Middle East: A Region in Search of a Policy

Lebanese talks fail, and Reagan decides against missile sales to Jordan

“Get your sandbags ready,” snapped Walid Jumblatt, the volatile leader of Lebanon’s Druze community, as he emerged from the elegant lakeside Beau Rivage Hotel in Lausanne, Switzerland. His message was all too clear. After nine days, the latest negotiations to bring about a reconciliation of Lebanon’s religious factions had ended in failure, and a return to warfare seemed inevitable.

Hours later, fighting broke out once more in Beirut, not only between Christians and Muslims but also between Druze militiamen and a radical Muslim faction. One of the few accomplishments of the conference had been an agreement on a ceasefire. But in the first seven days after the cease-fire supposedly went into effect, at least 50 people in the Lebanese capital were killed by the shelling.

The breakdown of the Lausanne talks came as U.S. influence in the region seemed to reach a new low. Under pressure from Congress, and angered by criticism from Jordan’s King Hussein, President Reagan withdrew a request for Senate approval to sell $274 million worth of Stinger antiaircraft missiles and launchers to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In an interview with a group of TIME editors, Syrian President Hafez Assad became the second Arab leader, after Hussein, to attack U.S. policy in the Middle East and particularly the influence of Jewish voters (see following story).

The fundamental stumbling block at the Lausanne conference was, as always, the division of political spoils in Lebanon. The country’s governmental system is based on the last census, which was taken in 1932, when the Christians still formed a majority. All sides generally agree that the Muslims today constitute about 60% of the country’s population of more than 3.5 million, and that the Shi’ite Muslims are the largest single community, with about 40%. Thus the Christians want to hold on to the power they have, and the Muslim and Druze opposition groups want to modify the political system in order to gain a larger say in the government.

Two of the Maronite Christian leaders, former President Camille Chamoun, 83, and Pierre Gemayel, 79, father of the current President, offered plans that would have created separate and independently administered Christian and Muslim “cantons,” while leaving the presidency and other important posts in Christian hands. They were joined by another former Maronite President, Suleiman Franjieh, 73, who had helped found the Syrian-backed National Salvation Front last year but broke with that group in the course of the recent conference.

Among the opposition delegates, Shi’ite Leader Nabih Bern, Sunni Leader Rashid Karami and Jumblatt all supported the retention of a unified system for Lebanon but called for a diminution of Christian power. They accepted reluctantly the proposition that the presidency should remain in Maronite hands, but they wanted the powers of the job trimmed. One proposal was that the Prime Minister, traditionally a Sunni Muslim, should be given more authority, including the right to veto top-level appointments in the army and civil service. Since “the post of army commander has customarily gone to a Maronite, the Christian delegates were horrified by the proposal, arguing that it would heighten Christian insecurities.

Almost in desperation, on the last day the delegates agreed to a further separation of the various militias and to a withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Beirut area. They also agreed to the formation of a security commission, to be headed by President Amin Gemayel, that will be charged with maintaining the ceasefire. Perhaps most important, they voted to establish a 32-member commission to prepare for the drafting of a new Lebanese constitution within six months. Considering the condition of the country, that was a tall order. “Maybe everyone will be back here in six months,” mused one delegate, “but a lot more blood will have been spilled in that time.”

The Syrians, who sponsored the conference, were deeply disappointed by its failure. Declaring that “Lebanon’s salvation starts with bringing the country out of the sectarian quagmire,” the Syrian government newspaper, Tishrin, asked whether the country’s leaders “will learn this lesson, or have they become so insensitive that only cauterization will work for them?” Having supported President Gemayel during the conference, the Syrians privately blamed the Christian “godfathers,” Chamoun, Franjieh and Pierre Gemayel, for the breakdown.

One remarkable aspect of Lebanon’s present plight is that for the first time in decades the U.S. is playing practically no role in trying to solve the country’s problems. But the vacuum is troubling to many of Washington’s traditional Arab allies, notably King Hussein. Earlier this year, Jordan drafted a United Nations resolution critical of Israeli West Bank settlements, with a text based entirely on previous U.S. statements on the subject. When the Jordanians asked the Reagan Administration to sponsor the resolution in the Security Council, or at least not to veto it, the U.S. refused.

More recently, King Hussein has been upset by the efforts of Congress to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He was angered by the public debate in the U.S. over the proposed sale of the Stinger missiles to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Two weeks ago, when President Reagan explained to a United Jewish Appeal audience in Washington why he believed such a sale was necessary, Hussein blew up. What many Americans saw as a bold step by Reagan in an election year seemed humiliating to Hussein. At this point, as the King told TIME editors and correspondents last week (see box), private protest seemed futile and he decided to go public. At the same time, his American-born wife, Queen Noor, who was already touring the U.S., began making speeches on her husband’s behalf. In Washington last week, she declared that U.S. ideals are being eroded by “an intransigent Israeli will.”

The Administration reacted defensively to the criticism. Secretary of State George Shultz argued that the King’s criticism had made congressional approval of the Stinger missile sale “extremely difficult.” And sure enough, when faced with the fact that at least 55 Senators were known to be opposed to the sale, the White House withdrew its request. To some degree, the Stinger debacle hurt the Jordanians, though they were considering other options, including the purchase of similar weapons from France or the Soviet Union. What suffered most, amid the sense of spiraling failure of American interests in the Arab Middle East, was the ability of the U.S. to influence events in a vital region of the world.

—By William E. Smith. Reported by John Borrell/ Lausanne and Barrett Seaman/ Washington