STATE OF BUSINESS: Stalemate in Steel

In his self-appointed task as an impartial factfinder in the steel strike. Labor Secretary James P. Mitchell labored for a painstaking month” under a mountain of steel statistics. Last week, reversing his original plan to keep the statistics only for Administration use, Jim Mitchell decided to share them with the country. Many an anxious reporter and confused citizen hoped to find in the Mitchell report a solution to the five-week-old steel strike. But the report produced more of a sputter than a bang. It bent so far backward to be impartial that each side in the steel dispute immediately claimed vindication for its own cause.

Under Mitchell’s urging, President Eisenhower released the report to quiet a rising congressional chorus for action by the Administration. Ike hoped that by publishing some indisputable facts on the impasse and admonishing both sides to bargain harder, the Administration could build up public pressure for a quick peace without breaking his promise not to interfere directly. To offend nobody, Mitchell called in both combatants beforehand, showed what he intended to release, made some minor changes suggested by each. Neither side quibbled with the final report, but neither was moved. Said Mitchell: “Management and labor already know these facts.”

Telling Statistics. The report nonetheless underscored some telling statistics. Mitchell reported that the 20 largest steel companies earned less on their invested capital (12.8%) than the nation’s 25 biggest industrial firms (14.7%) in booming 1955-57, which tended to take some of the steam out of the union’s talk about huge steel profits in 1959’s exceptional first half. On the other side, the report answered industry’s contention that a wage raise would necessitate a price rise. It showed that since 1951 the industry’s wage-and-benefit costs per ton of steel have gone up from $32 to $44, while its price per ton has gone from $125 to $173—a $48 price rise, v. a $12 boost in employment costs.

Pointing a finger at both sides, the report noted that rises in steel prices (up 178% since 1940) and wages (up 85% since 1950) have been much sharper than in other manufacturing, and that steel wages ($3.10 an hour) are far above the manufacturing average ($2.23). Furthermore, steel’s productivity from 1947 to 1957 rose only 3% a year, v. 3.1% for all manufacturing. That was an unspectacular performance, both by steel workers whose wages have been rising by an average 6.4% a year, and by steel management, which claims that it is spending so much to boost its efficiency ($1 billion a year) that it cannot afford a modest wage hike or price cut.

$1.33 a Week. In a subtle prod to union and labor, Jim Mitchell announced that he still had other statistics—some of them perhaps more telling—that he intended to dribble out to keep up the pressure. At week’s end he released another report stating that the impact of the steel strike “has been severe and is expected to be felt increasingly in weeks to come.” The number of jobless workers in steel-related industries has risen to about 125,000—60% in railroads and coal mining—and 75,000 of them have applied for unemployment aid. But there is not yet any shortage of steel for defense plants, and none looms in the near future. Foreign steelmakers were supplying part of the demand, used the situation to boost their prices—normally $30 to $40 per ton below U.S. mill prices—to the U.S. level or higher.

Despite Mitchell’s efforts, peace seemed as far away as ever. Steelworker Boss David McDonald agreed to return to daily bargaining sessions this week for the first time since Aug. 7. But the A.F.L.-C.I.O. made it clear that it expects the steel walkout to last at least another month; it scheduled a rally to back the steelworkers at its annual convention on Sept. 18, considered a drive to collect i^ a day from each of its 13,300,000 members to help support the 500,000 steel strikers. That—on the basis of a five-day week—would amount to $1.33 per striker per week.