SOUTH AFRICA: Mondale v. Vorster: Tough Talk

“It takes one word to characterize the meetings,” said an American participant at the close of last week’s discussions between Vice President Walter Mondale and South African Prime Minister John Vorster: “Tough.” And so they were. After 8% hours of talks in Vienna’s Hofburg Palace, Mondale grimly told a press conference that the U.S. and South Africa were in “fundamental and profound disagreement” over the Pretoria government’s policies, particularly apartheid. In what appeared to be a substantive turning point in relations between the two countries, Mondale added with almost startling candor: “We hope that South Africans will not rely on any illusions that the U.S. will in the end intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is pursuing, for we will not do so. Failure to make progress will lead to a tragedy of human history.”

Even before the talks began, Mondale had been somewhat troubled about the possible outcome of what he recognized as an exceedingly tough assignment. Indeed, given the convictions of the South African leadership and the human rights concerns of the Carter Administration, a head-on collision was all but inevitable. Vorster remains firmly committed to apartheid and a policy of “separate development” for blacks, based on the creation of quasi-independent tribal homelands inside South Africa. Jimmy Carter is committed to progress toward majority rule not only in Rhodesia and Namibia (South West Africa) but in South Africa as well. Last year, when he was trying to achieve a Rhodesian settlement, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was prepared to settle for majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and worry about South Africa later; Carter believes all three must move together. Even as Mondale was heading for Vienna last week, after making diplomatic stops in Lisbon and Madrid, the President said in a television interview in Los Angeles that the U.S. was doing “everything we can” to persuade Vorster to end apartheid.

Beforehand, Mondale had tried to move gently—favoring, for instance, such phrases as “full participation” for South African blacks rather than “oneman, one-vote.” But once the talks got under way, with the two sides seated at separate but equal tables, the atmosphere became tense—and remained so. At times, strident voices could be heard through the closed doors. Said one American official later: “Vorster’s expression never changed, nor did his tone.” Mondale spoke of American efforts to reduce discrimination and of the resulting benefits to the nation. The South Africans spoke of their 300-year history in Africa and, at one point, taunted the U.S. delegation about the slaughter of American Indians in the 18th and 19th centuries. At the end of the first day, as negotiators prepared to attend a formal dinner given by Austria’s Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, both sides refused all comment.

Next morning, after a final session, Mondale read a statement that summarized the meeting and crisply stated U.S. policy. It was utterly devoid of diplomatic euphemism. On both Rhodesia and Namibia, he said, there had been some slight progress, though “the significance of that progress will depend on future developments.” On Rhodesia, Vorster had reluctantly agreed to press for an agreement leading to an independent Zimbabwe (the African nationalists’ name for Rhodesia) during 1978. On Namibia, the U.N. trust territory that South Africa has administered since 1920, Vorster had made several concessions, Mondale declared, though the two countries disagreed over the makeup of an interim government that would hold elections and lead the territory to independence.

Unjust System. But on the crucial question, South Africa’s political system, there was not the slightest agreement. Vorster and his delegation had argued that apartheid is not discriminatory and that the homelands will be truly independent. Mondale’s public answer: “We cannot accept, let alone defend governments that reject the basic principle of full human rights, economic opportunity and political participation for all their people, regardless of race.” To arguments by the South African government that it is keeping the region free of Communism, Mondale replied: “We believe that perpetuating an unjust system is the surest incentive to increase Soviet influence and even racial war.”

The South Africans were, as one U.S. participant put it, “very, very direct” in their rejection of Mondale’s proposals, and seemed genuinely stunned by some of his remarks. “I’m prepared to be hanged for what I am,” Vorster told the press, “but I’ll be damned if I’ll be hanged for what I am not.” Like Vorster, Foreign Minister Roelof (“Pik”) Botha implied that Washington had tried to push too far. “If the U.S. demands from us a political formula that means our own destruction, then we will say no,” he declared. “As in the biblical story, if you blind our eyes, then we will pull down the pillars.”

As Mondale flew on to Belgrade to pay a call on Yugoslav Communist Leader Josip Broz Tito, Washington’s U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young was preparing to go from the Mozambican capital of Maputo to South Africa. In Mozambique, where he attended a 92-nation U.N. conference on Rhodesia and Namibia, Young had held private talks with Mozambican President Samora Machel and other African leaders. He irritated some delegates by comparing southern Africa to the American South and by advocating peaceful transition to African majority rule. Robert Mugabe, a leader of Rhodesia’s militant Patriotic Front, found the speech “hollow” and said it represented “no change” in U.S. policy. Maybe not, but the storm in Vienna suggests that a genuine and perhaps far-reaching change is indeed taking place.