West Germany: Collapse of a Coalition

A battle over the economy forces Schmidt to call elections

The dissension that has plagued the government of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his embattled Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) had reached epic dimensions. For months, the often abrasive Schmidt had struggled to hold together his troubled ruling coalition amid signs that its junior partner of 13 years, the Free Democratic Party, was preparing to bolt the government. Last week, in a crossfire of public recriminations, four Free Democratic Cabinet members, including Party Leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was also Schmidt’s Foreign Minister, resigned their portfolios.

In a tense appearance at Bonn’s spacious, glass-enclosed parliament building, a grave-looking Chancellor went before the Bundestag to announce the breakup of the coalition and to call for new elections. Said Schmidt: “In the interest of our country, in the interest of our parliamentary democracy, I cannot and will not stand by and watch the effectiveness and standing of the government being wrecked.” Conceding that his party “could lose some feathers” in an election, he declared, “I am convinced that the electorate will understand and prefer this course.”

It was perhaps the final act by a leader West Germans had celebrated as der Macher (the Doer). Schmidt has played a key role in steering the nation to unprecedented prosperity and international respect during his 30 years in politics, eight of them as Chancellor. True to form, in one swift, decisive action Schmidt had moved to break West Germany’s festering political crisis and shouldered the responsibility of bringing about the collapse of his own government. In so doing, he paved the way for his probable replacement by Christian Democratic Opposition Leader Helmut Kohl.

For both his allies and his detractors, the downfall of the Schmidt government came as no real surprise. His own Social Democratic Party was riven with disagreement over his unyielding support for NATO’s defense policy in Western Europe. His curiously low-keyed reaction to the Soviet-backed imposition of martial law in Poland had brought him into conflict with the Reagan Administration as a more fundamental dispute with Washington emerged over differing approaches to the Soviet Union. A burgeoning pacifist and environmental movement, strongly supported by West German youth, found Schmidt a tempting political target, draining support from his own Social Democratic rank and file. But finally, basic differences over how to reverse the nation’s declining economic fortunes led to his break with the Free Democrats—and virtually guaranteed Schmidt’s political demise.

After a week of escalating public feuding between Schmidt and F.D.P. leaders, Schmidt clearly hoped by calling new elections to use the power of his incumbency and his personal popularity among West Germans to stave off the Christian Democrats’ rise to power. He also gambled that the small Free Democratic Party, sagging badly in the polls along with his own Social Democrats, would balk at the prospect of immediate elections in their weakened electoral condition. Christian Democratic Leader Kohl, whose party has been enjoying a renaissance as Schmidt’s has gradually succumbed to what one French observer called “the wear and tear of power,” immediately rebuffed Schmidt’s proposal. Kohl’s move set the stage for a complicated parliamentary gambit that could thrust him into the chancellorship as long as he has the support of Genscher and the F.D.P. Said Kohl last week: “Our aim is to have an active government as soon as possible, and to draw up a program so that the new government can hold elections to get the program confirmed.” If the newly formed coalition between the F.D.P. and the Christian Democrats can command the necessary support in parliament, it will be the end of the Schmidt era.

Tension between the two coalition partners had been rising steadily since mid-1981. At that time, the S.P.D.’s left wing began stepping up its opposition to the government’s two-track decision to support NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe starting in late 1983, and U.S.-Soviet arms-reduction talks. At least 58 members of Schmidt’s parliamentary delegation publicly supported the 300,000 demonstrators who took to the streets of Bonn last October to protest Schmidt’s pro-NATO policy. Although Schmidt successfully defeated a leftist attempt at the S.P.D. conference in Munich last April to approve a moratorium on deployment of the new missiles, the intraparty squabbling conveyed a growing sense, in West Germany and abroad, that the Schmidt government was being hopelessly weakened. Around that time, some F.D.P members began to talk openly of the growing convergence of views between Genscher and the opposition Christian Democratic Union.

West Germany’s deteriorating economy deepened the rift. To reduce unemployment, which was approaching a record 2 million, or 8% of the West German work force, Schmidt presented a $700 million job-creating program to be financed by higher taxes. The business-oriented F.D.P. adamantly opposed Schmidt’s proposals, arguing that higher taxes would only slow the economy further. The Free Democrats also fought against increases in West Germany’s generous social security system, whose annual cost has skyrocketed from $15 billion in 1960 to about $250 billion last year and now accounts for fully 38% of total government spending. After months of wrangling, Schmidt and Genscher reached a fragile truce this June, agreeing to a 1983 budget with a deficit of only $11.4 billion.

The peace was short-lived. After the S.P.D. lost local elections in Lower Saxony and Hamburg, F.D.P. leaders began to give more serious consideration to the idea of shifting their support to the Christian Democrats in Bonn. Though the Free Democrats received 10.6% of the vote in the 1980 parliamentary elections, their great fear was that the S.P.D.’s declining fortunes would eventually rub off on their own party. For the F.D.P, a substantial loss of support could be fatal. According to the West German constitution, any group that fails to win at least 5% is excluded from the Bundestag. Troubled by internal disagreements and trying to assess a possible shift in alliances at the national level, the F.D.P. decided to enter elections in the state of Hesse without their local S.P.D. partners. The Free Democrats reasoned that if they did well enough in the Sept. 26 Hesse elections to help the Christian Democrats win, they were prepared to pull out of their national coalition with the S.P.D. and throw their support to Kohl.

Meanwhile, the S.P.D.’s standing with the public continued to decline. A poll conducted in July by the respected Allensbach Institute showed that the Christian Democrats could win an outright majority of 53.7% in national elections, in contrast to an alltime low of 31.4% for the Social Democrats and a dangerously thin 5.1% for the Free Democrats. The Greens-Alternative List, an amalgam of leftists, environmentalists, pacifists and other radical groups, would win an unprecedented 9%. The result represented a dramatic decline for Schmidt’s coalition, which had won a combined 53.8% in October 1980, vs. 44.5% for the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian allies, the Christian Social Union.

The simmering battle over the budget flared anew two weeks ago when Economics Minister Otto Lambsdorff, one of four Free Democrats in the Cabinet, announced that West Germany’s growth rate in 1983 would not be 3%, as previously stated by Schmidt, but less than 2%, increasing the budget deficit by $4 billion. To make matters worse, Lambsdorff the week before had openly endorsed the F.D.P.-Christian Democrat alliance in Hesse, declaring that “the Hessian voter will decide what he thinks of a change of the Free Democrats into another coalition.” His remarks infuriated Schmidt, who lashed out at Lambsdorff in a Cabinet meeting for discussing the Hesse defection in public.

Several days later, Schmidt departed from the text of his annual State of the Nation message before the Bundestag to mount a caustic attack on the F.D.P. “Our citizens are rightly fed up with the tactical moves and rumors presented every night on television,” he said angrily. Amid applause from S.P.D. members, Schmidt virtually challenged Lambsdorff to resign. But the Chancellor saved his most biting words for Christian Democratic Opposition Leader Kohl, who had watched from the sidelines as the coalition partners feuded openly. Said Schmidt: “You always make friendly remarks, Mr. Kohl, but you don’t say what you’re thinking. Perhaps you don’t think at all.” Schmidt then taunted the opposition to attempt to replace him by introducing a vote of no confidence. Kohl shot back: “This was not so much a report on the state of the nation as a report on the state of Helmut Schmidt. Your coalition long ago lost all confidence of the population.”

Lambsdorff drew Schmidt’s fire anew last week when he presented a 34-page survey of the economy, advocating deep cuts in West Germany’s social welfare system, including unemployment benefits and rent subsidies. The document, which had not been approved by the Cabinet, contained numerous personal views that ran counter to the coalition’s agreed policy. Schmidt criticized Lambsdorff’s “astonishing lack of analytical ability for an economics minister,” and S.P.D. Chairman Willy Brandt called for Lambsdorff’s resignation.

The result, in the words of the respected Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, was a growing public mood of “paralyzing hopelessness.” The government, for all practical purposes, was crippled by speculation of a break between the two coalition partners. Planning for new projects in ministries and government departments came to a standstill.

By last Thursday, the tensions within the government had become almost unbearable. During an acrimonious afternoon debate in the Bundestag, Lambsdorff refused to retract any of his economic proposals, which, he blandly claimed, did not mean he was breaking with Schmidt’s policies. Genscher accused the Social Democrats of damaging West German foreign policy by dragging international issues into the local Hesse elections. To delighted applause from the opposition benches, Genscher urged S.P.D. members to stop saying that the Christian Democrats’ strong stand on defense meant they did not want peace, and to support their own government’s foreign and security policy. Genscher also warned the S.P.D. “to stop denying the existence in democratic parties of will and capacity for peace.” The performance amounted to a remarkable joint challenge by the Free Democrats and Christian Democrats to Schmidt and the S.P.D.

Faced with open rebellion, the Chancellor decided to act. Without warning Genscher, he met with President Karl Carstens and informed him that he intended to call for new elections. Schmidt’s strategy was a long shot. First, he would have to ask for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag. By instructing S.P.D. members of parliament to abstain, he would arrange to lose the vote. Schmidt could then call for new elections, which would have to be held within 60 days. But there was one catch. Schmidt would need Opposition Leader Kohl’s support for new elections. Otherwise, the Christian Democrats could rush in while the Bundestag was still in session with a “constructive vote of no confidence” to elect Kohl as Chancellor of a new F.D.P.-Christian Democrat coalition. No new elections would need to be held until 1984.

During a 45-min. meeting with Kohl Thursday evening, Schmidt tried to convince him that a quick, clean contest might result in an absolute Christian Democratic majority—and a mandate to govern without F.D.P. support. Kohl was noncommittal. Schmidt then summoned Genscher and told him pointblank that he had “lost political confidence” in the Free Democrats.

As Schmidt prepared to address parliament the following morning, Genscher and the three other Free Democrat Cabinet ministers abruptly tendered their resignations, possibly surprising Schmidt, who had calculated that Genscher would be afraid to split his own party by lurching toward Kohl. Indeed, the F.D.P. executive committee later endorsed Genscher’s proposal to open negotiations with the Christian Democrats by a margin of 18 to 15.

Knowing that his own fate was sealed, Schmidt proceeded with his plan to ask all parties to agree to a call for new elections and to accept his minority leadership in the interim. Kohl lost no time rejecting what he pointedly called the Chancellor’s “intrigue.” Instead, the C.D.U. leader bluntly called on Schmidt to step aside. Said he: “It is your patriotic duty to resign. Our people need a new start and we are ready to provide it.” Added a member of the Christian Social Union: “We are not going to play the Chancellor’s game.”

Kohl later said that he planned to introduce a constructive vote of no confidence against Schmidt. To be elected Chancellor, Kohl will need the support of all 226 C.D.U. and C.S.U. members, plus at least 23 Free Democrats. At week’s end Kohl could count on the Christian Democrats’ unanimous backing plus the support of 33 of the 51 Free Democratic deputies. A parliamentary vote could come as early as this week.

Kohl has reportedly already promised Genscher that he will invite the F.D.P. to form a new coalition. But he did not say publicly when he would call for national elections to obtain a popular mandate for the new government. Said Kohl: “Our program must be clearly shaped before we take it to the electorate. Of course, we must act as quickly as possible.” The Free Democrats hope that the arrangement will give them time to build support prior to any new elections.

Precisely how a new C.D.U. government would approach the array of problems that brought down the Schmidt government is not yet clear. Kohl said last week that the new government’s first task would be to “put the budget in order, fight unemployment and take charge of the economy,” but he offered no details as to how he might accomplish this. Still, the C.D.U. should enjoy widespread public support, at least initially, from West Germans who feel that the time has come for a change of government in Bonn. Schmidt’s announcement that the coalition had collapsed sent the Frankfurt stock exchange soaring to record highs.

West Germany’s allies expect little change in the country’s foreign policy if Kohl becomes Chancellor. Like Schmidt and Genscher, Kohl favors NATO’s plans for the deployment of new nuclear missiles next year. He is not expected to be any more receptive than Schmidt to U.S. demands for higher defense spending. Though some officials in the Reagan Administration hope that a more conservative government in Bonn will be easier to deal with on such touchy issues as sanctions against the Soviet Union, most experts consider Kohl just as committed as Schmidt to detente and East-West trade. While quibbling about details, the Christian Democrats have generally supported Schmidt’s decision to help finance the controversial Soviet gas pipeline. But the tenor of U.S.-West German relations may change. Schmidt, for example, annoyed Americans by failing to conceal his contempt for Presidents Carter and Reagan. “Kohl will be more accommodating toward the U.S.,” says Walter Schutze of the Paris-based French Institute for International Relations. “It will not be a matter of substance, but the tune of Bonn-Washington relations will change. The Christian Democrats will play the same melody in a different way.”

The Western alliance will feel the loss of a statesman as experienced as Schmidt. Said former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey last week: “Helmut Schmidt is the only Western leader at the moment who has experience, a policy and imagination. He will leave a very serious gap.” Still, Schmidt’s departure should not weaken the bonds between London and Bonn. Though Schmidt and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher enjoyed good personal relations, Britain’s Conservative Party is ideologically closer to West Germany’s Christian Democrats. The opposite will be true for France. During his summer holidays, President Francois Mitterrand is said to have been telling friends that his biggest current worry was what would happen in West Germany this fall. Cool at first, Schmidt and Mitterrand developed a close working relationship.

For the moment, Schmidt will preside over a minority, lameduck government and a period of political confusion for West Germany. Before Kohl can actually replace Schmidt, he must negotiate the policies of a new government and dole out key Cabinet positions in consultation with his new coalition partners. The process could take only a few days, or it could be protracted and laborious. The framers of West Germany’s postwar constitution purposely made it difficult to change governments in order to avoid the revolving-door Cabinets of the Weimar Republic. Inevitably, speculation has already begun to circulate in Bonn that renegade deputies might try to block Kohl’s move to the sprawling Chancellery along the Rhine. Until new elections are held, West Germans will probably have to live with political uncertainty. —ByRussHoyle.

Reported by Roland Flamini/Bonn