Diplomacy Maverick in Moscow

Given his taste for political theater, it was just the kind of occasion that appealed to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Accompanied by five Cabinet ministers and two under secretaries, he paid his first official visit to Moscow last week. It was a four-day event that not only celebrated closer Soviet-Greek ties but allowed the Greek Socialist leader another moment in the spotlight as the maverick of the Western alliance. An element of dramatic suspense was provided by ailing Soviet Leader Konstantin Chernenko, 73, who has not made a public appearance in seven weeks. Only five hours before the scheduled meeting, Papandreou’s aides announced that Chernenko, who suffers from emphysema and related ailments, could not receive Papandreou for reasons of ill health.

Papandreou did not seem overly concerned that he had missed seeing Chernenko or Politburo Member Mikhail Gorbachev, 53, who is widely assumed to hold the No. 2 spot in the Kremlin. At a reception in the Greek embassy, Papandreou was in a jovial mood. As a folk singer rendered an old Russian favorite, Kalinka (Little Snowball Tree), in a throaty voice to the accompaniment of a balalaika and harmonica, the Prime Minister rose and, while 100 guests cheered him on, performed a graceful sirtaki, circling around with his arms raised over his head, like a man much younger than his 66 years.

It is an election year in Greece, and for Papandreou’s benefit the Soviets gave the visit all the trappings of international diplomacy, although neither side offered major political concessions. The mercurial Papandreou seemed content with yet another demonstration of his aggressively independent style in East-West relations. His occasional anti-U.S. rhetoric and his jabs against NATO (see box) are based on the conviction that a fellow NATO ally, Turkey, and not the Soviet Union, represents the greatest threat to Greece’s security.

For Papandreou, any glimmer of improved Soviet-Greek ties is an important bargaining chip in his jousting with Washington. Yet the Soviets were cautious in dealing with Papandreou. After meeting with him in Moscow, Premier Nikolai Tikhonov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko declared that Greece’s positions on disarmament were close to the Soviet Union’s, but they refrained from harsh attacks on the U.S. or NATO. So, for once, did Papandreou. Said a Western diplomat in Moscow: “The Soviets have behaved quite subtly. They’re hoping to exploit Greece’s differences with its allies, but they know if they push too hard, it will backfire.”

Indeed, the Soviets appeared to have few illusions about their wily guest. In a bitter attack on Papandreou only a year ago, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda pointed out that his Socialist party had campaigned on pledges to pull the country out of NATO and close down U.S. bases in Greece. Today, more than three years later, Greece remains in the alliance and a new U.S.-Greek base agreement has been negotiated. Editorialized Pravda: “There are many objective obstacles on the way to progressive changes.” Said a Moscow-based Western diplomat: “The Soviets must wonder if Papandreou ever means what he says.”

Despite pressure from the Greek delegation, the Soviets refused to be dragged into Greece’s bitter dispute with Turkey over Cyprus, and the official communique contained only a vague acknowledgment of Greek claims in the Aegean Sea. Since Greece and Turkey are strategically placed close to the Black Sea, Moscow wants to maintain good relations with both countries. The Soviets pleased Papandreou by agreeing to build a gas pipeline through Bulgaria to Greece, starting in 1986, at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion. Moscow also promised to award Greek shipyards orders for four vessels worth $65 million and contracts for $20 million in repairs. The Soviets also agreed to build a subway to replace Athens’ 80-year-old system.

Papandreou arrived in Moscow at a time when his relations with the U.S. have deteriorated to the point of public bickering. The bombing of a bar in an Athens suburb two weeks ago, in which more than 30 Americans, many from a nearby military base, were injured, prompted Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to comment, “This is one of those things you tend to get when all this anti-American sentiment is stirred up.” A Greek government spokesman fired back, “It is rather Mr. Weinberger who should be condemned for an anti- Greek campaign.” Athens police still do not know whether the bomb was tossed into the crowded bar by terrorists or by thugs.

The exchange involving Weinberger came just a day after the Reagan Administration provoked Greek anger by announcing foreign aid requests for fiscal 1986 that favor Turkey over Greece ($789 million in military aid plus $150 million in economic support, vs. only $501 million in military aid for Greece). In Athens’ view, the allocations violated a congressionally mandated policy of recent years to grant Greece the equivalent of at least 70% of military aid going to Turkey. Papandreou in turn hardened his stand toward NATO. Henceforth, he told a parliamentary group of his ruling Socialist party, Greece would not participate in any NATO exercises, in the Aegean or elsewhere, “unless the alliance changes its stance with regard to Greek- Turkish differences.” By adding that condition, the Prime Minister left himself a loophole. Greece cannot afford to lose even an unsatisfactory U.S. aid package. Papandreou knows all too well that it would be impossible to replace such assistance with aid from any other source, including the Soviet Union.