Popular Army

The Polish military is a rare institution in the Communist East bloc: aPeople’s Army that is truly popular. The 319,500 members of the threemajor armed forces, the largest non-Soviet military group within theWarsaw Pact, have a tradition of austere professionalism, which standsin stark contrast to the corruption that has plagued Poland’s civilianbureaucracy and angered the people. A recent national poll showed thatcivilians ranked the army third in favor among the country’sinstitutions, just behind the Roman Catholic Church and Solidarity.(The party came in a poor sixth, trailing even the hated police.)During the riots over food price increases in 1976, General WojciechJaruzelski showed how closely the army was allied with the people whenhe declared: “Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers.”

Most experts believe that this is still true, mainly because of theclose bonds between the two groups and the Poles’ strong feeling ofnational unity. The army’s 210,000 members are drawn largely from thesame worker and peasant ranks as members of Solidarity and its ruralcounterpart; so are 86% of the Polish officer corps. Conscripts tend toserve in the regions where they are drafted, adding further to theiridentification with local people.Says one Western diplomat in Warsaw: “An army like that is designed todefend the country and not to put down revolts. A third of the army hasbeen drafted since August 1980. Another third was inducted the yearbefore that. Their brothers, fathers and cousins are Solidaritymembers.”Asks he rhetorically: “How much use would those people be againstSolidarity?”

Many experts doubt that the Soviets would intervene in Poland in a waythat would invite a pitched battle; units are more likely to be calledin by the Polish government to help quell growing disturbances. But ifthe crisis were to escalate into a full-scale invasion, analystsbelieve that the Poles would fight, and fight well, even though theyare outgunned and outnumbered. There are 57 Warsaw Pact divisions onPoland’s borders and two more within the country, vs. the 15 Polisharmy divisions. The Soviets, moreover, could quickly cut off the Polishmilitary’s gasoline supply by shutting down the Friendship oil pipelinethat runs across the country to East Germany.

Another key factor is that neither the Polish army nor the air forcecontrols an independent communications network. Faced with Sovietmilitary intervention, the Polish forces would undoubtedly cost theinvaders heavy casualties, but would most likely be overwhelmed. Evenso, the Poles could then be expected to fight on as guerrillas.

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