The War: On the Defensive

From the battlefields along the Demilitarized Zone to the fearful capital of Saigon and southward, the allies last week were nearly everywhere on the military and political defensive, waiting uncertainly for the Communists’ next blow and by no means confident that it could be wholly blunted. A full 25 days after the Communists first launched their general offensive, South Viet Nam was still a country taut with terror and riven by fire. In Hué, South Vietnamese and U.S. Marines were still engaged in the most desperate fighting of the war to drive the last of the North Vietnamese out of the ancient Citadel. At Khe Sanh, the pressure mounted on the waiting U.S. Marines, who underwent one of the most concentrated barrages of the war—1,307 rounds of shells in one five-hour stretch. Having promisedto level Saigon in a “second wave” of attacks on South Viet Nam’s cities, the Communists kept up a steady drumfire of rockets and mortars on the capital.And the U.S. command announced that for the week ending Feb. 17, a record number of 543 Americans died in combat, bringing to 2,200 the number of U.S.dead so far this year v. 9,000 in all of 1967.

The Fifth Column. The Communists’ successful application of widespread pressure has forced a painful sequence of choices and consequences on the allies. Required to use all their armies to defend the cities and the line along the DMZ, allied commanders no longer have enough manpower to move out in pursuit of Communist battalions. They are thus unable to hit at their besiegers, or even put out sufficient reconnaissance patrols to determine the size and deployment of the Communist armies arrayed around them. Nor can the U.S. and the South Vietnamese be sure how many enemy forces, the remnants of the original wave of attackers, remain hidden inside the rings hastily thrown around the cities and towns. In Saigon, the problem is particularly acute, since the size and effectiveness of this fifth column might well determine theoutcome of any major Communist thrust.

Pulling in to defend the cities, the allies have been forced to cede large areas of the countryside to the Communists. Except for the largest population centers, for example, the rich Delta is now almost entirely in Viet Cong hands. There is not a Delta road safe to drive on, by day or night. Massive quantities of supplies are moving through the Delta for the enemy buildup around Saigon, and U.S. reconnaissance planes now sight piles of enemy artillery shells flagrantly stacked out in the open. But people and goods cannot move in the Delta; fish rot wherethey have been caught, rice molders unharvested. In Soc Trang, the costof food has risen 30%; in Vinh Long, the price of rice has soared tenfold.

In the countryside, the Communists are busily reaping the harvest so painfully wrested from them over the past two years in allied operations: propagandizing the peasants, collecting rice and taxes and, above all, recruiting fresh soldiers for their depleted ranks—even impressing into their ranks some ARVN soldiers caught home on Tet leaves. About half of the South Vietnamese army was on leave when the Communists first struck nearly four weeks ago, and many ARVN soldiers have not yet returned to their units. The government’s hope is that many of the missing offered their services to the nearest headquarters when the crisis began and are still serving in these areas. But no one knows for sure.

The Main Threat. Around Saigon, the Communists last week began overrunning U.S. and South Vietnamese guard posts on the city’s approaches. All week long there were sporadic fights around the vital Binh Loi bridge outside Saigon as the V.C. tried to cut the capital’s link with the major U.S. bases of Long Binh and Bien Hoa to the northeast. U.S. intelligence placed three enemy divisions no more than two nights’ march from the capital: the 7th NVA and the 5th V.C. divisions to the north and west, and the 9th V.C. Division to the northeast.

Efforts to hold back the narrowing Communist noose produced some of the fiercest fighting of the week. Seven miles west of the capital, U.S. 25th Infantrymen killed 128 Communists in a firefight, and less than a mile from the Chinese quarter of Cholon, ARVN Rangers killed 48 Viet Cong. Tan Son Nhut airport remained a major target for shelling, and there was fear that General William Westmoreland may not have sufficient troops to defend his own MACV headquarters there against a concerted enemy thrust. Aside from their military aims, the Communists may also be attempting to cut off Saigon and strangle it economically.

One Short Month. Menacing as the situation appeared around Saigon, the main enemy threat still hung over the northern provinces below the DMZ. The siege around Khe Sanh closed tighter than ever; the outpost is now surrounded by two divisions and a regiment. As the NVA crept closer and closer to the camp’s perimeter, one probing patrol of South Vietnamese Rangers hardly got outside the camp when they came under heavy enemy attack and had to retreat. In a way, the entire northern edge of South Viet Nam has come under the same sort of siege. Allied strength is clustered in pockets of outposts or in major cities—from Khe Sanh, the western anchor, through the Rockpile, Camp Carroll and Con Thien to Quang Tri city, Hué and Danang. Few of the allied bases are accessible now except by air. Last week the North Vietnamese infiltrated a fresh division into South Viet Nam, bringing to 50,000 their troop concentration in 1 Corps. Enemy troops now virtually surround Quang Tri city. One division is poised north of Con Thien and Gio Linh.

No one tries to guess any longer whether or when North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap will attack, either along the DMZ or for a second time against the cities. All that is clear is that whether or not he does, he has already succeeded in putting the allies in a perilous position. He has created a situation in which he could conceivably recapture all that the allies have fought so long and hard to deny him over the past two years: the countryside, where everyone has always agreed the war must ultimately be won or lost. Even in the unlikely event that he does nothing further, Giap has already wrought physical and psychological damage that will take months or perhaps years to repair. Undeniably, he now has the initiative throughout South Viet Nam. In that feat alone, he has, in one stunning month, created an entirely new and far more ominous war for the allies in South Viet Nam.