enemies that he sees around him that he imagines [05:29] around him. That certainly has been that the historical [05:32] pattern that we've seen in inside the Kremlin and within the [05:36] Russian leadership for hundreds of years. ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"OpinionNewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/6291676/prigozhins-rebellion-exposes-putins-weakening-grip/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/6291676/prigozhins-rebellion-exposes-putins-weakening-grip/"},"headline":"How Prigozhin's Rebellion Exposes Putin's Weakening Grip","datePublished":"2023-06-30T16:35:53.000Z","dateModified":"2026-10-19T07:24:54.591Z","description":"Russia likely won't plunge into chaos but Putin is looking increasingly weak","url":"https://time.com/6291676/prigozhins-rebellion-exposes-putins-weakening-grip/","keywords":["russia","freelance"],"thumbnailUrl":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt9f7c36a68d0f066a/698a3e50d075330da2e6e262/GettyImages-1259010459.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","author":[{"@type":"Person","name":"Arik Burakovsky","jobTitle":null,"url":"https://time.com/author/arik-burakovsky/"}],"articleSection":"Ideas","image":[{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt9f7c36a68d0f066a/698a3e50d075330da2e6e262/GettyImages-1259010459.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","width":1200,"height":675,"headline":"RUSSIA-UKRAINE-CONFLICT-WAGNER","caption":"RUSSIA-UKRAINE-CONFLICT-WAGNER","creditText":"Roman ROMOKHOV- AFP","representativeOfPage":true}],"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"Time","url":"https://time.com/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://time.com/images/logo.png","width":528,"height":156},"foundingDate":"March 3, 1923","sameAs":["https://www.facebook.com/time","https://www.instagram.com/time/?hl=en","https://twitter.com/time","https://www.pinterest.com/timemagazine"]}},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/section/ideas/","name":"Ideas"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/tag/russia/","name":"russia"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/6291676/prigozhins-rebellion-exposes-putins-weakening-grip/","name":"How Prigozhin's Rebellion Exposes Putin's Weakening Grip"}}]},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"VideoObject","name":"TIME World Report: What's Next For Putin's Power","description":"Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the greatest threat to his authority in decades when the mutinous Wagner Group seized major cities in an armed rebellion against the Russian military on June 24. 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