Spotlight: Afghanistan’s Elections

In the old days, Afghan President Hamid Karzai would appear in his swooshing green cape for a weekly videoconference with George W. Bush. But with his flailing presidency seen as a big reason the Taliban and al-Qaeda are regaining ground in Afghanistan, the Obama Administration cut Karzai’s White House access earlier this year.

The Aug. 20 Afghan elections were supposed to help fix that perception. Instead, they have been marred by allegations of massive ballot-stuffing, mainly (but not exclusively) by Karzai’s supporters. Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission has ordered a partial recount, citing “clear and convincing evidence of fraud.” Still, whether Karzai wins outright or faces a runoff with his rival, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, he will almost certainly be re-elected.

The problem is, Karzai’s legitimacy is shot. Even before allegations of vote-rigging, many Afghans were angry with him for his failure to curb corruption. The aid community has been dismayed by the warlords and drug traffickers infesting his government. And Washington is fed up with his duplicity and fecklessness. Even though he came to power on the back of a U.S.-led invasion, Karzai has portrayed himself as the one man willing to criticize coalition forces. “Karzai wants his legacy to be an Afghan leader who stood up against the foreigners,” says Haroun Mir, director of Afghanistan’s Center for Research and Policy Studies.

But Karzai could instead be remembered as the leader who drove away international support and plunged his country into chaos. Americans, tiring of bad news from Afghanistan, are asking why the U.S. should pour more troops in if they cannot make any headway against the Taliban and al-Qaeda or send billions more dollars if they vanish into the baggy pockets of Kabul officials.

But if the U.S. quits on Karzai, the results could be disastrous. “It will be dog-eat-dog here,” says Ashraf Ghani, a U.S.-educated presidential contender. In the vacuum created by a U.S. pullout, he argues, the Taliban would retake Kabul while millions of Afghans who embraced Western promises of girls’ education, democracy and a place for Afghanistan in the 21st century would flee the country.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda would return on a red carpet. “All these fancy new villas in Kabul where the diplomats and the rich businessmen live? They’ll go to al-Qaeda families,” says Mir, adding that a “defeat” of U.S.-led forces would be a boon to Muslim extremists worldwide, much as the Soviet army’s retreat from Afghanistan was during the 1980s.

To keep that from happening, Karzai needs to show results–fast. Afghans say he must dismiss corrupt officials, improve law and order and use foreign aid money to build long-promised roads, dams, bridges and schools. This would win back many Afghans and stall the Taliban’s advance. But it wouldn’t be easy. To secure victory in these elections, the President had to indebt himself to the very warlords who are strangling the country with their greed.