--- description: With the U.S.-backed government unable to maintain security, local strongmen are wielding more power than ever--and causing ordinary Afghans to lose faith in the West title: The Warlords of Afghanistan image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt54b6b1e0cb416644/698a474d47ca38742f3bbe27/360_wwarlords_0223.jpg?branch=production&width=750&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 ---  * [World](/section/world/) # The Warlords of Afghanistan by [Aryn Baker](/author/aryn-baker/) Feb 12, 2009 5:00 AM CUT  Paula Bronstein / Getty by [Aryn Baker](/author/aryn-baker/) Feb 12, 2009 5:00 AM CUT Like many mothers in Afghanistan, Maghferat Samimi has affixed a photo of a child to her mobile phone. But the 2 1/2-year-old is not her daughter. She is a rape victim, one of scores that Samimi, a researcher with the Afghanistan Human Rights Organization, has documented in the country’s northern provinces over the past year. Witnesses to the child’s abduction by a local militia commander have had their rape claim backed up by a nearby hospital, but the district police chief maintains that the child fell on a stick. The chief’s objectivity in the matter, however, is hardly assured, given that he once worked with the militia commander. In Afghanistan today, it can be impossible to know whom to turn to for help. Seeking justice from government officials, says Samimi, “is like going to the wolves for help when the wolves have stolen your sheep.” As the Obama Administration signals that it intends to devote more attention to the war in Afghanistan, many Afghans claim that in the name of fighting the Taliban, the West is ignoring abuses committed by its Afghan proxies. One of the worst offenders, alleges Samimi, is Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic-Uzbek warlord who helped in the triumphant ousting of the Taliban in 2001, when, backed by U.S. special forces, he led hundreds of men on horseback to liberate the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Dostum’s militia is accused of that war’s worst human-rights atrocity, in which hundreds of his captives suffocated to death after having been locked inside shipping containers. He denies the charges. Samimi is not concerned about Dostum’s wartime activities–few if any of Afghanistan’s leaders can boast clean hands after three decades of war. The problem, she says, is that the warlords and their militia commanders continue to commit crimes with impunity, protected by their alliances with foreign nations and comfortable positions within the Afghan government. A Criminal State Though they have largely relinquished their tanks and heavy artillery, several warlords have been able to maintain their core militias in the form of private security companies, political parties or loose business networks. Many derive their income from lucrative cross-border smuggling routes. Allegations of land grabs, rape, murder and kidnapping are common. Human Rights Watch and Afghan human-rights organizations like Samimi’s have documented extortion rackets operated by former warlords and militia-run prisons where captives are held for ransom. Afghan journalists covering these crimes have been harassed by police or thrown in jail. In 2007, Samimi received a phone call from Dostum threatening to have her raped “by 100 men” if she continued investigating a rape case in which he was implicated. Dostum denies ever making such a threat, telling TIME that the rape allegation is “propaganda.” And yet a witness to the phone call, military prosecutor General Habibullah Qasemi, was dismissed from his government post soon afterward, despite carrying a sheaf of glowing recommendation letters penned by U.S. military supervisors. The perception that warlords, protected by their influence and threats of violence, are not held accountable for their crimes has rocked Afghan society and fueled public discontent with the U.S.-backed Afghan government. A former NATO official in Afghanistan compares the warlords to shrapnel lodged in an artery: Infection is a risk, he says, but pulling it out could be even worse. “There are so many other things we have to worry about, so why go and open this can of worms?” he asks. In some areas, tackling the militias can backfire. In the northeastern province of Badakhshan, local commander Nazir Mohammad runs the provincial capital, Faizabad, as one big protection racket. Foreign humanitarian organizations that don’t hire his security services face attacks. When organizers at the German-run regional military-assistance base attempted to dismiss his men because of a compelling accusation of murder, the base was firebombed; Taliban militants were blamed even though they are not known to operate in that area. Says a former prosecutor at the Attorney General’s office: “Mohammad is such a powerful person in Badakhshan that he can cause many problems if his demands are not answered–even rocket attacks and roadside bombs.” Mohammad, whose militia provides security for NATO troops and aid organizations, denies threatening groups that don’t hire his services. “Why should I do that?” he asks. “I know they are here to rebuild Afghanistan. I am just trying to find \[my guys\] jobs.” The Afghan government seems largely unwilling to curtail the power of the warlords, whose wealth and influence have only increased in the new Afghanistan. These days, Dostum strides across the marble-inlay floors of his new mansion–a pink, three-tiered wedding cake of a house. The foyer boasts a massive aquarium stocked with exotic fish, next to a life-size portrait of Dostum standing beside U.S. General Tommy Franks. During a visit by TIME, workmen were putting the final touches on an immense gold-painted crown that spans the compound’s entry gate. The crown was modeled on that of the 14th century Central Asian military conqueror Tamerlane. The money to build the house, Dostum says, came from Afghan President Hamid Karzai, for whom he was military chief of staff. According to Dostum, Karzai pays him $80,000 a month to serve as his emissary to the northern provinces. “I asked for a year up front in cash so that I could build my dream house,” he says. Karzai, through a spokesman, has refused to comment on his association with Dostum. Nevertheless, he may see buying Dostum’s loyalty as a worthwhile investment. A presidential election is scheduled for the fall, and waning support from Afghans and the international community alike means that Karzai is far from guaranteed another term. Dostum, with his influence in the north, could prove a necessary if unpleasant ally. Back Where We Started This is not the first time warlords have held power in Afghanistan. After the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops, rival mujahedin groups that had united to drive out the foreigners turned on one another in a brutal civil war. The government collapsed, and militia commanders were able to seize territory and terrorize the population. The Taliban capitalized on widespread disgust with the warlords’ savagery, coming to power in 1996\. After Sept. 11, the U.S. relied on the northern warlords and their militias to help oust the Taliban. Many of those leaders were given prominent positions when the new Afghan government was formed, enabling them to claw back credibility that had been lost because of their behavior in the civil war. Samimi laments the squandered chance for Afghanistan to start over. “Right after the collapse of the Taliban, the government had the opportunity to go after these commanders because they were scared and weak,” she says. “Instead, the international community and the government supported them and made them stronger. They didn’t bring them to justice. They waited until they committed more crimes. For this we ousted the Taliban?” Karzai has frequently lashed out at the international community for supporting the warlords, even as he too tries to keep them on his side. “The Afghan point of view is, Cut relations, stop backing them,” he said in an interview last year. “Stop giving them contracts, stop arming them, and stop using them as political tools.” Robust and public prosecution of their crimes would limit the warlords’ power. The West would have to shoulder more of the security burden, but that may be unavoidable if the U.S. still hopes to transform Afghanistan. Educated moderates like Samimi have no love for the Taliban. But they have become disillusioned with the current government, in large part because of the unaddressed venality of militia commanders. Francesc Vendrell, the former European Union envoy to Afghanistan, holds that warlordism, as he calls it, is just as much at the root of the insurgency as religious ideology. “In Muslim society, justice is the most essential element, and here in Afghanistan, people simply don’t see it exist. They see impunity, they see a few people become extremely wealthy, and they see cruelty,” Vendrell says. “Therefore I think many of them are fence sitters. And you can’t hope to win an insurgency when the civilians are sitting on the fence.” The Warlords of Afghanistan ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"NewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/archive/6687643/the-warlords-of-afghanistan/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/archive/6687643/the-warlords-of-afghanistan/"},"headline":"The Warlords of Afghanistan","datePublished":"2009-02-12T05:00:00.000Z","dateModified":"2026-02-27T16:52:45.930Z","description":"With the U.S.-backed government unable to maintain security, local strongmen are wielding more power than ever--and causing ordinary Afghans to lose faith in the West","url":"https://time.com/archive/6687643/the-warlords-of-afghanistan/","keywords":[],"thumbnailUrl":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt54b6b1e0cb416644/698a474d47ca38742f3bbe27/360_wwarlords_0223.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","author":[{"@type":"Person","name":"Aryn Baker","url":"https://time.com/author/aryn-baker/"}],"articleSection":"World","image":[{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blt54b6b1e0cb416644/698a474d47ca38742f3bbe27/360_wwarlords_0223.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","width":1200,"height":675,"headline":"360_wwarlords_0223.jpg","caption":"","creditText":"Paula Bronstein / Getty","representativeOfPage":true}],"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"Time","url":"https://time.com/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://time.com/images/logo.png","width":528,"height":156},"foundingDate":"March 3, 1923","sameAs":["https://www.facebook.com/time","https://www.instagram.com/time/?hl=en","https://twitter.com/time","https://www.pinterest.com/timemagazine"]}},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"item":{"@id":"/section/world/","name":"World"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/archive/6687643/the-warlords-of-afghanistan/","name":"The Warlords of Afghanistan"}}]}] ```