MONEY

The 5 Funniest ‘Saturday Night Live’ Skits About Money

SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE: WEEKEND UPDATE THURSDAY, (from left): Amy Poehler, Seth Meyers, Kenan Thompson, (Episode 101, aired Oct. 9, 2008), 2008.
Dana Edelson—©NBC/Courtesy Everett Collectio

As the NBC comedy show celebrates 40 seasons on the air, here are MONEY's picks for the best sketches making light of awkward bank ads, the financial crisis, and more.

Over the course of a four-decade run, Saturday Night Live has taken aim at most of the trappings of American financial life—even the things you wouldn’t think were funny, like stock market crashes and consumer debt. In honor of the show’s star-studded anniversary celebration this Sunday, here are MONEY’s favorite SNL sketches about money, spanning nearly all of its 40 years.

1. Fix It! (Parts One and Two)

In these two Weekend Update segments, Kenan Thompson plays Oscar Rogers, a “financial expert” who describes a path out of the 2008 financial crisis.

Best line: “Fix it! It’s a simple three-step process. Step one: Fix! Step two: It! Step three: Fix it! Then repeat steps one through three until it’s all been fixed!”

 

 

In that one phrase, Thompson gives voice to the powerlessness and frustration felt by laid-off workers and pummeled investors worldwide. (We wonder what John Belushi’s samurai stockbroker would have to say about that.)

2. First CitiWide Change Bank

This 1988 commercial parody—featuring Jan Hooks, Kevin Nealon, and Jim Downey—highlights just how unimpressive financial services can be, in an ad for a bank that brags about offering change to customers. And they don’t mean it in the Obama way.

 

Best line: “We are not going to give you change that you don’t want. If you come to us with a hundred-dollar bill, we’re not going to give you two thousand nickels—unless that meets your particular change needs.”

Joking about how weak bank services are would be funnier if it weren’t so true.

3. “Don’t Buy Stuff You Cannot Afford”

Steve Martin and Amy Poehler play a couple in need of a budgeting intervention in this 2006 skit, featuring Chris Parnell as the author of a, shall we say, intuitively titled book about how to control spending.

Best lines:

Parnell: The advice is priceless and the book is free.”
Poehler: “Well, I like the sound of that.”
Martin: “Yeah, we can put it on our credit card!”

If only getting out of debt were as simple as the skit suggests; in reality, paying off loans and gaining financial stability can be hard no matter how smart or hardworking you are. But we’d still pony up for a copy of Stop Buying Stuff magazine.

4. Consumer Probe: Irwin Mainway

This 1976 classic features Candice Bergen as a reporter and Dan Aykroyd as the sunglass-sporting Irwin Mainway, purveyor of such children’s toys as Johnny Switchblade, Mr. Skin Grafter, Doggie Dentist, and Bag o’ Glass.

 

Best lines:

Bergen: “I just don’t understand why you can’t make harmless toys like these wooden alphabet blocks.”
Aykroyd: “You call this harmless? I got a sliver!”

5. Metrocard

Roseanne Barr plays a 24-hour hotline representative for the fictional “Metrocard” credit card in this 1991 sketch, which sends up confessional-style TV ads highlighting service. Phil Hartman plays a seemingly satisfied customer.

Best lines:

Barr: “And then he gets really mad and tells me I’m supposed to help him! You know, like I’m his mom or something. So I say, ‘Why don’t you call home and have somebody wire you the money? Or call your company and tell them the problem? Or, better yet, why don’t you take a personal check out of your checkbook, roll it up real tight, and then cram it!'”

Hartman: “She gave me several options.”

MONEY financial crisis

By This Measure, Banks Are Safer Today Than Before the Financial Crisis

150209_INV_BanksSafer
iStock

At least from the standpoint of liquidity, the nation's banks have come a long way over the last few years to build a safer and more stable financial system.

If you study the history of bank failures, one thing stands out: While banks typically get into trouble because of poor credit discipline, their actual failure is generally triggered by illiquidity. Fortunately, banks appear to have learned this lesson — though we probably have the 2010 Dodd Frank Act to thank for that — as lenders like Bank of America BANK OF AMERICA CORP. BAC -1.31% and others have taken significant steps over the last few years to reduce liquidity risk.

It’s important to keep in mind that banks are nothing more than leveraged funds. They start with a sliver of capital, borrow money from depositors and creditors, and then use the combined proceeds to buy assets. The difference between what they earn on those assets and what they pay to borrow the funds makes up their net revenue — or, at least, a significant part of it.

Because this model allows you to make money with other peoples’ money, it’s a thing of beauty when the economy is growing and there are no warning signs on the horizon. But it’s much less so when things take a turn for the worse. This follows from the fact that a bank’s funding could dry up if creditors lose faith in its ability to repay them, or if they need the money themselves. And if a bank’s funding sources dry up, then it may be forced to dispose of assets quickly and at fire-sale prices in order to pay its creditors back.

This is why some funding sources are better than others. Deposits are the best because they are the least likely to flee at the first sign of trouble. Within deposits, moreover, insured consumer deposits are preferable, at least in this respect, to large foreign, corporate, or institutional deposits, which carry a greater threat of flight risk because they often exceed the FDIC’s insurance limit.

The second most stable source of funds is long-term debt, as this typically can’t be called by creditors until it matures. Finally, the least stable source consists of short-term debt, including overnight loans from other banks as well as funds from the “repo” and/or commercial paper markets. Because these must be rolled over at regular intervals, sometimes even nightly, they give a bank’s creditors the option of not doing so.

It should come as no surprise, then, that many of the biggest bank failures in history stemmed from an over-reliance on either short-term credit or on large institutional depositors. This was the reason scores of New York’s biggest and most prestigious banks had to suspend withdrawals in the Panic of 1873, during which correspondent banks located throughout the country simultaneously rushed to withdraw their deposits from money center banks after panic broke out on Wall Street. This was also the case a century later, when Continental Illinois became the first too-big-to-fail bank in 1984. It was the case at countless savings and loans during the 1980s. And it’s what took down Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual in the financial crisis of 2008-09.

A corollary to this rule is that one way to measure a bank’s susceptibility to failure — which, as I discuss here, should always be at the forefront of investors, analysts, and bankers’ minds — is to gauge how heavily it relies on short-term credit and institutional deposits as opposed to retail deposits and long-term loans. If a bank relies too heavily on the former, particularly in relation to its illiquid assets, then that’s an obvious sign of weakness. If it doesn’t, then that’s a sign of strength — though, it’s by no means a guarantee that a bank is otherwise prudently managed.

One way to gauge this is simply to look at what percentage of a bank’s funds derive from short-term loans as opposed to more stable sources. As you can see in the chart below, for instance, Bank of America gets roughly 16% of its funds from the short-term money market. That’s worse than a smaller, simpler bank like U.S. Bancorp, which looks to the money market for only 9% of its liquidity, but it’s nevertheless better than, say, Bank of America’s former reliance on short-term funds, which came in at 31% in 2005. Indeed, as William Cohen intimates in House of Cards, one of the “dirty little secret[s]” of Wall Street companies prior to the crisis was how much they relied on overnight repo funding to prop up their operations.

A second way to measure this is to compare a bank’s funding sources to the liquidity of its assets, and loans in particular, as loans are one of the least liquid types of assets held on a bank’s balance sheet. This is the function of the loan-to-deposit ratio, which estimates whether a bank’s deposits can singlehandedly fund its loan book. If deposits exceed loans — though, remember that not all deposits are created equal — then a bank could theoretically withstand a liquidity run by pruning its securities portfolio or using parts thereof as collateral in exchange for cash. This would protect it from the need to unload loans at fire-sale prices which, in turn, could render the bank insolvent.

Overall, as the chart above illustrates, the bank industry has aggressively reduced its loan-to-deposit ratio since the crisis. In 2006, it was upwards of 96%. Today, it’s closer to 70%. It can’t be denied that some of this downward trend has to do with the historically low interest rate environment, which reduces the incentive of depositors to alternate out of deposits and into low-yielding securities. But it’s also safe to assume that banks have intentionally brought this number down to shore up their balance sheets, and in response to the heightened liquidity requirements of the post-crisis regulatory regime.

Whatever the motivations are behind these trends, one thing is certain: At least from the standpoint of liquidity, the nation’s banks have come a long way over the last few years to build a safer and more stable financial system. This doesn’t mean we won’t have banking crises and liquidity runs in the future, as history speaks clearly on the point that we will. But it does mean that, for the time being anyhow, this is one less thing for bank investors to worry about.

MONEY financial crisis

S&P to Pay Billions for Being the Watchdog That Didn’t Bark

Standard & Poor's building
Justin Lane—EPA

Standard & Poor's settlement is a reminder that the industry's safeguards failed in the lead-up to the financial crisis.

On Tuesday, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), agreed to pay $1.375 billion to settle claims by the Department of Justice and multiple state governments that the ratings agency defrauded investors in the lead up to the financial crisis.

As a bond-rating agency, S&P was responsible for keeping banks and other major financial institutions honest. Its apparently intentional failure to do so shows how one of the guard dogs of the financial system was co-opted by the very people it was meant to police.

Perverse incentives

Standard & Poors is one of three companies designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission as Nationally Recognized Statistical and Ratings Organizations (NRSROs). Their job is to rate the safety of bonds and thereby provide a kind of warning label for investors. The safest bonds—those issued by companies deemed most credit-worthy and best able to meet their financial commitments—are designated AAA; debt rated BB or lower is considered below investment grade, or “junk” in common parlance.

While companies like S&P theoretically exist to protect investors, much of their revenue comes from the lenders whose securities they were rating. As Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy describe in their book The Subprime Virus, ratings agencies generally bring in 1% of any debt deal they rate. Between 2000 and 2007, the three agencies underwrote $2.1 trillion in subprime mortgage-backed securities.

With that kind of money at stake, there was an obvious incentive for these firms to issue ratings that are favorable to the interests of their paying clients.

S&P and the financial crisis

According to a statement of facts released by the Justice Department and “agreed” to by S&P, that seems to be exactly what the company did. Contrary to the company’s Code of Practices and Procedures—which promises that its ratings “shall not be affected by an existing or a potential business relationship”—S&P “toned down and slowed down” the roll out of a new rating model for so-called Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) after an unnamed investment bank suggested the system could jeopardize “potential business opportunities.”

The statement also shows S&P delayed for months ratings revisions on securities it knew to be failing. As far back as November 2006 the head of S&P’s residential mortgage-backed securities group sent two senior executives a spreadsheet—revealingly entitled “Subprime_Trouble.XLS”—warning that many S&P-rated loans were in serious trouble and should be downgraded.

Multiple sources told the Justice Department investigators that the group’s head frequently complained that her concerns were ignored because downgrades would hurt S&P’s rating business. A public warning that major downgrades were imminent was delayed until July, 2007.

Aftermath

The rest, as they say, is history. The housing crash brought to light the incestuous relationship between rating agencies and bond issuers, and eventually resulted in lawsuits like this one. Though S&P was not forced to admit wrong-doing, the case and subsequent settlement revealed a trove of information about the inner workings of the agency and wiped away a full year of the company’s profits.

Dodd-Frank imposed a number of additional regulations on ratings agencies, including new rules regarding conflicts of interest. But S&P’s payout is a reminder that it wasn’t just crooked banks and lenders that tanked the financial sector. The supposed watchdogs were involved as well.

TIME finance

The S&P Settlement Is Odious—And Business as Usual

S&P Index Reports Record Drop In U.S. Home Prices
David McNew—Getty Images GLENDALE, CA - NOVEMBER 27: A reduced price sign sits in front of a house November 27, 2007 in Glendale, California. U.S. home prices plummeted 4.5 percent in the third quarter from the year before. It is the biggest drop since the start of Standard & Poor’s nationwide housing index 20 years ago, the research group announced. Prices also fell 1.7 percent from the previous three-month period in the largest quarter-to-quarter decline in the index’s history. (Photo by David McNew/Getty Images)

The settlement is huge news and proof that the shady arrangement between Wall Street and Washington is back to business as usual

The bill finally came due for Standard & Poor’s Financial Services: $1.37 billion. That’s what the company will pay to the federal, state and D.C. governments to resolve the culpability of its ratings agency in draining trillions of dollars from our bank accounts, 401ks and home equity not to mention contributing mightily to the global financial crisis.

As Attorney General Eric Holder put it: “As S&P admits under this settlement, company executives complained that the company declined to downgrade underperforming assets because it was worried that doing so would hurt the company’s business. While this strategy may have helped S&P avoid disappointing its clients, it did major harm to the larger economy, contributing to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.”

But S&P got off cheap and the fact that none of the people in charge of the company at the time are going to jail tells you it’s business as usual between Washington and Wall Street. It’s just a speeding ticket, people. Move along. The company was quick to point out that it wasn’t guilty of what it admitted to: “The settlement contains no findings of violations of law by the Company, S&P Financial Services or S&P Ratings,” the company’s press release asserts.

Nope, just a level of odiousness that still resonates eight years later.

S&P, part of McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. rates bonds for a living—it still does—and it was living well up to the financial crisis by rubber stamping its top, AAA rating to tranche after tranche of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOS) from 2004 to 2007. The way this works is that the bond issuers pay the ratings agencies to rate them. No conflict there, right? Triple-A is the rating reserved for the best of the best. But RMBs and CDOs that S&P was rating were partially underwritten by the vast number of no-doc, “liar loan” and other mortgages being handed out by equally sleazy outfits such as Countrywide Financial.

It all collapsed like the Ponzi scheme it was when these unfit buyers started to default on their mortgages and the value of the bonds crashed. It would lead to cascading calamities including the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the bailout of AIG, Freddie and Fannie Mac (quasi-government mortgage agencies) not to mention widespread contagion in the auto industry. S&P will also pay $125 million to calPERS, the California pension fund that, like many other pension funds, bought some of these AAA bonds under the guise that they were safe.

Nice work, that. For years, S&P was able to fend off lawsuits by claiming that its ratings were merely statements of opinion protected by the First Amendment, which particularly ticked me off. Don’t use our free-press/free-speech amendment to shelter your atrocious behavior. But that defense finally collapsed after the government took another tack: alleging that S&P committed fraud. “As S&P knew,” read the Justice Department’s lawsuit, “these representations were materially false, and concealed material facts, in that S&P’s desire for increased revenue and market share in the RMBS and CDO ratings markets led S&P to downplay and disregard the true extent of the credit risks posed by RMBS and CDO tranches in order to favor the interests of large investment banks and others involved in the issuance of RMBS and CDOs.”

S&P continued to resist, despite the DOJ uncovering emails that showed S&P employees knew they had clearly underestimated the risk of the RMBs and CDOs. Here’s my personal favorite: “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.” (Some, in fact, did and are.) S&P’s other defense is essentially that the bankers all knew we were full of it.

In the agreement that S&P signed with prosecutors it admits to the fact that the company was selling garbage. The DOJ also made S&P eat the company’s assertion that the lawsuit was retaliation for S&P’s downgrading the debt of the United States in 2011. S&P was wrong about the quality of its bonds and wrong about the quality of U.S. treasuries. Treasuries have never been more desirable.

So now S&P is free to go about its business, which is an oligopoly that it shares with Fitch and Moody’s, the same threesome that controlled the rating market in 2007. In its reregulation of the financial industry, Congress left the ratings agencies alone. Which means that at some point in the future you can expect the same problems to crop again.

TIME Companies

S&P to Pay Nearly $1.4 Billion to Settle Financial Crisis-Era Suits

Standard Poors Settlement
Henny Ray Abrams—AP 55 Water Street, home of Standard & Poor's, in New York City.

Lawsuit alleged the ratings firm had defrauded investors by issuing inflated ratings

Standard & Poor’s Financial Services has agreed to pay $1.375 billion to settle a Justice Department-led lawsuit that alleges the ratings firm had defrauded investors by issuing inflated ratings in the years preceding the financial crisis.

Under the terms of the settlement, the company agreed to split the settlement, paying $687.5 million to the Justice Department with an equal amount paid to 19 states and the District of Columbia, which filed their lawsuits after the federal government. The settlement contains no findings of violations of law by the company, notes McGraw Hill Financial, the parent company to ratings firm S&P.

The case, which stems from a 2013 lawsuit filed by the Justice Department, put the ratings firm at odds with the U.S. government over allegations that S&P had issued inflated ratings that misrepresented the true credit risks of the residential mortgage-backed securities and other ratings it weighed in on. Most media reports say that the feud was triggered by the ratings firm’s surprise downgrade of the U.S. government’s sovereign credit rating in 2011, a move that shocked observers. S&P still rates the U.S. at double-A-plus, which is one level below the prized triple-A rating held by Canada, Australia and a handful of wealthy European nations.

The complaint alleged that S&P falsely represented that its ratings were objective and uninfluenced by the firm’s relationship with investment banks. The Justice Department further contended that S&P was swayed by its desire to boost revenue and profits by winning business from those banking institutions.

S&P, along with Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings, hold a near monopoly on the credit ratings business, issuing ratings that can help investors determine if it is safe to buy bonds. The ratings are supposed to be objective, but banks pay for the business and that creates a conflict of interest according to some critics of the practice. The Justice Department, when it filed its suit in February 2013, said that it believed the S&P’s rosy ratings played “an important role in helping to bring our economy to the brink of collapse.”

McGraw Hill’s settlement is related to ratings issued between 2004 and 2007. The settlement will be reflected in McGraw Hill’s fourth-quarter results, which are due to be reported on Feb. 12. The company also reached a separate settlement with the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, or Calpers, to resolve some ratings claims. That settlement totaled $125 million.

S&P said it agreed to settle the matter to “avoid the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience, and expense of further litigation.” With that settlement now secured, the government is reportedly investigating Moody’s for the favorable ratings it allegedly issued before the financial crisis.

This article originally appeared on Fortune.com

MONEY Markets

Why Investors Are So Bad at Predicting Market Crashes

NYSE New York Stock Exchange
Stephen Chernin—Getty Images

After the market does well, no one expects a crash. After it crashes, everyone expects it to crash.

Stocks have boomed for nearly six years now. Are we due for a crash?

Yeah, probably. It’ll happen some day. Crashes happen.

But anytime I see people touting metrics that supposedly predict when a cash will occur, I shake my head. None of them work.

Yale School of Management publishes a “Crash Confidence Index.” It measures the percentage of individual and professional investors who think we won’t have a market crash in the next six months. The lower the index, the more investors think a crash is coming.

Yesterday came the headline: “More And More Investors Are Convinced A Stock Market Crash Is Coming.”

The Crash Confidence Index plunged in December to its lowest level in two years. “Less than a quarter of institutional investors and less than a third of individual investors believed that stocks wouldn’t crash,” Business Insider wrote.

Before you panic and liquidate your account, the most important line in Business Insider’s article is this: “On the bright side, this indicator may be a contrarian indicator.”

Bingo.

Plot the Crash Confidence Index (in blue) next to what the S&P 500 did during the following 12 months (in red), and you get this:

Investors were increasingly confident that stocks wouldn’t crash in 2007, and then a crash came. Then they were sure a crash would occur in 2009, just as a monster rally began. Same thing to a lesser degree in 2011.

If you plot the Crash Confidence Index next to what stocks did in the previous two months, you kind of see what’s going on here.

After the market does well — like in 2007 — no one expects a crash. After it crashes — like in 2009 — everyone expects it to crash:

This is similar to the consumer confidence index, which consistently peaks just before the economy is about to get ugly and bottoms when things are about to turn. (Although we only know the timing in hindsight.)

Stocks have done poorly during the last few weeks, so it’s not too surprising that expectations of a crash are growing. People like to extrapolate returns into the future.

We’ll have a crash some day. But more money has probably been lost trying to predict and hedge against a looming crash than has been lost by just expecting and enduring one when it comes.

For more on on this stuff:

More from The Motley Fool: Where Are The Customers’ Yachts?

TIME Morning Must Reads

Morning Must Reads: December 29

Capitol
Mark Wilson—Getty Images The early morning sun rises behind the US Capitol Building in Washington, DC.

Objects Spotted in Hunt for Jet

An Australian aircraft has detected objects that may be related to AirAsia Flight QZ 8501, which vanished Sunday en route from Indonesia to Singapore with 162 on board. The sightings were made near Nangka island, about 700 miles from where contact was lost

What We Know About QZ 8501

In the third Malaysia-linked aviation disaster this year, an AirAsia plane traveling from Indonesia to Singapore disappeared on Sunday over the Java Sea

U.S. Ends Afghan War

The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan ended its combat mission Sunday, marking the formal — if not real — end to the longest war in American history

Greece Fears New Financial Crisis

Greek financial markets reacted negatively on Monday to news that the country’s lawmakers refused to elect a new president, triggering snap elections that may bring to power the radical left-wing Syriza party, which has threatened to default

San Francisco 49ers, Jim Harbaugh Agree to Part Ways

The San Francisco 49ers and head coach Jim Harbaugh have “mutually agreed to part ways,” team CEO Jed York said in a statement on Sunday. York also said the 49ers have already started its search for the team’s next head coach

All Passengers Evacuated From Burning Ferry in Adriatic Sea

All passengers were evacuated off a burning Italian ferry adrift in the Adriatic Sea after the craft burst into flames on Sunday. More than 400 passengers have been safety removed from the vessel, and five passengers died

Box-Office Report: The Hobbit, Unbroken Beat Into the Woods

The two new films were neck and neck: Into the Woods made $15.1 million Christmas day, while Unbroken made $15.9 million. As it turns out, audiences were equally intrigued by the star-studded musical and the Oscar-ready drama

NYC Police Chief Defends Mayor

NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton said it was wrong for police to turn their backs to a video monitor outside the church where New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio spoke at the funeral of officer Rafael Ramos. “I certainly don’t support that action,” said Bratton

ISIS Executes Nearly 2,000 People in 6 Months

ISIS executed 1,878 people in Syria over the past six months, including 120 of its own members, according to the U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Most people killed by the Islamist group were civilians, among them 930 members of a single tribe

Ferguson Police Spokesperson Suspended

A spokesman for the Ferguson, Mo., police department has been suspended without pay after he admitted to calling a memorial for an unarmed black teenager shot to death by a white officer “a pile of trash,” the city said on Saturday

Spokesman: George H.W. Bush to Remain in Hospital

A spokesman for George H.W. Bush says the former President will remain in a Houston hospital for now but that news of a “possible discharge” could come soon. Bush was taken to the hospital on Tuesday for what was reported as a precaution

James Franco and Seth Rogen Live-Tweet The Interview

Twitter already went wild over The Interview when the controversial comedy was released online on Christmas Eve, and now, stars James Franco and Seth Rogen are joining the fray. The actors live-tweeted the film on Sunday

Get TIME’s The Brief e-mail every morning in your inbox

TIME Greece

Greek Parliamentary Vote May Lead to Snap Elections and a Derailed Bailout

GREECE-POLITICS-ECONOMY-PARLIAMENT-VOTE
Aris Messinis—AFP/Getty Images People walk past the Greek Parliament in Athens on Dec. 17, 2014. Greece is a step away from early elections that could repudiate its international bailout and rekindle a euro-zone crisis after lawmakers failed to elect a President

Antiausterity left-wing party rides high in polls

The Greek Parliament is holding a vote Monday that will decide whether the country will go to snap elections, possibly bringing to power the left-wing Syriza party that has vowed to renegotiate the battered country’s international bailout.

The vote is the third and final round to elect a new President. Failure to do so will trigger polls by early February, reports Reuters.

Prime Minister Antonis Samaras’ nominee Stavros Dimas runs unopposed, but needs 12 more votes to secure the necessary supermajority.

Syriza is leading the opinion polls, buoyed by its objections to the present terms of the joint E.U.-IMF rescue package and a promise to review austerity measures taken in the country since the financial crisis of 2009.

“In Europe, sentiment is changing,” Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras wrote in his party newspaper Sunday. “Everyone is getting used to the idea that Syriza will be the government and that new negotiations will begin.”

[Reuters]

TIME Economy

We Still Haven’t Dealt With the Financial Crisis

Five Years After Start Of Financial Crisis, Wall Street Continues To Hum
John Moore—Getty Images A street sign for Wall Street hangs outside the New York Stock Exchange on September 16, 2013 in New York City.

It often takes years after a geopolitical or economic crisis to come up with the proper narrative for what happened. So it’s no surprised that six years on from the financial crisis of 2008, you are seeing a spate of new battles over what exactly happened. From the new information about whether the government could have, in fact, saved Lehman Brothers from collapse, to the lawsuit over whether AIG should have to pay hefty fees for its bailout (and whether the government should have penalized a wider range of firms), to the secret Fed tapes that show just how in bed with Wall Street regulators still are (the topic of my column this week), it seems every day brings a debate over what happened in 2008 and whether we’ve fix it.

My answer, of course, is that we haven’t. To hear more on that, check out my debate on the topic with New York Times’ columnist Joe Nocera, on this week’s episode of WNYC’s Money Talking:

TIME Asthma

Study: Fear of Job Loss Can Increase Asthma Risk

The report looked at German adults during the recent economic downturn

Fear of losing one’s job can cause a marked increase in the risk of developing asthma, according to a new study released Tuesday.

The study, published online in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, found that for every 25% increase in job security that a worker felt, that worker’s likelihood of developing asthma increased by 24%. For people who told researchers it was more likely than not that they would lose their job, the risk of developing asthma climbed 60%.

Fear of losing one’s job has been linked to a number of negative health outcomes, but this is the first time it has been linked to the risk of developing asthma, the study’s authors said.

The study surveyed the records of more than 7,000 working German adults between 2009 and 2011, a time in which European economies were in downturn.

Your browser, Internet Explorer 8 or below, is out of date. It has known security flaws and may not display all features of this and other websites.

Learn how to update your browser