Better Than Nothing

Now that a deal has been struck with north korea on its nuclear weapons program, both the South Korean and U.S. governments have embarked on a hard sell. They claim that this new accord trumps the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton Administration, and that it signals the beginning of a complete denuclearization of North Korea.

Unfortunately, it does neither. The current agreement simply brings us back to the position in which the Bush Administration criticized the Clinton team for leaving us: freezing and monitoring the Yongbyon facilities without ensuring their complete dismantlement. In fact, we are actually worse off than when the Agreed Framework was signed, as North Korea has used the past five years of wrangling to expand its nuclear arsenal. Nonetheless, a deal is a deal, and better than no deal at all. Never mind that this week’s agreement is silent on Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment, an issue that precipitated the current crisis. Nor that it says nothing concrete about the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, materials and weapons. What we got in Beijing this week was the best deal we could get.

Why did the Bush Administration finally drop its opposition to bilateral talks with North Korea, or to seeking an incomplete solution? Why did it agree to reward bad behavior? Perhaps it was the muddle in Iraq and the continuing difficulties the Bush Administration has in dealing with Iran. Perhaps it was because of the Democratic Party’s victory in the November congressional elections. Perhaps the White House simply needed a success story, even if it turns out to be one more of perception than fact. Whatever the reason, Washington’s change of mind is welcome. It’s better to stop North Korea’s nuclear activities, even at a price, than to allow it to keep churning out plutonium and nuclear weapons. For its part, North Korea has been able to take advantage of Washington’s eagerness to engage. All it had to do was give the U.S. government a reason to claim success. Fortunately for North Korea, and unfortunately for the rest of the world, Pyongyang did not need to promise to ensure the dismantlement of its nuclear facilities, equipment, material and weapons.

Will North Korea eventually give up those facilities as the U.S. and others insist? To answer that, we need to ask why the North developed and secured nuclear weapons, over several decades, at such a high cost and risk. There are a number of reasons. First, nuclear status is a political trophy for Kim Jong Il. From senior party members down to young children, North Koreans have boasted to recent visitors that Kim’s great feat of testing a nuclear bomb last October has enabled their country to stand as an equal with the big powers. Second, the nuclear program is intended to deter a possible external attack—indeed, Pyongyang blames America’s military prowess and policy of pressure for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Third, North Korea’s nuclear capability gives it an upper hand militarily in relation to the South—an important consideration, especially with the reduction and, possibly, the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Fourth, the nuclear program is seen as a key to survival—a way to block and prevent any outside attempts at regime change. Finally, nuclear weapons represent a powerful bargaining tool, which explains why the odds are that Pyongyang will want to retain its nuclear chips as it doles out piecemeal concessions, starting with a freeze, inspections and reporting; then—if it ever comes to that—moving to dismantlement of facilities, material and weapons.

Given what North Korea sees as compelling motives to possess nuclear weapons, it’s highly unlikely it will succumb to a Libya-like solution and agree to completely rid itself of nuclear equipment and material, as Muammar Gaddafi’s regime did in 2003. The best we can hope for, perhaps, is convincing Pyongyang not to produce any additional nuclear weapons. In 60 days’ time, we’ll know if even this modest goal can be reached. Now that the previous objective of achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement looks increasingly unrealistic, the question boils down to this: Should the rest of the world accept a North Korea that has nuclear weapons as long as that number isn’t increasing?

When dealing with the North, it’s necessary to remain realistic. That way nobody gets disappointed, or gives up a deal that—to be sure—is not 100% satisfactory, but that can serve as a start. The more ambitious goal of total denuclearization will only be achieved over time, within the context of broader changes that would include closer U.S.-China cooperation, increased Chinese pressure on Pyongyang or a leadership change in North Korea.