--- description: There are those who say it's the fastest way out of Afghanistan. But it's easier said than done title: Talking with the Taliban: Easier Said Than Done image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/bltee9ad75b5e0b2a6e/698a47ec47ca3857b73bbf36/360_wtaliban_1130.jpg?branch=production&width=750&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 ---  * [U.S.](/section/us/) # Talking with the Taliban: Easier Said Than Done by [Aryn Baker](/author/aryn-baker/) Nov 30, 2009 5:00 AM CUT  Some Taliban fighters relax in a compound in the district of Chardarah, near the norther city of Kunduz. Some Taliban fighters relax in a compound in the district of Chardarah, near the norther city of Kunduz.Ghaith Abdul-Ahad / Reportage / Getty by [Aryn Baker](/author/aryn-baker/) Nov 30, 2009 5:00 AM CUT Abdul Jameel was ready for peace. The commander of a small group of Taliban fighters in the province of Wardak, Afghanistan, Jameel was able to persuade his men to surrender to the government in exchange for amnesty and the chance to return to a life of farming or shopkeeping. But he never got that chance. Just weeks after he approached the government, Jameel and several members of his family were gunned down. It is unclear if the Taliban killed him or if old rivals were seeking revenge. Nevertheless, Jameel’s story — which quickly spread around the province — provided a potent deterrent to other would-be reconcilers and a lesson in the complexities of talking with the Taliban. As Afghan President Hamid Karzai embarks on his second five-year term, he maintains that his primary agenda is to bring the war in Afghanistan to a peaceful close through negotiations with members of the Taliban insurgency. Karzai has gone so far as to invite his “Taliban brothers” to “embrace their land” and join him in talks. The U.S. too is growing weary of the war. As President Barack Obama finalizes his new strategy for Afghanistan and deliberates over how many more troops he should send to the front, he is facing pressure to define a clear exit strategy. What was once anathema — talking to an enemy that was overthrown by U.S. forces in 2001 in retaliation for sheltering Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network — is now gaining acceptance, as the generals realize that military tactics alone will not win this war. For many U.S., European and U.N. diplomats as well as Afghan officials, talking with the Taliban seems to be the fastest, and perhaps only, way out of the quagmire. [(See pictures of the battle against the Taliban.)](https://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1653255,00.html "undefined") Is it really? Or is a dialogue with the Taliban just another dead end? For those who think that negotiations are worth trying and that so-called moderate Taliban can be coaxed to break ranks with their extremist leaders, there is a hopeful precedent. Starting in early 2007, tens of thousands of Iraqi insurgents were persuaded to lay down their weapons in exchange for cash and jobs, usually as part of local militias fighting their former al-Qaeda allies. Building on that example, General Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander of international forces in Afghanistan, wrote in his recent assessment of the Afghan war that NATO “must identify opportunities to reintegrate former mid- to low-level insurgent fighters into normal society by offering them a way out.” Lieut. General Graeme Lamb, a former head of Britain’s special forces who was asked by McChrystal to head the program, which was announced in September, says insurgents need to be offered security, vocational training, jobs and amnesty for past crimes. “This is not rocket science,” says Lamb. “Insurgents have been reconciling and reintegrating back into society for centuries. This is about entering a dialogue where they can see opportunities, because the way you counter an insurgency is with a better life.” [(See pictures of the U.S. Marines’ offensive in Afghanistan.)](https://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1908500,00.html "undefined") Both Afghan and Western officials have embraced the new terminology: they seek reintegration for low-level Taliban members who are assumed to be fighting for money or personal grievances, and reconciliation for Taliban leaders who are motivated by ideology. The plan, according to U.S. officials, will be undertaken in concert with the Afghan government. “We think that reintegration, if done right, if done by Afghan leaders and people, helps to create conditions for broader-scale reconciliation,” says a U.S. diplomat. The Taliban leadership, needless to say, has greeted all this with a snort of derision. “The mujahedin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are not mercenaries,” said Mullah Brader Akhund in a statement. “This war will come to an end when all invaders leave our country and an Islamic government based on the aspirations of our people is formed.” Such a denunciation was to be expected. But even those who back the plan worry that Karzai’s corruption-riddled government is so detested that money and jobs will not be enough, on their own, to woo fighters to switch sides. “Paying the low-level \[Taliban\] may work temporarily, but it won’t solve the main problems,” says Ishaq Nizami, the former head of the TV and Radio Directorate under the Taliban regime. “There is so much corruption and no laws. In many areas the Taliban have been able to bring security and justice, which the government has not done. Even if some fighters turn, they will turn back again when they understand that their lives are not better.” For reintegration to work, in other words, Afghanistan needs to have a government worth fighting for. So far it does not. [See pictures of suicide in recruiters’ ranks.](https://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1889200,00.html "undefined") [See pictures of Osama Bin Laden.](https://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1888705,00.html "undefined") **You Can’t Help if You Aren’t There** Persuading fighters to think of laying down their arms might be the easiest part of a new approach. They also need to believe they will be safe if they do so. Many Taliban foot soldiers joined the movement simply because they ended up on the wrong side of a local power equation. As with Jameel in Wardak province, affiliation with the Taliban offered them protection. So if they are going to disarm, they need to be confident that the side they are joining will stay and win — otherwise, desertion could be a death sentence. Trouble is, that means making the sort of guarantee that the U.S. and its allies shy away from. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently that the U.S. is “not interested in staying \[in Afghanistan\]” and has “no long-term stake there,” she probably — if inadvertently — caused fence sitters to reconsider their options. Indeed, Masoom Stanekzai, Karzai’s point man on the reintegration policy, says that for it to work, a U.S. commitment of more troops is important. “The stronger presence of security forces in an area means that more Taliban commanders are under pressure,” says Stanekzai. “They will ask themselves, ‘Continue and be killed, or join the peace process?'” [(See who’s who in Barack Obama’s White House.)](https://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1863062%5F1863058,00.html "undefined") So far, the new policy has focused on low-level Taliban fighters. But there have been moves to engage the insurgency’s leaders too. In a sign of mounting frustration with Karzai’s government, Obama recently requested an analysis of Afghanistan’s provinces to determine which of them had leaders with whom the U.S. could work directly. The request apparently did not exclude Taliban commanders, a move that has met with approval among Afghans. “There are many capable people in the Taliban … \[who\] can be an asset \[to the government\] if they agree to lay down their arms,” says Haleem Fidayee, governor of Wardak province. To many, the Taliban are no worse than the warlords who preceded them in power. Several such warlords are now serving in Karzai’s Cabinet. If they can be brought into the tent, the reasoning goes, why can’t the Taliban leadership? “If you want to get important results, you have to talk to important people,” says Talatbek Masadykov, director of political affairs at the U.N. But do those important people want a conversation? In recent months, Mullah Omar, the one-eyed veteran Taliban leader, seems to have distanced himself from al-Qaeda. In a September statement, Omar assured foreign nations that Afghanistan would never again be used as a launching ground for international terrorism, as it was before 9/11\. “We assure all countries,” he said, “that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not extend its hand to cause jeopardy to others.” Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network and author of a recent book on the war, is convinced that the Taliban is trying to send a message. “They are presenting themselves as a parallel government. Even before 9/11 they wanted to play ball. We didn’t take them seriously then, but we should start doing that now.” [(See what happened to the accused 9/11 plotters.)](https://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1939309%5F1939306,00.html "undefined") Others might dispute that analysis. In 2001, the Taliban leadership was fractured between moderates, who sought international engagement, and conservatives, influenced by al-Qaeda, who preferred continued isolation. But assuming that at least some Taliban leaders want to reach out to the West, what would a conversation with them be about? “Everyone says we have to talk to the Taliban,” says Hekmat Karzai, director of the Kabul-based Center for Conflict and Peace Studies. “But when you do, what the hell are you going to say?” It’s a good question. The first thing the Taliban would want is a cease-fire, says Antonio Giustozzi, author of Decoding the New Taliban. “They crave the kind of legitimacy that such a cease-fire would bring. They want to be counted as a legitimate force with legitimate grievances.” But a cease-fire would mean that Taliban senior leaders would be removed from the U.N. sanctions list as well as the Pentagon’s Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List, which catalogs authorized targets for U.S. forces. Doing so shouldn’t be that difficult. It could even be used as a bargaining tool to lure some of the Taliban to the table. [See pictures of a Jihadist’s journey.](https://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1883150,00.html "undefined") [See who’s who on the CIA payroll.](https://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1933053%5F1933052,00.html "undefined") **The al-Qaeda Connection** Other key Taliban demands will be less easy to meet. In any negotiations, for example, the Taliban would want to see a timeline for the withdrawal of international forces. The problem there, Hekmat Karzai says, is that “Afghans know that if the international soldiers leave we won’t have a solid security institution, so foreign withdrawal has to be concomitant with increased Afghan security forces.” But training of the Afghan army and police force is going more slowly than planned, and U.S. and European instructors are in short supply. It will be several years before Afghan troops can defend the country on their own. Before it withdraws its forces, the U.S. will want to be sure that all al-Qaeda bases have been destroyed and that the group will not be able to use Afghanistan as a launching pad for further terrorist attacks. In theory, that is doable. Intelligence officials estimate that there are fewer than 100 al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, but for the Taliban to completely renounce their al-Qaeda sponsors, says Giustozzi, they will have to be provided with alternative sources of income. [(See more about the Taliban.)](https://www.time.com/time/searchresults?Ntt=Taliban "undefined") Even if Saudi Arabia or others stepped into the financial breach, not all Afghans are convinced that the Taliban leadership can be easily peeled away from al-Qaeda. A senior Afghan security official points to a recent attack on the U.N. compound in Kabul that was planned and financed by al-Qaeda but executed by the Taliban. The war has brought their causes closer together, he says. “Now the real Taliban is no different from the real al-Qaeda. They are not a bunch of hungry guys fighting because al-Qaeda is paying them. They will never accept our vision of a stable, democratic Afghanistan.” That rejection extends to Western demands for Afghan women to have basic rights. Listen to Abdul Wahid, 26, a Taliban member jailed for his involvement in a car-bomb blast that claimed several lives. Wahid says compromise on the establishment of Islamic law is out of the question — and to him, that means women would not be able to work. “They could leave the house, but only if they were dressed appropriately. They could go to school, but they would never be able to work in offices — only in women’s hospitals or as teachers at girls’ schools.” If the Obama Administration were willing to negotiate with the Taliban in the hope of a quick exit, such issues would not just create outrage at home; they would disillusion those Afghans who still believe in Western promises of human rights and democracy. “Afghans don’t really want reconciliation,” says the Afghan security official. “They are not prepared to have the Taliban return. They are desperate to come to an end of the fighting — that is all.” So too is the U.S. And that is why Hekmat Karzai sees the enthusiasm for talks less as a considered proposal for a long-term Afghan solution and more as a way for the U.S. and its allies to get out as soon as they can. “If we are going to initiate dialogue, it should not be so the West can immediately leave Afghanistan, saying, ‘Look, now they have come together. They have developed a solution Afghans are happy with, so we can back off.’ If you did that, this country would collapse back into chaos. We have to do this because we want to make sure there is a lasting peace.” Talking to the Taliban, on that view, will work only if it is accompanied by an extensive nation-building program, leading to a clean government that protects its people and gives them real opportunity. Pity that is precisely the long-term commitment to Afghanistan the U.S. is trying to avoid. [Download TIME’s iPhone and BlackBerry application.](https://app.time.com "undefined") [See TIME’s Pictures of the Week.](https://www.time.com/time/picturesoftheweek "undefined") ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"NewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/archive/6690096/talking-with-the-taliban-easier-said-than-done/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/archive/6690096/talking-with-the-taliban-easier-said-than-done/"},"headline":"Talking with the Taliban: Easier Said Than Done","datePublished":"2009-11-30T05:00:00.000Z","dateModified":"2026-02-27T17:08:36.940Z","description":"There are those who say it's the fastest way out of Afghanistan. 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