Fighting Among Friends

U.S.-Israeli relations are caught in a crossfire of harsh words

The rhetoric, observed a commentator in one of the year’s classic understatements, was not exactly “the linguistic currency to be used between heads of government.” Still, Menachem Begin’s angry words were apt symbols of the latest nadir in American-Israeli relations. Responding to a tough rebuke from the Reagan Administration, Israel’s choleric Prime Minister summoned U.S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis for a 72-minute tongue-lashing that was at once an irrational howl of defiance and a bleating cry of pain.

In Washington, the Administration’s public answer to Begin’s blast was soothing. “A disagreement among friends,” declared Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The official assumption was that the outburst was a spasm of momentary rage and that the special relationship with America’s prickly ally would return to something resembling normality in a matter of weeks. But the restoration would have to be on U.S., not Israeli, terms. Said a ranking White House staffer: “A certain amount of attitudinal change on their part will be necessary.”

The crossfire of reprisal and rhetoric was the explosive aftermath of Begin’s decision to push through the Knesset a law that in effect annexed the Golan Heights. Israel seized the 444-sq.-mi. area of high ground from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War. Reagan’s answer was to suspend a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation, signed by the U.S. and Israel last month to promote a coordinated defense against Soviet threats to the Middle East, and to postpone purchase of $200 million worth of Israeli-made military equipment.

In addition, the Administration announced it would vote for a Syrian-backed resolution before the United Nations Security Council to declare the annexation null and void. Said a State Department spokesman: “We do not recognize Israel’s action” and consider it to be “without international legal effect.”

The Administration bore its share of responsibility for the crisis by having failed to chart any kind of firm, long-range Middle East policy. Despite their expressed commitment to the Camp David accords, Reagan and his aides have given little priority to pushing forward the long-stalled talks between Israel and Egypt on autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nor has the Administration been at all decisive in dealing with Israeli actions that were clearly contrary to U.S. interests. After Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad last June, the U.S. withheld a shipment of new fighter jets. But the embargo was lifted less than three months later, even though Israel had subsequently used American-supplied planes to bomb Beirut, killing at least 300.

The wavering U.S. policy is due in part to divisions within the Administration. Reagan, who took office with ardent pro-Israel instincts, felt he had developed a personal rapport with Begin that would translate into restraint on Jerusalem’s part. Only recently has he become disillusioned with the Israeli leader, his aides say, and he is “deeply disappointed” about his misplaced faith. Haig also favored a policy of conciliation and cajolery in dealing with Begin. Prior to the Golan annexation, the leading advocate of a tough line with Israel was Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who felt that the memorandum of strategic understanding would hamper U.S. efforts to build military alliances with moderate Arab nations. But it was Haig who felt most hurt by Begin’s recent actions and strongly urged Reagan that it was time for something more than a wrist tap. Said one top U.S. diplomat: “There is no question that we have been remiss in drawing the lines and no question that Begin misunderstands our tolerance.”

Many in Israel argue that the country must hold on to the Golan Heights for security reasons, since Syria used the high, rocky terrain to lob shells into Israeli settlements prior to the 1967 war. Not only has Syria shown no interest in negotiating any peace with Israel, but it has tried to assert its authority over Lebanon by moving its missiles into the southern part of that country. The Administration answer is that de facto annexation of the Golan added nothing to Israel’s security and blatantly violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which require a return of Israeli-occupied territory in exchange for recognized and secure boundaries for all states in the region.

Begin’s annexation of the Golan was probably intended, in part, to placate ultranationalists in his ruling coalition who object to the withdrawal from the Sinai, scheduled for April, and the abandonment of the Jewish settlements there. But according to some experts a more serious game of brinkmanship may be involved. Begin seems willing, even anxious, to risk international isolation by forcing Egypt or the U.S. to break off the Camp David process, thus providing a justification for Israel to annex the West Bank and Gaza. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has shown restraint. Although he condemned the annexation of the Golan, he said that if Syria went to war over the Golan, Egypt would not join in.

Some critics of the Administration argue that its prior policy of being conciliatory to Begin has simply encouraged him to take advantage of the U.S. One member of Israel’s Labor Party sums up the case: “The most frightening thing is that [Begin’s] ‘unpredictability method’ of foreign policy seems to be working. Every year since 1967 we have told each other that next year the Americans will finally turn off the spigots and force our leaders to behave sanely. But it seems the Americans always give way in the end.” Despite Begin’s seemingly mercurial conduct, his moves over the past two weeks have been carefully calculated. He even prepared notes for his diatribe to Ambassador Lewis before delivering it.

Begin’s “wild” words, as the Jerusalem Post labeled them, were met with mixed emotions in Israel. Said former Foreign Minister Abba Eban during the Knesset debate on the Golan annexation: “This isn’t,aggressive diplomacy. This is weakness.” Complained former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: “Begin has chosen to weaken Camp David by grabbing everything he can where he can.” But many Israelis admired their Prime Minister for having tweaked America’s nose. Said Yossi Nahmani, a vegetable vendor in Jerusalem: “It’s great when he puts it to the rest of the world. It makes my heart sing.” By a vote of 57 to 47, Begin’s governing coalition defeated a no-confidence motion put forward by a small opposition party after his rebuke to Ambassador Lewis.

The American Jewish community once again rallied behind Begin, but without much sense of urgency or conviction. Hyman Bookbinder, the Washington lobbyist for the American Jewish Committee, observed, “I feel as if I’m overhearing a very ugly argument between my parents. I’m not so interested in which one is more to blame. I just want the fight to end.” Even many of Israel’s unflinching supporters in Congress were dismayed by both the Golan annexation and Begin’s verbal barrage at the U.S. Said Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of Washington: “It is regrettable that Begin makes these kinds of moves. A lot of Jewish leaders are very unhappy.”

Begin did accomplish one thing: he helped reconcile, at least for the moment, radical and moderate Arab nations. Syria’s opposition to a Saudi Arabian peace plan had led to the early collapse of an Arab League summit in Morocco last month. But Syrian President Hafez Assad was warmly welcomed last week in Riyadh, his first stop on a tour to solidify opposition to Israel’s Golan grab. Saudi Crown Prince Fahd postponed indefinitely a scheduled trip to Washington next month, thus dealing a setback to the current U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with the ranking oil power in the Middle East and other moderate Arab states. How can the breach between Israel and the U.S. be repaired? The Administration has made clear that it expects Israel to adhere to the Camp David accords by returning the rest of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty on schedule, show restraint in dealing with Syrian missiles and Palestinian guerrillas based in Lebanon, and display flexibility in the Palestinian autonomy negotiations. As long as there is progress in these areas, the U.S. will veto any meaningful sanctions against Israel proposed by the U.N. Security Council. Reagan and Haig may never regain the feeling of personal trust they once had in Begin, but the longstanding friendship between America and Israel should emerge from the rubble.

U.S. officials fear, however, that Begin will try to escalate the tension and reassert Israel’s authority with yet another unilateral gambit. There is speculation that he will fulfill his frequent threat to move the Prime Minister’s office to predominantly Arab East Jerusalem. High Israeli officials warn that this might be only the first in a series of provocative steps. Said a top-ranking Begin aide: “Obviously, the old man is preparing another surprise, something on the scale of the Golan annexation or even bigger. It’s all in his mind, and he’s not shared his thoughts with anybody. It may be something that will force the partners in the Camp David accords to violate the treaty or will justify annexation of the West Bank.”

That the U.S. must worry about such possibilities shows how drastically Begin has undermined America’s basic attitude toward Israel: from a relationship of trust to one of uncertainty and frustration. Begin charged last week that the U.S. was “trying to make Israel a hostage.” The fact is, the U.S. has become something of a hostage, its interests buffeted and deflected by unpredictable Israeli actions. Despite its increasing effort to seek and maintain Arab allies, the U.S. has a firm commitment to Israel’s survival, and U.S. support makes that survival possible. Which is all the more reason why the U.S. must make it perfectly clear to Israel, and to itself, what its own Middle East policy is, and what this policy can legitimately demand of allies. —By Walter Isaacson. Reported by David Halevy/Jerusalem and Johanna McGeary/Washington