THE SURRENDER: Job for an Emperor

(See Cover)

Washington and Manila were in a fantastic tizzy. Some celestial observer, watching the frantic fumblings of the victors and the rise of a new Government in Tokyo (see FOREIGN NEWS), might have thought that the Japs had dropped an atomic bomb on the U.S. Said a topflight U.S. admiral: “Here we had things neatly laid out and the war was going fine—then the damned Japs surrender and throw us into a hell of a stew.”

Both the stew and the task of occupation were without precedent. The U.S. and her Allies simply were not ready for sudden victory, and most of the alarums and troubles stemmed from that fact.

At best, the task would be a huge one. In the 1,200 years since Japanese history emerged from the mists of legend, the islands had not been occupied by conquerors from overseas. The problem was no less novel for the victors: never before had any power or alliance of powers been confronted with so great a victory without invasion. Beaten to her knees by air power and sea power—for which Allied ground forces had seized the bases—Japan still had 2,500,000 or more undefeated troops on her own soil, almost as many more on the soil of her conquerors, and a military spirit undimmed by all the woes of war.

To enter and occupy such a country, the Allies had need of a man with great experience, great gifts and well-nigh infinite wisdom. Weeks before the actual problem arose, they had chosen General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

This week, in Manila, members of MacArthur’s staff received, with icy dignity, the first envoys of surrendered Japan. There were still irksome details to be settled and irritating delays to be overcome, but soon the Allies would make a great show of force: the first occupiers of Japan would go ashore in strength, from combat-loaded attack transports, under the great guns of the fleet and with clouds of carrier aircraft standing by—just in case.

The Man. The choice of MacArthur was one point on which there was near-instant unanimity both within the U.S. and within the grand alliance. The Russians denied that they had opposed his selection; Britain and China were content; when even the U.S. Navy admitted that he was the man for the job, there could be no further argument.

It was not that the forces under his command had made the greatest direct contribution to the defeat of Japan. That distinction belonged rather to men of all services who had fought under Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and to the strategic bombers of the Twentieth (B29) Air Force. But the occupation command fell naturally to the top field commander in the theater—providing he had the qualifications for the job.

MacArthur had the qualifications. As a young man, he had seen Japan in the flush of its victory (1905) over decadent Tsarist Russia. He had studied the Jap military machine and its methods. He had seen something of the Orient when he was an aide to his roving father, Lieut. General Arthur MacArthur.

As the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff (1930-35), he had been an administrator, dealing daily with civilian government officials. As the Philippine Commonwealth’s Field Marshal, he had closely studied his prospective enemy, and had become the target of America-hating Japs who called him “that leading Japano-phobe.” Perhaps most important, he had come to understand alien peoples (in the case of the Filipinos, to love them).

The Greater Gifts. In his handling of a multinational Allied command, MacArthur had developed some of the greater gifts he would need now. In the heat of combat he had often seemed brittle, bitter against those who disagreed with him. Last week, in Manila, at the apex of his fame and success, he looked five years younger than he had five years ago. He was confident, at ease, urbane, witty and analytical. He had no need to argue his case in words his deeds had spoken.

The very qualities in MacArthur which once had been most criticized stood him in good stead now. His imperial manner made him, of all Allied commanders, the one best fitted to give orders to an emperor. He presumably would hold himself as aloof from the masses of the enemy as he had from the masses of his own men. In Japan, that would be a good thing.

First Task. MacArthur had a clear conception of his role. First, he was going “On to Tokyo,” fulfilling the motto he himself had proclaimed only six months earlier. Beyond that, he told President Truman, he would “do everything possible to capitalize this situation along the magnificently constructive lines you have conceived for the peace of the world.” MacArthur was the Supreme Allied Commander for the purpose of receiving Japan’s formal surrender. The emphasis was on the word “for”; he was not supreme commander “of” Allied forces. The surrender terms which he imposes upon Japan must be executed in Manchuria by the invading Russians, in China by Chinese armies, in Southeast Asia by Admiral Mountbatten’s forces, in the Indies by the Dutch and Australians, in the Philippines by MacArthur’s own Army divisions, in countless Pacific islands by the U.S. Navy.

Forces directly under MacArthur’s command must take the surrender of Japan’s home armies, occupy the four “home islands” (see map), and perhaps Korea.

Upon these forces (which would include token groups from other Allies) would fall the burden of implementing plans to secure the peace of the world, and of Asia in particular.

First Steps. Sporadic shooting went on. Untidy odds & ends of combat took Allied lives, even in the Tokyo area where the orders of Imperial Headquarters could have been transmitted and should have been enforced most quickly. By the Japs’ own admission, their planes attacked twelve Allied transports cruising near Shikoku; Third Fleet fighters shot down snoopers aplenty. A brace of kamikaze pilots heading for the Shinto heaven crashed into Ihiya Island, near Okinawa, causing U.S. casualties.

MacArthur had warned the Japs that Allied reconnaissance must continue, but when B-32s droned on photographic missions over the Tokyo region, Zeros attacked. One B-32 had an engine shot out, and its pilot asked the lead plane to slow down so that he could keep up. A Jap fighter pilot cut in on the same frequency, in English : “Yes, please slow down so that I can catch you and shoot you down.” Tokyo and Manila exchanged a dozen formal messages and many more informal items. For one thing, the Japs had to have more time to start envoys on the way to Manila, where they would receive MacArthur’s terms; and besides, they wanted him to spell everything out twice for “clarification.” The consensus was that the Japs were stalling, and MacArthur curtly cut them off: “The directive from this headquarters is clear and explicit and is to be complied with without further delay.”

In Manchuria and China surrender came rapidly: even on remote Bougainville (in the Solomons) and Wewak (New Guinea), there was less delay in dealings between field commanders than between the two supreme headquarters.

First Fears. Among civilians and servicemen alike, anger rose. At Okinawa a field officer asked bitterly: “Is there anyone here today proud of being an American?” Said others: “The Japs are now dictating the peace.” In Honolulu, veterans of the Spanish-American War proclaimed that they would not “join in any parade celebrating the victory of Emperor Hirohito over our Washington politicians. We have lost face.” On Guam, B-29 airmen quit their kidding about “Tokyo Tours” (see cut).

Sober-sided New York Timesman Hanson Baldwin rumbled: “There is not much use blinking the fact that . . . the Japanese had made us look like monkeys— not on the battlefield, but since fighting virtually ceased.”

Things were probably not so bad as they seemed. It was the surprisingly quick surrender, rather than the U.S. concept of occupation, which led to the confusion and unease last week. The lack of completed plans and readied staffs to arrange the surrender and begin the actual occupation had nothing to do with the basic theory that conquered Japan should be ruled through its abjectly subordinated Emperor. In fact, having once chosen to deal with and through the Emperor, the occupiers could only hope & pray that he would be able to take and hold effective control until they could land troops in Japan. For better or for worse, the whole success of the occupation turned temporarily on the Emperor’s success in fashioning a surrender government.

Whatever their sins of omission in preparing adequately for an early victory, General MacArthur’s superiors in Washington needed all the time they could get, and they made the most of it. So did he.

Bitter Tea. When the Japs at last decided to get on with it, MacArthur rubbed the salt of Bataan into their wounds, insisting they use the word as their planes’ radio call. During the halfway halt at Ie Shima, one of the Jap crewmen appeared with a bouquet for “peace and friendship.” Not an arm was bent in salute. Gaping G.I.s showed more interest in the booted, fur-hatted Jap pilots than in the stubby little men walking over to the Army Transport Command plane (a C-54 Skymaster) assigned to carry them to Manila.

The big transport was oven-hot before it left the baked, gleaming coral of the runway. Fifteen of the Japs took off their heavy boots and lolled in the plush, adjustable seats—even more luxurious than the famous “MacArthur chairs.” The 16th kept his boots on. He was grey, roundheaded Lieut. General Torashiro Kawabe, vice chief of the Army General Staff.

After the C-54 had flown revealingly close to the plane-packed airfields of Okinawa, the flight steward broke out box lunches with sandwiches, hardboiled eggs, cake and a sweet pickle apiece. All ate well, and asked for seconds of pineapple juice—except Kawabe. He sipped a little juice, nibbled at the egg.

As the 930-mile swift flight to Manila was ending, a junior Jap flashed a wad of pre-1929 king-size U.S. bills, and asked permission to tip the flight steward. The answer was no.

At Manila’s Nichols Field, where the scars of conquest and liberation alike were abundantly evident, Kawabe was first out of the plane. He strode toward rusty-haired, slim Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir and saluted. Mashbir returned the salute.

Then, although he speaks fluent Japanese, Mashbir merely gestured with his thumb for Kawabe to move on toward towering, German-born Major General Charles A. Willoughby. Kawabe and Willoughby saluted like automatons, and the American brusquely led the Japs to waiting staff cars, (see cut).

In Manila, shattered by the Japs’ fanatic fury in February, the Japs were quartered at the damaged but serviceable Rosaria Apartments. Supper (by chance, a little better than usual) was sent over from a nearby general officers’ mess. Kawabe showed a huge roll of U.S. money, sent an American orderly out for six cartons of U.S. cigarets. Then the envoys were whisked to the heavily damaged, hastily repaired City Hall where MacArthur and his staff have their headquarters.

The Orders. Kawabe bowed low to stone-faced Lieut. General Richard K. Sutherland. MacArthur’s chief of staff nodded, quickly led the six ranking members of the delegation to a conference with Willoughby, three other staff generals and Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman. For five strained hours, the victors extracted information about harbors and airfields around Tokyo, which Allied forces would need for their entry.

The Japs had five hours to sleep (on Army cots), and in mid-morning the conferences were resumed. At the end, Kawabe was handed 24 or 25 pages of detailed orders. By lunch time, 19 hours after the C-54 had dropped onto Nichols Field, the Japs were on their way back to Tokyo.

They had not met five-star General MacArthur. Their highest-ranking envoy was outranked by Sutherland, and they saw no one higher.

Said MacArthur, in a statement such as only he can write: “The Japanese emissaries have . . . imparted all information required. … In my capacity as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers I shall soon proceed to Japan with accompanying forces composed of ground, naval and air elements. Subject to weather that will permit landings, it is anticipated that the instrument of surrender will be signed within ten days. … It is my earnest hope that pending the formal. . . surrender, armistice conditions may prevail on every front and that a bloodless surrender may be effectuated.”

Missouri’s Harry Truman had asked that the final surrender be signed aboard the Third Fleet flagship, the 45,000-ton battleship Missouri.

The Olympian. Preparing for the event, MacArthur worked calmly with men who had been with him at Corregidor and on the long road back. Cabled TIME Correspondent Shelley Mydans:

“The old Bataan crowd is going to deal with the Emperor.

“There is no tendency to bloodlust or retribution in this headquarters group. Led by MacArthur, the thinking is on a broad plane with an effort to understand Japan and Japanese attitudes.

“The best adjective for MacArthur’s attitude toward this peace and the Japanese is ‘Olympian.’ He is thinking in centuries and populations.”