--- ---  IDEASTime ideas # We Must Remember Nagasaki by [James M. Scott](https://time.com/author/james-m-scott/) ## James M. Scott James M. Scott is a Pulitzer Prize finalist and the author of "Empire of Ashes: Truman, Hirohito, and the Descent into Total War." Aug 10, 2026 8:45 PM UTC  Devastation after the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945. Devastation after the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945.MPI—Getty Images by [James M. Scott](https://time.com/author/james-m-scott/) ## James M. Scott James M. Scott is a Pulitzer Prize finalist and the author of "Empire of Ashes: Truman, Hirohito, and the Descent into Total War." Aug 10, 2026 8:45 PM UTC Each August, the world pauses to remember the U.S. dropping an atomic bomb on [Hiroshima](https://time.com/3777218/hiroshima-ground-zero-1945/), Japan during World War II. Newspapers publish [retrospectives](https://time.com/3086966/hiroshima-nagasaki-anniversary/), television [documentaries](https://time.com/7306986/atomic-people-true-story-pbs/) revisit the devastation, and world leaders gather to [warn against](https://time.com/5875424/ban-ki-moon-hiroshima-nagasaki-nuclear/) the destructive power of atomic weapons. [Nagasaki](https://time.com/5876864/nagasaki-atomic-bomb-overlooked/), bombed just three days later, receives only a fraction of that attention. The imbalance extends well beyond anniversary commemorations. In 2025, Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Museum welcomed over [2.5 million](https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20260406/p2a/00m/0na/024000c) visitors, while Nagasaki’s attracted fewer than [900,000](https://news.jp/i/1414798351034680041?c=39546741839462401). Yet history tells a different story. While Hiroshima has become the defining [symbol](https://time.com/3879427/hiroshima-portraits-of-survivors/) of the atomic age, it was Nagasaki that helped change the course of World War II. The second atomic bomb—not the first—broke the [deadlock](https://time.com/archive/6847269/the-world-hirohito-a-happy-experience/) within Japan’s leadership, compelled [Emperor Hirohito](https://time.com/archive/6839265/the-world-hirohito-the-first-gentleman/) to intervene in the political process, and set in motion Japan’s surrender. Eighty-one years later, that fact remains one of the least appreciated turning points of the twentieth century. By the summer of 1945, [Japan](https://time.com/archive/6792701/international-the-defeated/) had largely lost the war [militarily](https://time.com/archive/6833383/japan-the-growing-defense-force/). Its Navy rested on the muddy floor of the Pacific, while the remains of its air force were being converted into kamikazes. Sixty-four of its cities had been reduced to [rubble](https://time.com/3494421/hiroshima-and-nagasaki-photos-from-the-ruins/) and ash by incendiary bombs, as a submarine blockade strangled its economy, cutting off food, fuel, and raw materials. But, I would argue, there is a difference between defeat and surrender. And historical records tell us that the latter remained unthinkable for Japan’s military leaders. Japan still counted [5 million](https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/key-documents/stimson-bomb/) men under arms, a force military leaders believed offered one final opportunity. Their strategy was simple: inflict such brutal casualties on invading American troops that Washington would have no choice but to abandon its demand for unconditional surrender and grant Japan more favorable peace terms. President [Harry Truman](https://time.com/3984086/harry-truman-atomic-bomb-myths/) had already approved Operation Olympic, the November 1945 invasion of Kyushu, the first phase of a massive assault on the Japanese home islands. The savage battles of [Iwo Jima](https://time.com/3708180/cables-from-iwo-jima-wwii/) and [Okinawa](https://time.com/archive/6793868/okinawa-forgotten-island/) had already demonstrated the ferocity with which Japanese forces would defend their homeland. One July 1945 Pentagon [estimate](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Downfall/rIlPEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Downfall:+The+end+of+the+imperial+Japanese+empire&printsec=frontcover) projected America would suffer between 1.7 million and 4 million casualties. Japanese military and civilian losses were [expected](https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-057/h-057-1.html) to reach between 5 to 10 million. Then, on August 6, the United States dropped the [first](https://time.com/5644493/what-happened-enola-gay/) atomic bomb on Hiroshima, obliterating nearly five square miles of the city. Approximately 140,000 men, women, and children ultimately died from the blast or the subsequent effects of radiation. But contrary to [popular understanding](https://time.com/4346336/atomic-bombs-1945-history/) among many today, Hiroshima did not convince Japan to surrender. In fact, Japan’s Supreme War Council—the six men responsible for directing the war—did not even meet in the days immediately following the attack. The military leadership remained [committed to fighting](https://time.com/5877433/wwii-japanese-surrender-coup/) on despite the destruction of an entire city. Many were convinced that Hiroshima represented a terrible but isolated event. Atomic weapons were new and extraordinarily expensive, and they surmised that there was no way the Americans had more than one—or at most, a few—such bombs. If America had only limited bombs, Japanese leaders concluded, they could still hope to force a costly invasion and perhaps negotiate better terms. Nagasaki shattered that illusion. [Just 75 hours](https://time.com/4142857/wwii-leaflets-japan/) after Hiroshima, a second atomic bomb annihilated another Japanese city, killing 73,000 people. Two cities had vanished in just three days. From Tokyo’s perspective, there was no way of knowing whether the United States possessed two bombs—or twenty. Even more terrifying, America now might never even need to invade Japan. It could simply destroy one city after another until nothing remained. That realization prompted Japan’s leaders to at last confront the reality that the war could not be won. Even after Nagasaki, however, surrender was far from certain. The Supreme War Council deadlocked three-to-three between those favoring peace and those determined to fight to the finish. The impasse was broken only when Emperor Hirohito took the [extraordinary step](https://time.com/3993973/emperor-hirohito-myths/) of personally intervening in the political decision-making process—a move virtually unprecedented in modern Japanese history—to demand Japan at last accept surrender. None of this diminishes the horror of either atomic bombing. Tens of thousands of men, women, and children died in unimaginable circumstances. Their suffering deserves remembrance, mourning, and reflection on the terrible consequences of nuclear war. But moral judgments and historical causation are not the same question. And the historical evidence is clear. Hiroshima alone did not end the war. Nagasaki did. [For decades](https://time.com/3987513/hiroshima-anniversary-70-pictures/), public memory has elevated Hiroshima into a universal symbol of the tragedy of war and horror of atomic weapons, while allowing Nagasaki to fade into the background. Hiroshima was unquestionably the first use of an atomic weapon, and more people did die in that attack than in Nagasaki. But the prominence accorded to Hiroshima has unintentionally obscured the event that helped force Japan’s surrender. Understanding that distinction is important. It reminds us that history is rarely as simple as anniversary news stories portray, and that decisive moments are not always the ones we see remembered. And equally as important, it reminds us that the final days of World War II were not shaped by a single atomic bomb, but by Japan’s terrifying realization that the United States could strike again—and again. History should continue to remember Hiroshima as the beginning of the atomic age. But it should also remember Nagasaki as the moment World War II finally ended. [TIME Ideas](https://www.time.com/ideas) hosts the world's leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors. We Must Remember Nagasaki ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"OpinionNewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/article/2026/08/10/why-nagasaki-matters/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/article/2026/08/10/why-nagasaki-matters/"},"headline":"We Must Remember Nagasaki","datePublished":"2026-08-10T20:45:21.982Z","dateModified":"2026-08-10T20:45:22.157Z","description":"“Public memory has elevated Hiroshima into a universal symbol of the tragedy of war and horror of atomic weapons, while allowing Nagasaki to fade into the background,” writes James M. 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