Proliferation: A Foot in the Arms-Control Door

Opponents of arms-control talks have long justified their skepticism by citing Moscow’s long-standing refusal to allow arms inspectors on Soviet soil. Last week the Soviets took a small step toward spiking that criticism. At a ceremony in Vienna, the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement that for the first time allows the U.N.-sponsored International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect carefully selected parts of Moscow’s civilian nuclear industry. Said Soviet Diplomat Vladimir Petrovsky at the signing: “On the eve of U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, we feel it is necessary to create a favorable atmosphere.”

The agreement is an adjunct to the 1970 nonproliferation treaty, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. More than 90 other nations have similar arrangements with the IAEA, including the U.S., which signed an inspection agreement in 1980. Moscow did not agree to the idea in principle until 1982, and subsequent negotiations on the actual terms of the new document took 16 months. How important a concession is the accord? That may depend on what Soviet facilities have been opened for inspection: the latest, advanced civilian nuclear plants, or merely old, outdated ones.