National Affairs: Question Before the House

There still remained the problem of Communist China itself: should the U.S. recognize it, or firmly announce now that it has no intention of doing so?

The lawyers and the State Department argued that recognition meant neither approval nor disapproval, since the U.S. already recognizes Communist Russia and all the Communist satellites in Eastern Europe. Besides, the U.S. had just recognized the unsavory Arias government in Panama, while making clear that it disapproved of it.

So far as China was concerned, State Department Mimeograph machines could churn out legal opinions until the Amazon froze without altering one fact: recognition of the Reds would be received through the world as a major change in U.S. policy, with enormous gain of “face” for Peking. It was the kind of problem honest men differed on: the influential Far Eastern division in State wanted to recognize; so far, Harry Truman was against. Most Congressmen who had spoken up at all were also against recognition. These were the arguments:

The Case For:

¶Yes, Red China is a willing ally of Stalinism, but nothing is to be gained by standing alone after Britain and other non-Communist nations recognize. ¶Why should the U.S. slam any door when diplomatic posts could provide observation points, when businessmen might profit from trade and the U.S. could have hostages against their safety in Chinese Communist diplomats here? ¶The Chinese are basically anti-foreign and will grow to hate Moscow string-pulling. So there is always the chance that China’s Boss Mao Tse-tung will become another Tito. It might help to have an ambassador around to encourage him. ¶As the sole provider for Japan’s deficits, the U.S. taxpayer would benefit financially if Japan could resume her oldtime brisk trade with the Chinese mainland. ¶Communist China will inevitably apply for China’s seat on the United Nations Security Council. What would the U.S. then do—use the veto, which it scorns in Russian hands, to keep the representatives of 450 million people from the only forum of international discussion? The arguments on the other side were as strong, or stronger.

The Case Against:

¶It is not true that the State Department always plays along with a de facto government, when it doesn’t approve of it. Example: while the U.S. technically recognizes Franco Spain, it sends no ambassador there.

¶Britain owns Hong Kong and has a billion dollar investment in China. Because she wants to recognize Peking, is no reason why the U.S. should.

¶Diplomats in Communist China, like Consul General Angus Ward—are apt to find themselves whipping posts and not listening posts. How can businessmen or missionaries have any security there? ¶As Mao’s visit to Moscow indicates, he has shown no sign of wavering from the international Communist line. If he does set out to become a Tito, recognition can just as well wait until that happy day. ¶To recognize Mao would be to abandon America’s friends in China—not only the Nationalist government, but all anti-Communist elements.

¶Recognition would jeopardize any U.S. moves in Formosa. So ran the debate. Last week another influential voice joined the discussion. The Republican’s top foreign-policy strategist, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, returned to Washington, thinned down (by 30 Ibs.) but recovered from his operation. His answer to recognition was neither yes nor no. It was not yet. Said Michigan’s Vandenberg: Communist China must first demonstrate its “competent control [and] its willingness to observe the rules of international law. In neither respect does it now qualify for recognition.”