Asia: What’s In It for Russia

In its unending drive to erode the foundations of U.S. power and prestige, Russia in recent months has been in a position to choose among several profitable cold-war theaters: Cuba, the Congo, Berlin. With such a profusion of attractive targets, why had Nikita Khrushchev chosen to push his attack hardest in an obscure piece of Asian jungle? Dangling like a plum from Asia’s heartland, Laos borders on four non-Communist nations—Cambodia, Burma, Thailand and South Viet Nam. With the Laotians little interested in defending themselves and the U.S. half a world away, the temptation was irresistible—particularly if it could be had on the cheap. Victory in Laos would help flank South Viet Nam, which is already being subjected to Communist terrorism (see below}. Some specialists think that the ultimate Communist ambition is to isolate India from the East, from the Pacific, from Australia, and from easy help from the U.S.

Double Target. Another story was being spread by Soviet diplomats themselves. To Westerners who would listen, they suggested that Russia’s underlying purpose in Laos is to keep a more militant Peking out. The argument: Soviet leaders are no less anxious than the U.S. to prevent the total takeover of Southeast Asia by the Chinese, and by intervening in Laos themselves, hoped to forestall a more reckless Chinese intervention that might lead to a general war. Indian diplomats, who are concerned about the Chinese on their borders, liked this explanation, pointing out that Moscow has in fact been competing with Peking for the dominant position in North Viet Nam. Pathet Lao rebels in Laos are being supplied by planes from far-off Russia rather than nearby China.

Along with these two theories, there was the fact that Khrushchev, on ground more convenient to Russia than to the West, is out to test—and, if possible, to break—the will of the new President of the U.S., feeling the need to destroy his prestige.

From Khrushchev’s point of view, what must appeal most about Laos is that he can test Western intentions there while remaining free at any time to call the Pathet Lao off and accept the U.S. offer of a neutral Laos. Even such a seeming Soviet retreat would hold strong prospects of future profit. By accepting the Western proposal for a 14-nation peace conference, which would include Red China. Moscow would win the opportunity to impress upon Peking that it was through Soviet efforts that China had won a place at the bargaining table.

The possibility of eventual Communist takeover in Laos would still exist, for under whatever political settlement the peace conference might work out, the Pathet Lao would almost surely win a voice in the Laotian government. Even a cease-fire by itself would leave the Communists in possession of much of northern Laos. And as everyone has learned since World War II, cease-fire lines nowadays have a way of turning into permanent borders.