WAR IN SPAIN: Unpleasant Reading

Six weeks ago the British Government dispatched to the capitals of Spain’s warring factions—Barcelona and Burgos—a closely printed, 50-page memorandum entitled: “The text of a proposed resolution reaffirming and extending the Nonintervention Agreement and provision for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain, for the grant in certain circumstances of belligerent rights to the two parties in Spain, and for the observation of the Spanish frontiers by land and sea.”

This “proposed resolution,” adopted unanimously by the 27 nations of the London Non-intervention Committee after 24 months of quarreling and petty dickering, was in effect a plan to ease international tension by getting foreign soldiers out of Spain. Before the elaborately painstaking plan could be carried out, Spain’s Rightists and Leftists had of course to accept. To tempt them into agreement, concessions were tentatively offered to both factions. Held out to Rightist Spain was the plum of belligerent rights which would legalize a blockade of Leftist Spain’s ports. For Leftist Spain was a tempting offer of a “proportionate withdrawal” of foreign volunteers. Since the Rightist Army has at least twice as many Italian and German soldiers as there are French, Russian, British volunteers in Leftist trenches, for every soldier removed from the Leftist ranks under the “proportionate withdrawal” plan, two would come from the Rightist battalions.

Last month Leftist Spain accepted the plan with only a few minor reservations.This week Rightist Spain told Great Britain that it too ”accepted the principle” of withdrawal of foreign volunteers. But larded into General Franco’s “acceptance” were so many Rightist complaints, demands, objections, charges and refusals that, in effect, it was almost a flat rejection.

General Franco’s answer asked the British to explain how the Non-intervention Committee could possibly expect to get an accurate count on Leftist volunteers, since (the note charged) they: 1) are presented with Spanish names and Spanish passports; 2) do not have distinguishing marks; 3) are generally placed at the front; 4) could be hidden among the civilian population; 5) could be assigned to the medical corps.

Instead, General Franco offered: 1) a withdrawal of 10,000 foreign troops from each side; 2) to respect two “safety ports” in Leftist Spain for the exclusive entry of food; 3) to try to agree upon a definition of military objectives. Mincing few words, he demanded “as a right” to be granted a belligerent status because: 1) he possesses more territory than his enemy; 2) he maintains a sovereign government; 3) he has an army and air force organized to guarantee order. Charging that vessels have taken contraband munitions into Leftist Spain with Non-Intervention Committee observers on board, General Franco complained that Rightist Spain is now denied the right of search on the high seas, that she is hampered by a list of contraband imposed by the Committee. He complained also that only those foreign volunteers of nations represented on the Non-intervention Committee would be withdrawn under the plan, leaving the volunteers from the U. S.—not a Committee member—still fighting.

General Franco ended with fervor: “Nationalist Spain solemnly reiterates its former affirmations that it is fighting for the greatness and independence of the country and does not consent, and never will consent, to the slightest mortgage on its soil, or on its economic life, and that it will defend at all times, to the last hand ful, its territory, its protectorates and its colonies, if any one dares to make an at tempt against them!”

For British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, the note was decidedly un pleasant reading. His pet project, the Anglo-Italian agreement of last April, can not go into force until the Spanish question is solved, and that appeared further off than ever. For Non-intervention Com mittee Chairman, the Earl of Plymouth, two years’ tedious diplomatic wrangling had been wasted.

To prophets of the war’s outcome, the Franco note meant that Generalissimo Francisco Franco himself expects that an other winter of war is probably in store for his army, that he will need all his German and Italian “volunteers.” When Franco Allies Germany and Italy agreed in London to the withdrawal plan, Rightist armies were victoriously on the march. The end of the war seemed not far off. Since then the Rightist offensive toward Valencia was stopped, the Leftists struck back with three advances. Last week a Rightist offensive was still hammering unsuccessfully against the Leftists’ recently-won Ebro River salient.

Meanwhile, Leftist Premier Dr. Juan Negrin, who before the war was a professor of physiology, did a curious thing. He skipped off to Zurich, Switzerland, ostensibly to attend a Congress of Physiologists. When Premier Negrin failed to show up at a congress banquet, when on the same day the Duke of Berwick & Alba, Rightist agent at London, appeared in Zurich, the coincidence was very strange indeed. Rumors buzzed that the two representatives of warring Spanish factions were talking matters over.