ministries’ procurement departments to establish oversight and vendor vetting mechanisms and to ensure continued international funding for the ANSF post-2014. ISAF will also encourage Afghan security ministries to connect with elements of civil society in a long-term effort to generate social pressure for reform and to contribute to the Afghan narrative on corruption reform.

In the current reporting period, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), a specialized and vetted law enforcement unit of the MOI, significantly increased the number of cases against corrupt government officials and transnational organized crime members. The cases included prosecutions against corrupt provincial governance, corrupt parliamentarians, human trafficking, kidnapping, and transnational organized crime. In early December 2013, GIRoA dedicated a part-time prosecution team from the AGO to the MCTF to ensure that cases are properly prepared for prosecution and tracked through the criminal justice system. This has yet to translate into charges being filed against high-level or well-connected corrupt actors.

3.8: COUNTERNARCOTICS

Narcotics continued to play an integral role in financing the insurgency, creating instability and enabling corruption. The Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics collaborated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to publish the 2013 *Afghanistan Opium Survey* in November 2013.\(^\text{13}\) The survey reported a record 209,000 hectares cultivated in 2013, a 36 percent increase over 2012. The number of poppy-free provinces decreased from 17 to 15, while eradication declined by 24 percent.

The narcotics trade in Afghanistan remains large, and insurgent penetration of that market is extensive and expanding. Successful CN interdiction operations in one region or area may be offset by insurgents increasing revenues by other means, such as kidnapping for ransom or through donations, which are difficult to affect. GIRoA regularly collaborates with U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of the ISAF counternarcotics (CN) campaign plan, ISAF coordinates with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. government departments and agencies to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry. Afghan forces conducted 157 operations from October 1, 2013 to March 14, 2014 resulting in seizures of 13,686 kg of opium, 1,202 kg of heroin, 7,921 kg of hash, 182 kg of morphine and 9,208 kg of precursor chemicals as well as detention of 206 individuals. The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. U.S. intelligence organizations provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to coalition mentors.

The number of operations by the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNP-A) and other Afghan CN agencies declined during the reporting period because of the loss of ISAF supported enablers, the reduced number of ISAF partnered operations, and security concerns in some contested southern provinces with increased poppy cultivation. During the second half of the

\(^\text{13}\) *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, Summary findings, November 2013.
reporting period, most interdiction activities occurred in RC-E and RC-C. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in RC-S and RC-SW where the majority of opiates are grown, processed and smuggled out of Afghanistan. This shift is likely a result of the coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in RC-E and RC-C is generally less than the threat in the South and Southwest.

**Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**

The CNP-A is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNP-A headquarters is located in Kabul, and the CNP-A has officers stationed in all 34 provinces, including four forward operating bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD supports the CNP-A through capacity building to establish an Afghan institution that can capably counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption.

The CNP-A Development Unit, funded by DoD but implemented by the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, continued to assist the CNP-A in preparing for transition.

DEA’s CN efforts concentrated on building and sustaining the capability and capacity of specialized vetted units (National Interdiction Unit (NIU), Special Investigation Unit, and Technical Investigation Unit) of the CNP-A to address the illicit drug trade. These vetted units are essential to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. DoD, State, and DEA capacity-building efforts included training, provision of equipment and infrastructure, and mentorship by DEA enforcement, intelligence, and training personnel. A significant example of the results of these efforts was a joint operation that targeted heroin conversion laboratories in Badakhshan Province in which the NIU dismantled a large heroin laboratory and seized approximately 700 kilograms of opium and other products.

The CJATF-Nexus made substantial progress in assisting the ANSF with investigating the targeting both individuals and networks at the nexus of insurgency, counternarcotics, and criminal patronage. The task force developed targeting packets and illustrative intelligence products, which are releasable to GIRoA. These tools have been used to provide security force assistance to ANSF organizations to further operational activities and tactical success.
Afghan Special Missions Wing Support to Counternarcotics

During the reporting period, the SMW received six new Mi-17s and five new PC-12s. The PC-12s will primarily be used to provide ISR support to operations. In addition to its mission responsibilities to support CT and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), the Special Missions Wing (SMW) continues to provide aviation support to the DEA and Afghan CN law enforcement organizations. DEA liaison officers with the SMW and coalition Special Operations Forces ensure DEA aviation requirements are considered and appropriately supported in the special operations allocation and tasking process. The unit conducted several Afghan-planned, led, and fully executed tactical missions in support of CN and CT objectives including seven NVG and one-day multi-aircraft tactical missions. SMW missions resulted in the destruction or seizure of 100 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 900 kg opium, 4,112 kg hashish, 4,000 liters of morphine solution, 150 kg morphine, 24,700 kg of poppy seeds, and two drug labs were destroyed.

Border Management

DoD’s partnership with the U.S. Embassy Kabul Border Management Task Force (BMTF) is an essential element in the professionalization of Afghan border and customs police officials. BMTF mentors taught a number of classes at the Kabul International Airport to improve airport security. Border mentors provide training and mentorship to Afghan border officials at key border crossing points. This support will continue to reduce U.S. military forces pull back from border locations.

Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell

Led by the DEA, the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) identified and disrupted sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan since 2008. The ATFC includes DoD deputies and staff comprised of personnel from DoD, Treasury, and law enforcement agencies. During the reporting period, ATFC assisted with Treasury designations of key threat finance targets and continued working with U.S. and Afghan law enforcement partners on vital investigations. ATFC’s law enforcement arm also began a training program focused on advising district and provincial Afghan police on how to disrupt illicit finance networks, such as those operated by unlicensed money service providers.