Like a Shakespearean tragedy, what may be the final chapter of General Pervez Musharraf’s reign began with an ominous echo of the original sin in its first pages: the October 1999 coup by which he overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the democratically elected Prime Minister. Sharif’s highly publicized return from exile on Sept. 10 lasted just four hours; Musharraf had him deported again, to Saudi Arabia. But if his first expulsion of Sharif brought Musharraf to power, the second may well hasten the general’s downfall.
It’s unclear how and when this final chapter will play out, but, true to Shakespeare, the main characters are flawed, and the drama replete with intrigues and power grabs. Sharif is now hailed by many Pakistanis as a warrior for democracy, but during two previous terms as Prime Minister in the 1990s, his administrations were widely regarded as inept, corrupt and autocratic. Then there’s Benazir Bhutto, another ex-PM agitating to return from exile. Given her glamorous political pedigree (her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was also a former leader, who was executed by the army), her supporters worship her as practically royalty. But her critics see her as too ready to compromise principles. As for Musharraf, he was once regarded by both Pakistanis and those in other nations as a stern but progressive-minded leader; many in the West thought him a stalwart ally in the global war on terror. Today, he is under siege, increasingly viewed as a dictator who refuses to surrender power, and a leader without the popular support needed to fight the extremism that incubates in his land.
Musharraf has become so vulnerable that even an opposition figure who has long been absent poses a serious threat. Now in exile in Jeddah, where Saudi authorities have him under virtual house arrest, the 57-year-old Sharif continues to haunt Musharraf, 64. His return to Pakistan, though brief, has effectively changed the country’s power equation. In the immediate aftermath of Sharif’s deportation, public reaction was muted. But there is a growing sense of a nation spoiling for a fight. The day after Sharif’s failed comeback from exile, his political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PMLN), filed a petition with the Supreme Court to order his immediate return and to bring contempt-of-court charges against the government — given that the Supreme Court had earlier ruled Sharif has “an inalienable right” to return. His party faithful, undaunted by their leader’s absence and the arrest of many of his aides, are planning mass protests that are likely to feature a wide spectrum of Pakistanis upset with Musharraf — from Islamists to communists to professionals to small-business folk. “What the government did to stop Sharif was absolutely disastrous for this country,” says shopkeeper Oranzab Shahid. “As a citizen of Pakistan it was his right to come back.” Sharif’s brother, Shahbaz, has sworn to lead the battle against Musharraf from the PMLN London office, and Sharif’s wife Kulsoom Nawaz, a potent politician in her own right, has said she will return to Pakistan in coming days. “Musharraf should be worried,” says Shahbaz. “He has fired the pistol shot for an open revolt.”
Musharraf’s woes go beyond Sharif. Support in both the army he leads and the political party he founded, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), is hemorrhaging over a proposed power-sharing deal with Bhutto. It would require Musharraf to shed his uniform, drop corruption charges against Bhutto, which have kept her in exile since 1999, and do away with the constitutional amendment that allows the President to dissolve Parliament. Musharraf would get the backing of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party to stay as President, while she gets a shot at being Prime Minister. But the deal has stalled. It has run into much public opposition partly because it is backed by the U.S., which is increasingly unpopular in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda militants and other extremists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, meanwhile, are capitalizing on the discontent to launch a jihad against Musharraf’s regime — in recent weeks, the country has been rocked by bomb blasts. Musharraf’s political rivals sense his weakness. “If he thinks that by sending Sharif into exile he is going to save his own skin, he is sorely mistaken,” says Imran Khan, the former cricket star who now heads an opposition party. “The whole country has no choice but to unite in the movement against him.” Says former Law Minister Iftikhar Gilani: “This is the death spasm of the general’s rule. He can’t survive as a political entity.”
If change were to come in Pakistan, how would it happen? Musharraf’s current tenure ends on Nov. 15. To have another go at the presidency, he will need to be elected before then for a second five-year term by the sitting national and provincial assemblies, before they are dissolved for parliamentary polls that can be held as late as January 2008. But the Supreme Court can block Musharraf’s bid to remain in power by enforcing a constitutional ban on elected officials from holding military rank. (Retired soldiers must wait two years before standing for office.) Musharraf previously got around the contravention by getting an exemption from tame judges. That exemption expires when his term does, and the Supreme Court, which resents the general for trying to sack highly respected Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry earlier this year, is unlikely to give him another. “Never before has a judiciary emerged which is able to check the power of the executive,” says Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, director of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT).
Musharraf also risks Bhutto turning on him. The re-emergence of Sharif, just as her own popularity crumbles over her dealings with a loathed general, has cast a shadow upon her own return, now scheduled to be announced this week. If the talks fail, Bhutto has said she will embark on her own comeback tour. Her reputation as a tireless crusader for democracy, however, has been tainted by associating with Musharraf. At the same time, she may be forced into a partnership with the President just to save her political career. “It’s a damned-if-you-do and damned-if-you-don’t type situation,” says onetime Bhutto adviser Murtaza Poya. “She has lost quite a few notches, definitely. The only thing she can tell supporters now is that ‘If I don’t make the deal I can assure you somebody else is going to make it.'”
Because Pakistan is a frontline state in the war on terror, what happens there is closely followed by Washington. The State Department has studiously stayed away from condemning Sharif’s deportation. “It’s a matter for the Pakistanis to resolve,” said spokesman Sean McCormack. “The Pakistani Supreme Court has made a judgment about this issue and the decision to deport Mr. Sharif runs contrary to that, but it is still a pending legal matter in Pakistan, so we’re not going to have anything to say about it.”
Washington seems to be still fully behind Musharraf. “Yes, on paper [his] power is diminished,” says a State Department official. “But the hope is that Musharraf will continue to influence policy in the war on terror as President.” Retired Lieut. General Hamid Gul, former director of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, calls the Americans “naive” for thinking that Musharraf will have any power if he steps down as military chief, or that Bhutto as Prime Minister will be able to control the army. “The Pakistani army is a one-man show. Whoever is chief gets to call the shots. And if you send the army back to the barracks, no civilian leader can tell them what to do.” Gul says that in trying to influence the political process in Pakistan, the U.S. is playing with fire. Just as Bhutto has been tainted by her relationship with Musharraf, the President is sullied by his relationship with Washington. Warns Gul: “The more the people of Pakistan become disillusioned with their leadership, and the more America gives support to that government which is failing the Pakistani people, the closer the time comes that someone picks up a flag and says, ‘follow me, we are going to fight the Americans.’ As President of Pakistan, as military leader, Pervez Musharraf is history. And if Americans try to reverse the course of history then it will be to their own disadvantage.”
Which raises the question: If Musharraf’s position is so tenuous, why is the U.S. so lukewarm to Sharif? Perhaps because the Bush Administration does not think he will ever be a serious contender for power. “His popularity is linked not to what he is but what he represents,” says a State Department official. A senior Bush Administration official says Bhutto’s party “has historically been more popular and closer to the moderate center than [Sharif’s] party.”
Yet, as PM, Sharif had excellent ties with the Clinton White House, allowing the U.S. to use Pakistani airspace for missile attacks against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in 1998. He cracked down on sectarian extremism, and used his influence with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to curb opium production and extradite known terrorists. As a center-right politician, he is much closer to the conservative parties that hold sway over Pakistan’s religious leaders. Bhutto, says Zahid Hussain, author of the seminal Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam, risks alienating the conservative groups by driving them into the embrace of extremists. “The problem with Benazir is that her coming to power will increase polarization. She is seen as pro-West, and she is very clear about it.” Sharif himself has made it clear that combating militancy would be top of his agenda were he, or his party, to lead Pakistan. “You can’t fight terror the way Mr. Musharraf is fighting,” he told CNN. “He needs the threat of terror for his own survival. We will fight out of conviction.”
But Pakistan does not have a tradition of leaders who put the nation above self. During Sharif’s time in office, he tested six nuclear devices, dismissed a Supreme Court chief justice (as Musharraf tried to do), and promoted Islamic law. The press was often, and brutally, stopped from reporting on sensitive matters. Under Sharif’s rule, Pakistan and India nearly erupted into nuclear war over Kashmir, when Musharraf, as head of the army, sent troops into Indian-held territory at Kargil. (Sharif maintains that Musharraf acted on his own, and that he subsequently tried to dismiss Musharraf — the act that led to his eventual overthrow.)
Musharraf, for his part, has not been all bad for Pakistan. The economy is growing at a rapid clip, new infrastructure projects have brought roads, water and electricity to remote areas, and the arts and media are freer than they have been in a long while. But it’s a quirk of Pakistani politics that leaders are easily built up, torn down, cannibalized and regurgitated. Like Musharraf, Sharif has a new persona. Once deemed an industrialist out of touch with the masses, he is now seen as an economic savior who will curb the crippling inflation that plagues Pakistan today. Corruption charges against him, including money laundering through a paper mill to the tune of about $31.5 million, are glossed over as opposition propaganda. (Sharif denies the charges.) He even gets credit for standing up to the Indians at Kargil, and is lionized as a hero for the nuclear tests he conducted. “He is a true patriot,” says Naveed Khawaja, a 40-year-old office worker in Rawalpindi.
PILDAT’s Mehboob disagrees. He reckons that of all Pakistan’s imperfect leaders, Musharraf is the best of the lot. “Nobody can fix all the problems in this country. But Musharraf promised Pakistan when he took power that he would fix democracy. And now he has that opportunity. It may not be in the way he wanted, but by stepping down now he can do more for democracy in this country than any other leader.” That’s a legacy worth leaving.
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