The Nation: The New Attack on Presidential Power

THE congressional challenge to the President’s foreign policy reached a new intensity last week. The Senate began a lengthy debate on whether to give Nixon a two-year extension of the draft; many argued strongly against it. Senator John Stennis, conservative chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a loyal supporter of Administration military policies, introduced a resolution that would curtail presidential power to make future wars. After years of objecting to the heavy U.S. troop commitment in Europe, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield took decisive action: he introduced an amendment to the draft bill that would compel the Administration to reduce American forces in NATO by one-half.

It was the Mansfield move that most alarmed the White House. The dollar crisis in Europe had underscored Mansfield’s complaint that the troop commitment was too costly for the U.S. The amendment, which comes to a vote this week, picked up considerable support. The Administration reacted vigorously, claiming that it would lead to collapse of the Atlantic Alliance. Said a White House aide: “There is no fall-back position on this. We are going to fight it like hell, and we may lose. But there is no alternative.”

Asinine. The President called on some notably big guns to help in the fight. He summoned foreign policymakers, past and present, Democratic and Republican, to a hastily convened conference at the White House. NATO Commander General Andrew Goodpaster and Robert Ellsworth, U.S. Ambassador to the Atlantic Alliance, arrived from Europe. Also on hand were George Ball and Dean Acheson, John J. McCloy and Henry Cabot Lodge, General Lucius Clay and General Alfred Gruenther—a reunion of the old U.S. foreign policy establishment. After the meeting, they presented a solid phalanx of support for the Administration. Snapped Acheson: “It is absolutely asinine to reduce forces unilaterally.” Later in the week, even Lyndon Johnson weighed in with a stern warning against troop withdrawal.

The Administration also got an unexpected assist from, of all people, Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev, who gave a speech at Tiflis, in Stalin’s Georgia homeland, recommending that the Soviets and the NATO powers start talking about mutual troop reductions in central Europe. Brezhnev challenged the U.S. to get serious about the subject. He asked rhetorically: “Don’t these curious people resemble a person who tries to judge the flavor of a wine without imbibing it?”

Brezhnev’s intervention further complicated an already intricate debate (see box, following page). Seizing the opportunity, Administration spokesmen spread the plausible message that it would be ridiculous to withdraw U.S. forces when there was a chance to use them to strike a bargain with Russia.

Strict Constructionism. While fighting off unacceptable amendments, the Administration had its hands full trying to salvage the draft bill itself. For the first time since 1940, when President Franklin Roosevelt persuaded an isolationist Congress to renew Selective Service, the Senate seriously considered whether to have a draft at all. Viet Nam, of course, was the reason. Some Senators argued that abolishing the draft would bring the war to a speedier conclusion.

Perhaps more important in the long run than the skirmishes over the draft bill was the defection of Senator Stennis. His resolution struck at the heart of the President’s war-making powers. Not that he meant to be as unkind as he seemed. As the Senate sponsor of the draft-extension bill, he wanted to separate the problem of war making from the draft. But as a strict constructionist who opposed the Viet Nam War in the first place, he felt that the time was ripe to rein in the President’s power to involve the nation in an undeclared war. His proposal would not apply to the Viet Nam War, but in the future it would allow the President to commit troops only in the case of an imminent or outright attack on the U.S., or if American citizens or armed forces were endangered abroad. He would then be permitted to use troops for a period of 30 days without congressional consent. In any other kind of conflict, only Congress could authorize going to war.

Encroachment. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State William Rogers replied that such a bill would be an unconstitutional encroachment on the President’s powers. Said Rogers: “To circumscribe presidential ability to act in emergency situations—or even to appear to weaken it—would run the grave risk of miscalculation by a potential enemy regarding the ability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.”

Beyond question the President needs freedom to act in an emergency, but that is not the issue that Congress is now pressing. While the Stennis resolution exempted Viet Nam, it was clearly the Indochina war that had prompted him and animated his supporters. Very little in that war has required instant presidential decision; the vital choices have been made only after weeks or even months of mulling over by the commanders in Viet Nam, the civilian chiefs at the Pentagon, and the President and his men at the White House.