World: Nkomo: We Are Not Villains

Joshua Nkomo, 62, is generally regarded as the father of black nationalism in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, having risen from trade union organizer to leader of the first independence movement, in the mid-1950s. Last week the burly, jovial guerrilla leader presided over another historic turn in London, where his ZAPU party directed much of the Patriotic Front political strategy that led to the acceptance of the constitution. Shortly after his fateful meeting with Lord Carrington, Nkomo discussed the possibility of a settlement with TIME Johannesburg Bureau Chief William Me Whirter. Excerpts:

Q. Does the agreement on the constitution give you any satisfaction?

A. I’m still not very satisfied at the way the British are handling things. When they proceeded without us to talk to the Salisbury group, it confirmed our suspicions: Lord Carrington just wants to show the world an acceptable constitution and then say that the Patriotic Front is refusing to implement this reasonable document because the interim arrangements are not to its satisfaction. They want to lift sanctions and pass legislation for a government that will play their tune. This is what I call the law of Moses. Carrington is the type of man who believes he can make no mistakes; he can only deal with the Muzorewas who love that treatment. If we get into the second phase with that sort of attitude, then I’m afraid we’re in for a real hard time.

Q. Then why did you submit to the British constitution? Was it because you have no intention of fulfilling it anyway if you assume power?

A. The point is that the British are getting out, so there is no need to argue with them. Within six months, we will deal with our country in the way we want. We will abide by what we have agreed, but we at least want to be certain that we get something we can use. We have sacrificed sufficient lives already to push the British and the Salisbury regime to accept one man, one vote. No one ever thought they would accept this.

Q. The most crucial issue between you and the British became that of land nationalization and compensation. What will be the effect of your land policy?

A. If the U.S. had not stepped in, it would have been very difficult to move on this question. The war is about land, and the British were protecting the settler element’s right to keep land to themselves. But this does not mean we want to rob the white settlers of their land. The whites are an essential part of the country and therefore they must have some land as citizens. Only that land that is not fully utilized will be made available to other people. This arrangement would affect perhaps half of the white-controlled land. Private ownership is a foreign ideology. Our system is that the land is yours for as long as you work it, and the fruits of your labor belong to you. But you don’t own it. It’s the people’s property.

Q. What chances would you give for the rest of the conference to succeed?

A. This is the most crucial stage and also the most difficult to handle. We’re not just dealing with the shape of the transitional arrangements, but with the end of the war. With two armed military forces facing each other, it’s not going to be easy to reach a ceasefire. What happens to the men? What happens to their equipment?

People have a lot of wrong views of us. We are not the beasts and villains we are painted to be. We’ve come here to succeed, not to fail. We’ve come here to negotiate, not to push other people’s heads. What have we been fighting for really? For one man, one vote. I think we deserve it. We’ve given our lives for Zimbabwe and we must get it.