MIDDLE EAST: Step-by-Step Is Still in Business

Henry Kissinger arrived in the Middle East last week seeking keys to further progress toward peace between Israel and Egypt, and almost immediately began to hear some freewheeling suggestions. One Israeli diplomat offhandedly suggested that peace might be easier to attain if athletic contests could be arranged between the two countries. “That’s not a bad idea for a settlement,” said one weary aide to Premier Yitzhak Rabin at the end of the talks. “We could let our national football teams beat their brains out against each other and send the armies home to watch.”*

Solutions to the complex problems of the Middle East are not that easy. But after six days of intense talks, primarily in Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus, Kissinger headed home, with stops in Europe, convinced that a second-stage disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel was possible. He will return to the Middle East in early March to begin a fast-moving and decisive two weeks of shuttle diplomacy.

No New Miracles. The immediate objective of Kissinger’s trip last week was to explore the possibility of further ameliorating the Israeli-Egyptian confrontation in the Sinai, the easiest problem to untangle. In Jerusalem and Cairo, Kissinger offered no solutions but solicited from both sides a general idea of their minimum and maximum concessions. Thus there was no need for formal positions, policy clarifications or what Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon at one point referred to as “new miracles” from the Middle East’s proclaimed miracle worker.

As usual, the Secretary interjected chunks of humor into the discussions. Staring at a map of Sinai on a Jerusalem conference-room wall, Kissinger asked jokingly, “What did you put that map up for? I don’t intend to talk about Sinai.” At a dinner with Israeli officials he described Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur as a general “who displays great affection for any piece of territory possessing any elevation whatsoever.” Referring to three promontories on the Golan Heights that Israel insisted on controlling in the first stage of disengagement talks with Syria, Kissinger told Gur: “I’ll get one of those hills yet.” Retorted a Gur aide: “You haven’t so far.”

Before landing in Israel, Kissinger predicted that he stood only a fifty-fifty chance of arranging a further disengagement. The problem between Egypt and Israel, he pointed out, was “to balance the tangibles of territory against the intangibles of recognition and the desire for peace.” Israel’s basic diplomatic strategy was that it would only give “a piece of land for a piece of peace,” and thus it would not surrender any more of the Sinai (see map following page) without getting clear-cut assurances of Egypt’s peaceful intentions from President Anwar Sadat.

In Jerusalem, at least, Kissinger’s problem was complicated by increasing Israeli distrust of his motives as well as nagging fears that his step-by-step diplomacy would harm Israel in the end. Ha’aretz, Israel’s most influential newspaper, worried about the impact of Kissinger’s peace plans: “It is not clear enough if the American Secretary of State intends to mediate between Israel and Egypt in full awareness that there is a partnership between us and the U.S., or whether he wants to succeed at any price, a price that Israel alone will have to pay.” Aware of the pugnacious mood, Kissinger in his principal Jerusalem speech carefully noted: “We will not knowingly sacrifice Israel to considerations of great-power politics.”

Fragile Coalition. The Israeli attitude may yet frustrate the latest round of talks. Prior to Kissinger’s visit, even some dovish politicians in Jerusalem were coming round to the hawk point of view that the country gave up too much for what it received during previous negotiations. On the Golan Heights, for instance, many Israelis feel that they should have held onto the provincial capital of Quneitra instead of returning it to the Syrians. Officially, Premier Rabin was authorized by his Cabinet to conclude only what Jerusalem called a thirty-fifty deal—a military pullback in the Sinai (see box) of 30 kilometers in the south broadening to 50 kilometers in the north. This withdrawal would include neither the Abu Rudeis oilfields nor the vital Giddi and Mitla passes. In a speech to the Knesset last week, Rabin promised that these would be exchanged only for a clear-cut declaration of nonbelligerency on Egypt’s part.

The diplomatic problem, as Kissinger has pointed out to the Israelis, is that Sadat cannot make a nonbelligerency commitment without running the danger of alienating his Arab allies. In rebuttal last week, Israelis argued that Rabin, a political novice who heads a fragile coalition government, is just as vulnerable to pressures as Sadat. Moreover, Kissinger can no longer work out a deal privately with one Israeli leader, as he could with former Premier Golda Meir. Now he must satisfy a triumvirate consisting of Rabin, Allon and Defense Minister Shimon Peres.

Postal Service. Flying on to Egypt after two days in Jerusalem, Kissinger sought to determine what “intangibles” Sadat could offer Israel. One possibility was an aide memoire of some sort formalizing the Egyptian President’s recent statements, made during his visit to Paris and in Aswan to members of TIME’S Middle East news tour, that neither Egypt nor Syria would attack Israel first. Other possibilities discussed included lessening of the longtime Arab economic boycott of Israel and establishing airline flights and possibly postal and telephone connections between Cairo and Jerusalem. Kissinger and Sadat apparently agreed that some kind of memorandum of agreement could be written that might spell out Egyptian concessions on these issues in return for Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai.

Kissinger is anxious to work out another agreement, at least between Israel and Egypt, before the U.N. peacekeeping mandates come up for renegotiation in the spring. If he is successful, Syria’s President Hafez Assad might even agree to delay a resumption of the full-scale Geneva conference long enough for Kissinger to work out second-stage agreements on the Golan Heights. Sadat desperately wants Kissinger to succeed. If he can work out a Sinai deal, it will justify Sadat’s argument that a moderate approach can recover territory.

“We’re still in business,” said Kissinger as his Air Force jet soared between Cairo and Damascus in a hectic shuttle that also included a second visit to Jerusalem and brief meetings with King Hussein in Jordan and with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. At week’s end, Kissinger confirmed that he would indeed return to the area for another round of talks.

It will not be an easy one. The tough stance of the Israelis as they face second-stage talks seems increasingly unrealistic. They apparently underestimate the new political power of Arab oil and appear to be still hypnotized by the idea that security depends on territory and military might, neither of which can ever bring them peace with larger and more populous Arab neighbors. Beyond that, Jerusalem knows full well that even moderate Arab leaders will not tolerate another extended period of no-war, no-peace without progress toward a settlement. Yet the Israelis seem to think that time is on their side and that they will benefit from the fact that the tempo of negotiations is bound to slow down as Washington heads toward an election year. “God is on the side of the patient. Impatience is a sin,” said Allon last week, quoting an Arab saying, not least of all because of the possibility that a pro-Israeli Democratic candidate like Senator Henry Jackson may win.

Victim of Support. The hostile comments heard in Jerusalem about Henry Kissinger before his arrival there clearly indicated that Israeli officials read one signal correctly—namely that Washington no longer automatically considers U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East to be more or less identical. But Jerusalem seems not to have digested this fact; the insouciance with which the Rabin government, at a time when the U.S. is in its worst recession since World War II, sought another $2.5 billion in military and economic aid on credit demonstrates that. Even within Israeli government circles there is a lingering feeling that the U.S. to some extent is still a hostage of Israel, a victim of Washington’s open, unqualified support for the country over the years. From this lofty conviction comes the view that the U.S., if only for reasons of prestige, could not stand the trauma of seeing Israel defeated in another war with the Arabs. The U.S. indeed would not allow such a defeat under foreseeable circumstances. But that is a fall-back for Israel, not a launch pad for resisting hard decisions necessary for peace.

“The idea is not new. According to I Samuel: 17, a Jewish David once faced Goliath of the Philistines, from whom Palestine takes its name, in a one-on-one competition while their armies looked on.