--- ---  IDEASTime ideas # Why the War with Iran Could Be a Long One by [Paul Poast](https://time.com/author/paul-poast/) and [Pegah Banihashemi](https://time.com/author/pegah-banihashemi/) Mar 13, 2026 11:00 AM UTC  A police officer stands guard beneath a poster of Iran's former leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on March 10, 2026 in Tehran, Iran. A police officer stands guard beneath a poster of Iran's former leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on March 10, 2026 in Tehran, Iran.Majid Saeedi–Getty Images by [Paul Poast](https://time.com/author/paul-poast/) and [Pegah Banihashemi](https://time.com/author/pegah-banihashemi/) Mar 13, 2026 11:00 AM UTC Since American and Israeli airstrikes started a war with Iran, almost every aspect of the conflict has been called into question: its initial rationale, the Trump Administration’s strategy for ending hostilities, and the shape of the day after. Questions persist because President Donald Trump and his officials have offered contradictory answers, ranging from the [limited aim](https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2026-03/us-war-iran-new-and-lingering-nuclear-risks) of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons to the [maximalist goal](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/trumps-endgame-in-iran-regime-change-without-us-boots-on-the-ground) of toppling the Islamic Republic through a popular revolt. Trump did describe one element of the campaign with accuracy at the outset: it would not be quick. While announcing the military campaign against Iran, Trump spoke about likely U.S. casualties, and a few days later, he remarked the war could last “[four to five weeks](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/10/us/politics/trump-iran-war-how-long-timeline.html),” and if necessary, “for far longer.” In a recent [interview](https://www.axios.com/2026/03/11/trump-iran-war-end-withdrawal) with Axios, Trump said that the war will end soon, adding, "Any time I want it to end, it will end." His claims about a quick end to the war may be more about political signaling than a realistic assessment of the military situation. Rapid declarations of victory can help calm financial markets and reassure domestic audiences, but they do not necessarily resolve the structural drivers of the conflict. Military escalation, regional retaliation, and unresolved strategic objectives often outlast political announcements. Most wars between nation states are quite short. The war in Ukraine, in its fourth year, is an anomaly. Data from the [Correlates of War](https://correlatesofwar.org/) project shows that most interstate wars over the past two centuries have lasted less than four to five months. Many wars have been much shorter––among them the [12-day war in June 2025](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel%5Fwar) between America, Israel and Iran. But there are also wars that drag on: [the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq%5FWar) was fought for eight years and killed over a million military personnel. ### A resilient Tehran The Iranian government is unlikely to collapse. It is a vast and deeply institutionalized network sustained by oil revenues and extensive economic and political relationships built up over decades. It did not crumble on Feb. 28 after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in an airstrike by the United States and Israel. The Islamic Republic briskly followed a constitutional path for transition to temporary leadership and moved to defiantly select the slain leader’s son [Mojtaba Khamenei](https://time.com/article/2026/03/12/iran-new-supreme-leader-vows-revenge-blocks-strait-of-hormuz/) as is new Supreme Leader. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its affiliated Basij forces have [displayed resilience](https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/) in face of a war with much stronger adversaries. Over decades, the IRGC has been subjected to intense ideological vetting and institutional consolidation, expressly designed to produce the most committed defenders of the Islamic Republic. An air campaign can significantly [damage](https://time.com/7295877/issues-with-regime-change-iran/) Iran’s military and economic infrastructure but it will not lead to the [collapse of the regime](https://time.com/7382278/iran-bombing-regime-change-pape/) and break the Revolutionary Guards’ will to fight. Iran did learn some lessons from the ferocious 12-day conflict with the U.S. and Israel last June. In the months since, its military and security institutions have rebuilt capabilities and prepared for a broader confrontation. Iran responded to the military strikes by the U.S. and Israel by expanding the geographic [footprint of war](https://time.com/article/2026/03/11/war-trump-iran-gulf-oil-gas-economy/) through retaliatory drone and missile attacks on several Gulf Arab countries and by blocking the [Strait of Hormuz](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/10/politics/iran-begins-laying-mines-in-strait-of-hormuz). Even if large scale hostilities were to pause, Iran would retain the capacity to pressure American allies in the region through limited strikes on their infrastructure or by disrupting [maritime movement](https://www.reuters.com/world/irans-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-says-strait-hormuz-should-remain-shut-2026-03-12/) of oil and gas. ### The economic fallout Whatever Trump’s preferred timeline, the conditions that typically produce short wars—a decisive military advantage, an adversary willing to negotiate, and a clear political end game—are conspicuously absent in this conflict. And Israeli military and political leaders have [signaled](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-war-to-end-soon-practically-nothing-left-to-target-israel-no-time-limit/) a far less optimistic assessment of the timeline and suggested that degrading Iran’s military capabilities would require sustained operations. From the Israeli perspective, the military [objective](https://en.yenisafak.com/world/israel-prepares-for-month-long-war-with-iran-and-proxies-official-says-3715590) is to reduce long-term strategic threats from Iran. The divergence between Washington’s political messaging and Israel’s operational expectations adds another layer of uncertainty to the trajectory of the conflict. The economic [fallout of the war](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/12/business/economy/iran-oil-shock-economy-global-impact.html) is already rattling the globe. With the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one fifth of the world’s oil supply passes, emerging as a major chokepoint and [focus of the war](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1w5141vx53o), the oil markets have turned volatile and oil prices are climbing despite the producers releasing reserves. Even the perception of prolonged instability in the Gulf can ripple through global supply chains, affecting fuel prices, inflation expectations, and financial markets. Iran retains the ability to impose uncertainty on [global energy flows](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/10/iran-war-resilience-economy-world-hormuz-oil-trump-us/) by continuing to weaponize the Strait of Hormuz. The economic dimension creates additional incentives for the U.S. to signal restraint while continuing military pressure. The entanglements of the war are multiplying. There are [reports](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/06/politics/russia-aiding-iran-targeting) that Russia has been sharing intelligence about the locations of American bases with Iran. There are also [concerns](https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/middleeast/russia-iran-advice-drone-tactics-intl) that China might or may already be extending support to Iran, perhaps in the form of economic and technological assistance mirroring its[ support](https://www.economist.com/china/2025/06/19/china-has-become-the-most-important-enabler-of-russias-war-machine) to Russia throughout the war in Ukraine. And Washington has [reportedly requested](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-will-help-us-counter-iranian-drones-2026-03-05/) Ukraine’s assistance in countering Iranian drones, which Russia has been using against Ukrainian forces. ### Rallying the nation Any potential move to involve [Kurdish armed groups](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/11/opinion/iran-kurds-us-israel.html) in the war against Iran would further complicate and elongate the conflict. Six Kurdish parties have recently formed a coalition, and Washington reportedly explored the possibility of [arming them as militia forces](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/03/politics/cia-arming-kurds-iran) to enter Iran from its western border. Trump has dismissed the possibility and denied American plans to deploy Kurdish forces inside Iran. Yet speculation about their potential role has not stopped. Several Kurdish leaders have [insisted](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRS7MZD4x5c) they don’t seek secession and see themselves as part of a broader Iranian national identity. Even the [perception](http://cnn.com/2026/03/03/politics/cia-arming-kurds-iran) that outside powers are arming ethnic minorities in Iran would be an incendiary. It would reinforce the regime’s resilience and prompt segments of Iranian society that oppose the government—but fear territorial fragmentation or foreign domination—to rally behind the state. Nationalist mobilization could temporarily override popular grievances, as it did during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, when the regime successfully channeled anger outward and mobilized mass recruitment. Iranians could [rally around the flag](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/08/dark-like-our-future-iranians-describe-scenes-of-catastrophe-after-tehrans-oil-depots-bombed) as American and Israeli strikes damage residential buildings, kill civilians, and damage critical infrastructure in the country. Considering these multiple variables, Trump’s messaging increasingly reflects a form of strategic hedging. By simultaneously projecting the possibility of rapid victory while preparing the political ground for a longer confrontation, the Trump Administration appears to be managing expectations across multiple audiences: financial markets, domestic political allies, and international partners. Such ambiguity may itself complicate the search for a clear endgame. All of this confronts American and Israeli officials with a question they cannot indefinitely defer: is achieving their war aims, whatever those might be, worth the cost of a protracted and intense war? [TIME Ideas](https://www.time.com/ideas) hosts the world's leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors. 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