Al-Qaeda Infiltrating Pro-U.S. Militias in Iraq, Sources Say

Sheik Hamid al-Hayess is not optimistic. A burly man with a thick black mustache and closely knitted brows, he is one of the founding members of the Anbar Awakening. The grouping of Sunni tribal sheiks in the once al-Qaeda–infested western province turned against the insurgents and sided with the U.S. military, providing the model for what became a nationwide campaign known as the Sahwa. But that model is in trouble. “The Sahwa has been infiltrated by al-Qaeda,” he says somberly. “A civil war is coming.”

If it happens, this time the lines in the sand will more likely be between Sunnis. Iraq’s minority Sunnis have become increasingly split between those like Sheik Hamid, who are now allied with the Shi’ite-led government, and Sunnis who are against it. Some co-religionists remain so antigovernment that they either have returned to the insurgency or sympathize with those who have. (See pictures of the sheiks who helped bring stability to Anbar province.)

In recent months, al-Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates have been regrouping, recalibrating their targets and tactics; they have recruited disenfranchised members of the U.S.-allied Sahwa movement, planting them as sleeper agents among the mainly Sunni neighborhood patrolmen, who number about 94,000 nationwide, according to a highly placed source close to the insurgency. “Many of the Sahwa have returned after seeking forgiveness, but they are still Sahwa,” the source tells TIME. “They wear the government’s uniform, but they plant explosives and sticky bombs. The Sahwa is the biggest recruiting pool for al-Qaeda.” (See the most dangerous streets of Baghdad at the height of the insurgency.)

The source claims that some 40% of the Sahwa are insurgent spies. A senior source in the Interior Ministry who requested anonymity does not deny the infiltration but puts the figure at closer to 20%. The Interior Ministry source says intelligence agencies are reviewing the Sahwa files. Abdel-Karim Samarraie, the deputy leader of the parliament’s defense and security committee and a senior member of the Tawafuk, the largest Sunni bloc, says al-Qaeda moles represent a small minority of Sahwa but should be weeded out. “The Interior Ministry fired 62,000 of its employees because there were legal accusations against them,” he says. “The same thing can be applied to the Sahwa.” The U.S. military did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

This new security threat comes as the U.S. military prepares to withdraw its forces from Iraq’s cities by June, ahead of a complete withdrawal by the end of 2011. But in many ways, U.S. troop numbers and locations are secondary factors. This is an Iraqi problem, one that stems from festering political rivalries and suspicions among the country’s competing centers of power.

Those suspicions made some members of the Sahwa easy pickings for a tenacious insurgency that has capitalized on the rising resentment many in the Sunni community feel toward Shi’ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government. Among their complaints: that Baghdad has sometimes been a month or two late in forking over the $300-a-month salary for Sahwa patrolmen; that Sahwa leaders have been arrested, sometimes on charges harking back to their insurgent past, despite promises of amnesty; and most significant, that the government has been slow to make good on its pledge to incorporate 20% of the Sahwa into the security forces and find government jobs or civilian training for the rest.

There are conflicting reports as to how many Sahwa have been absorbed into the Iraqi security forces. Interior Ministry spokesman Abdul-Karim Khalaf says 13,000 have been trained and placed in local police units. Major General Mike Ferriter, deputy operations commander of the U.S.-led forces, says the police have taken in 5,000 and the army 500. Even so, the figure is clearly not the promised 20%. A recent hiring freeze in the security forces — prompted by budget woes due to the massive drop in oil prices, which account for about 90% of government revenues — has further reduced the likelihood that the 20% benchmark will be achieved anytime soon.

As poverty, broken government promises and feelings of marginalization took hold of the Sunni community, all al-Qaeda and its allies had to do was wait. “The coalition and the Iraqi government told the people that the reason for their poverty was the insurgents. But when the people became Sahwa, their poverty was not alleviated,” the insurgent source says. “They realized that their poverty was due to the Americans and the government. That’s what’s happening in western Baghdad.”

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There’s been a marked uptick in violence over the past month across the country, especially in majority Sunni western and northern Baghdad neighborhoods that used to be insurgent strongholds. Almost 200 people were killed in March, many in attacks targeting the security forces or tribal leaders in these largely Sunni areas of the country, including the restive northern city of Mosul, a reflection of the insurgency’s new target list.

The senior Sahwa tribal sheiks are al-Qaeda’s “enemy No. 1,” according to the source, because as Sunnis, they stood against their co-religionists in the insurgency and sided with a Shi’ite-led government. (The Americans have dropped to fourth on the enemies list, he adds, after Iraqi security forces and all those who work in the government.) Low-level Sahwa members have been encouraged to return to the jihadis’ fold. Indeed, in mid-March, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Qaeda in Iraq’s main front group, posted a communique on several jihadist websites announcing an amnesty for “every Muslim in Mesopotamia, even if he acted badly in the past,” urging them to return to the insurgency. “This new stage is very serious,” said the message, signed by alleged ISI leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. “It’s necessary for all the Sunnis to stand together.”

Although the Iraqi insurgency has been markedly weakened and is a shadow of its former self — with only 13 of the 43 armed groups that once comprised it still actively engaged in violence, and with much dissent among them — it is by no means a spent force. Some groups appear to have heeded the ISI’s call for unity. The Islamic State of Iraq and Ansar al-Islam — which worked with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi before the U.S. invasion in 2003 — have quietly formed a new alliance, pooling their intelligence and efforts, according to sources within both the insurgency and the Sahwa. (See a brief history of the Iraq War.)

The government has few good options to counter this threat. If it moves to purge suspect elements within the Sahwa, it could face a violent backlash and claims of sectarian prejudice, deepening already tense ties with the Sunni community. The weekend’s spasm of street violence in Fadhil, a central Baghdad neighborhood once completely under al-Qaeda control, may be a harbinger of things to come. Iraqi forces clashed with members of the Sahwa movement in the neighborhood after they moved in to arrest its leader Adil al-Mashhadani. Fierce fighting ensued, leaving four dead. Mashhadani was detained on a litany of charges, including “improvised explosive device (IED) attacks that killed Iraqi security forces, leading an IED cell … ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and collusion with the terrorist network Jaysh al-Islami,” according to a Multi-National Force-Iraq statement, clearly suggesting that Mashhadani was an al-Qaeda mole.

Sheik Hamid, the Anbar Awakening member, has little doubt that Mashhadani was “double-dealing with terrorists.” The sheik says he and many other Sahwa leaders have repeatedly cautioned the Interior Ministry about terrorist infiltration of the Sahwa, but their warnings have largely gone unanswered. As a result, Sheik Hamid is taking his own precautions. “We will move our platoons to face off against them. If the government doesn’t take any action, we will be forced to,” he says. “Let them come out and face us. We have fought them before.”

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