--- ---  # China First: As Trump Meets Xi, How Beijing Sees the World Now ## Video: Trump Extends White House Invitation to Chinese President Xi Jinping [Watch (HLS stream): Trump Extends White House Invitation to Chinese President Xi Jinping](https://cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/vtQD8oNh.m3u8) (0:32)  _Published 2026-05-14. What China seeks is not the abrupt unravelling of American power, but the space to expand its own capabilities without provoking overwhelming resistance._ by [Yu Jie](https://time.com/author/yu-jie/) ## Yu Jie Dr. Yu Jie is a Senior Research Fellow for China at Chatham House May 13, 2026 10:00 AM UTC by [Yu Jie](https://time.com/author/yu-jie/) ## Yu Jie Dr. Yu Jie is a Senior Research Fellow for China at Chatham House May 13, 2026 10:00 AM UTC President Donald Trump is [scheduled to meet ](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/world/asia/xi-trump-china-taiwan-arms-sales.html)with China’s president, Xi Jinping, in Beijing on Thursday for a two-day summit. The question that hovers over the encounter is deceptively simple: what does China want? This question has been posed since the founding of the People’s Republic and carries a sharper edge today. In early March, the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, one of China’s most prominent foreign affairs think tanks, gathered the “good and great” of Beijing’s strategists, some former senior Chinese officials, and a contingent of foreign scholars for its annual dialogue. The conversation circled around the same question: What does China want? Yet rather than offering a clear articulation of Beijing’s ambitions, many participants framed their answers in the opposite—insisting that what China does not want is to become a superpower in the image of the United States. So, how does China see the world? Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has embraced what might be called a “China First” approach to the world. The phrase does not echo the populist rallying overtones it carries elsewhere. It reflects how Chinese elites and the public perceive their country’s position in the world, along with a hierarchy of priorities: reducing vulnerability to external pressure with reasonable growth; managing—rather than resolving—its deepening rivalry with the United States; and stabilizing China’s periphery. “China First” is a vision of global leadership that is conditional, instrumental, and always subordinate to Beijing’s imperatives of domestic prosperity creation, national security, and regime survival. ### **What does "China First” mean?** Beijing’s “China First” strategy is a pragmatic approach to managing its domestic concerns and foreign affairs. The playbook prioritizes economic and technological self-reliance; long-term political stability, secured by cementing the authority of the Chinese state and the Communist Party; prudently managing—not resolving—rivalry with the United States; and consolidating regional dominance along its periphery. It reflects both ambition and insecurity. China is more powerful than ever, and yet it is more cautious and inward focused. Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China’s rise has[ been defined by integration](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-still-rising) into global markets, multilateral institutions, and sprawling supply chains. Today, its trajectory is shaped increasingly by insulation. Today, Beijing is focused on building economic resilience against technological chokepoints, geopolitical encirclement, and the volatility of an international order it neither fully trusts nor wishes to abandon. The result is not a retreat from the world, but a recalibration of how China engages with it. Under President Xi, this “China First” strategy has grown both more explicit and more tightly enforced. The guiding concept of [“national rejuvenation”](https://eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/05/xis-chinese-dream-collective-strength-for-national-rejuvenation/) frames China’s rise not as an open ended pursuit of global leadership, but as a historically bounded project: restoring the wealth, power, and status the country believes it deserves. Within this narrative, foreign policy is not a vehicle for ideological expansion or a universal mission; it is an instrument calibrated to shape an external environment conducive to China’s domestic priorities. ### **Fortress China** In March, China unveiled its[ 15th Five-Year Plan](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/03/chinas-15th-five-year-plan/), laying out the country’s economic objectives and development trajectory from 2026 to 2030\. The political blueprint marked a significant departure from the plans of the past three decades. Where earlier plans were focused on maximizing economic growth, this one places far greater emphasis on resilience in an era of mounting uncertainty. From President Xi and his lieutenants, the message is unambiguous: resilience and technological self-reliance are not temporary adjustments to external pressure, but enduring strategic priorities. The logic underpinning this shift is straightforward. Over the past decade, Chinese policymakers have grown increasingly wary of the very forces that once powered the country’s rise. Economic globalization, which was long the engine of export-led growth, has come to be seen as a source of[ exposure as much as opportunity](https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/more-nuanced-lexicon-heterogeneity-vulnerability-and-uncertainty-china-studies). Trade frictions, regional conflicts, and the disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have revealed the fragility of global supply chains. At the same time, tightening technology restrictions by the West have alarmed Beijing about how dependence on foreign inputs can cripple the nation. For China, the world’s second largest economy, these vulnerabilities cut to the core of its economic model. It relies on manufacturing strength that depends not only on domestic capacity, but on reliable global supply networks, efficient logistics, and access to large external markets. Stability at home and abroad is a precondition for continued growth. When that stability can no longer be assumed, the model itself must adapt. Seen in this light, China’s objective is not to sever global ties, but to reshape them on more favorable terms. The phrase Chinese officials often use to describe their approach is “[controlled interdependence](https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-chinese-reassessment-of-interdependence).” Beijing intends to remain deeply embedded in the global economy, while reducing exposure to external shocks and political pressure. That requires a more active role for the state in steering industrial policy and managing the balance between domestic demand and[ seeking](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2026/03/10/south-south-trade-with-china-is-the-future-of-global-trade/) external markets for its products. The conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran will only reinforce Beijing’s conviction. Instability in several of the world’s most important energy suppliers illustrates how quickly geopolitical crises can ripple through global markets. For China, which remains the world’s largest energy importer—with 70% of its crude oil imported—and a central hub in global manufacturing networks, the conflict in the Middle East is a stark reminder of the risks inherent in overreliance on external conditions beyond its control. Beijing’s turn toward resilience appears,[ in its own telling](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356830.shtml), both prescient and necessary. Efforts to strengthen domestic supply chains, upgrade advanced manufacturing, and invest heavily in strategic technologies, from cutting-edge semiconductors to next-generation 6G connectivity, are framed not merely as economic initiatives, but as imperatives of national security. In “Fortress China,” economic policy and geopolitical strategy are no longer distinct domains; they are increasingly, one and the same. ### **China, the United States, and the West** If “China First” begins at home and in the near abroad, it faces its most severe test in Beijing’s relationship with Washington and the wider Western alliance. Among[ some international observers](https://www.ft.com/content/248b5e50-d12b-4aa0-aa85-05bd9fa3ac82?syn-25a6b1a6=1), a persistent assumption holds that a more inward-looking or disruptive America—particularly under leaders such as Donald Trump—would hand China a handsome strategic advantage. Beijing, however, sees the matter in more nuanced terms. For all its friction with Washington, China’s rise has been deeply embedded in an international system that the U.S. built and upheld. Access to global markets, acceptance by international institutions, and integrated technological ecosystems have been critical to China’s development. What Beijing seeks, therefore, is not the abrupt unravelling of American power, but the space to expand its own capabilities without provoking overwhelming resistance. The experience of intensifying competition, from the first Trump Administration through the Biden years, has reinforced the risks of triggering a more coordinated and restrictive Western response. So, what kind of America does China actually prefer? For years, Beijing seemed content with a relatively stable, gradually declining America—one challenging enough to sharpen Chinese ambition, predictable enough to plan around—as China steadily narrowed the gap in power and influence. A more volatile and internally divided America, less committed to alliances and more erratic in its foreign policies, does not necessarily serve China’s interests. America may appear weaker in certain respects, it is also less predictable and more prone to military miscalculation. For Chinese policymakers, managing a competitor that is both strategically powerful and politically unstable may prove more difficult than dealing with one that is consistent, if adversarial. Against this backdrop, Beijing has come to treat strategic competition with Washington as a protracted condition rather than a passing phase. Trade and tariff disputes, technology restrictions, and security tensions, from the Taiwan Strait to the broader Asia-Pacific, have hardened attitudes on both sides. Yet China has shown little appetite for confrontation. Its approach is defined by calibration: pushing back where core interests are at stake, while preserving high-level channels of communication where mutual benefit remains possible. Beijing’s strategy extends to the broader Western coalition. Europe occupies an increasingly frictional position. The member states of the European Union are, for China, both vital[ economic partners](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531%5F11367378.html) and persistent strategic sceptics. Beijing has sought to navigate this ambivalence by engaging individual European governments while sidelining Brussels, a tactic that reliably[ antagonizes EU institutions](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/xi-jinping-hopes-improve-eu-china-relations-and-drive-wedge-between-europe-and-us). China’s objective is not to fracture the Western alliance outright, but to prevent the consolidation of a fully unified and enduring Western front. In this sense, managing the rivalry is less about winning decisively than about avoiding strategic overreach or direct confrontation. ### **China’s periphery** If “China First” begins with securing the domestic base, it is most clearly expressed in the prioritization of its immediate periphery. China’s foreign policy in Asia combines[ economic integration with selective coercion](https://eh4s.eu/publication/diplomatic-charm-offensive-and-hard-line-on-security-chinas-evolving-approach-to-asia-under-the-second-trump-administration), deployed in varying proportions depending on the country and context. President Xi Jinping has made more than[ 20 visits](https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/xi-travels-less-world-coming-beijing) to Asian countries—more than to any other region—a telling indicator of the importance Beijing attaches to what it calls “[periphery diplomacy](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa%5Feng/xw/zyxw/202504/t20250410%5F11592755.html).” Unlike America, whose global role draws it into crises far from its shores, China’s path to influence runs first through its own neighborhood. Geography imposes both opportunities and risks: a stable periphery provides strategic depth, while a hostile one raises the danger of encirclement. The priority is not aspiring to outright global leadership but the steady expansion of influence close to home. This is most visible in China’s posture toward the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait—two flashpoints where sovereignty and security interests are contested by countries such as Japan and the Philippines. In both cases, Beijing has paired growing military capabilities with calibrated assertiveness, seeking to shift the balance of power through the[ steady normalization of Chinese pressure](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c87l7xjp235o) and presence, while carefully avoiding escalation. Yet the picture is more complicated than simple Chinese expansionism. A diminished American presence in Asia is often assumed to benefit Beijing. In practice, it may produce new uncertainties. China’s concerns increasingly extend to its immediate neighbors, particularly Japan and the Philippines. Without a reliable American security umbrella, both countries could feel compelled to expand and develop their military deterrents.[ Measures](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/japanese-leader-takaichi-warns-china-coercion-vows-security-overhaul-rcna259857) seen as defensive in Tokyo or Manila are invariably interpreted in Beijing as offensive—reinforcing, rather than easing, cycles of suspicion. Beyond military power,[ economic statecraft](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202510/29/content%5FWS6901698cc6d00ca5f9a0725b.html) remains China’s primary instrument. Through trade, investment, and, at times, economic coercion, Beijing has[ embedded](https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2025/vw202530%5F2/) itself in the economies of its neighbors. Many Asian countries now count China as their largest trading partner, a reality that creates both opportunity and unease. China has also demonstrated a[ willingness to apply pressure](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/technology/tech-news/how-china-is-trying-to-stop-apples-big-iphone-move-to-india/articleshow/120617573.cms) when it perceives core interests to be at stake. Its relations with India, marked by long-standing[ border tensions and disputes](https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/asia/south-asia/india-china/334-thin-ice-himalayas-handling-india-china-border-dispute), illustrate the risks of mismanaging a nuclear neighbor. Here, competition for regional influence has produced a more openly adversarial dynamic, one that both sides have mostly managed without military escalations. China does not seek to replicate traditional models of hegemony. Before it can reshape the global order, Beijing must ensure that its immediate neighborhood is not a source of disorder. The challenge, however, lies in execution. The more Beijing presses, the more it risks[ provoking](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/14/philippines-says-fishermen-hurt-boat-damaged-in-china-coastguard-skirmish) the very reactions it seeks to avoid. Managing that tension will remain the defining test for its periphery diplomacy. ### **Confident rise or defensive stance** Beijing’s strategic path is neither “[autarky](https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/China%5FExecutive%5FBriefing%5FOpen%5Fto%5FAutarky%5FChinas%5Fcoming%5F5-year%5Fplan.pdf)” nor a seamless continuation of the heyday of economic globalization. It is something less settled: a world of overlapping systems, partial decoupling, and persistent rivalry managed short of open conflict. And yet, “China First” is not without its trade-offs. The economic shift toward resilience, tighter regulation, and a retreat from unfettered global integration may strengthen China’s ability to withstand external pressure. But these same choices can also weigh on employment creation and employment levels, private sector confidence, and long-term growth prospects, which can lead to potential frictions at home. Managing the balance between security and opportunity will be critical, particularly[ for a generation](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/17/china-youth-unemployment-civil-service-jobs-economy-slowdown.html) whose expectations were shaped by decades of meteoric economic rise. Still, it would be a mistake to view “China First” solely through the lens of constraints. In several respects, the approach has yielded tangible gains. Despite ongoing irritants, China has so far avoided severing ties with the U.S. and maintained a degree of strategic stability even as competition deepens. Channels of engagement, however strained, remain open, and both sides have shown an interest in preventing their rivalry from spiraling into direct conflict. Progress has also been made on the technological front. While gaps remain, China has made real strides[ as a technology champion](https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-12/can-west-recover-chinas-hi-tech-knockout-blow) and demonstrated that external pressure can, under certain conditions, catalyze innovation rather than suppress it. The pursuit of self-reliance, in this sense, is not merely defensive; it is also an incentive. The balancing act between these strengths and strains will shape China’s future. A more resilient economy and a more self-sufficient technological base may enhance Beijing’s power. But neither will be sustainable without continuous growth and domestic confidence. “China First” cannot be secured by policy alone; it must also command the confidence of those it is ultimately designed to serve. In the end, the strategy’s success will be judged by a singular measure: whether it works for the 1.4 billion Chinese people it was ultimately designed for, who expect a better life. 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