THE RUHR: Second British Note

The British Government published its correspondence with the Allied Governments on the subjects of the Ruhr Occupation and Reparation Payments. The object of this publicity of hitherto secret documents is twofold: first, to bring the British point of view before the entire world; second to arouse world opinion against France.

Premier Poincare of France, however, seems determined to stay in the Ruhr until such time as Germany starts to make reparation payments. Even then France will only withdraw progressively as payments are received. In two speeches Premier Poincare laid stress on the havoc and wanton destruction wrought in France by the Germans during the War. In no sense can either of these speeches be regarded as a preface to a French reply to the latest British note, although M. Poincare was aware of the contents of the note at the time of making his speeches. He did, however, make a veiled accusation against Britain, Italy and Japan for being “without knowing it, under the influence of German propaganda.” He stated that France’s aim was “to receive indemnity for her sufferings.” In short, M. Poincare’s speeches were little more than a reiteration of his previous discourses and an emphatic defense of France’s aims and rights.

The text of the first British note to the Allied Governments haspreviously been outlined. The second, which has recently been received in Paris and Brussels, is possibly the strongest note that has passed between the Allied Governments since the beginning of the War. It contains 54 paragraphs and a memorandum, the whole amounting to some 10,000 words. In it the British Government made its position quite clear and made specific answers to French and Belgian queries.

The main points in the note are that Belgium, having received nearly 75% of her total reparations claim, now wants further priorities in future payments; that France, having agreed to a sum of 34,000,000,000 gold marks under the Spa agreement now wants a minimum of 26,000,000,000 gold marks plus what she owes to the U. S. and Great Britain, which is roughly another 27,000,000,000 gold marks; therefore, the total now claimed by France is virtually 53,000,000,000 gold marks.

Great Britain offers in the note to reduce her own claims on Germany to 14,200,000,000 gold marks, that sum being enough to pay her debt to the U. S. of $4,600,000,000. These payments from Germany would be treated as coming from France herself. In other words Germany will pay France’s debt and Britain will waive her claim on reparations except for 2,200,000,000 gold marks needed to make up the difference between the British debt to the U. S. and the French debt to Britain. The note reminds Belgium that her debt to the Allies had already been cancelled.

The memorandum reminds France that no payment on her British debt has been made. It says that the “present practice of adding interest to capital cannot be indefinitely continued,” and it suggests that payment of “part of the interest should be made as soon as sterling and franc exchange become reasonably stable.” This is in case France refused to accept the British proposals.

The final clause of the note is perhaps the most stinging and significant of all :

“It is the hope of His Majesty’s Government that the above explanations will convince the French and Belgian Governments of the reasonableness of the British position and will win their assent to its acceptance. They are reluctant to contemplate the possibility that separate action may be required in order to have a settlement which cannot be much longer delayed without the gravest consequences to the recovery of the trade and peace of the world.

“I have, etc., “CURZON OF KEDLESTON.” While the exterior situation in Europe is gloomy in the extreme, hidden events are somewhat more reassuring. It is known that several transactions were made recently between German, British and French industrial concerns. The practical effect of these transactions is to give Britain and France an interest in future German production. The scheme is ingenious and it may be justly inferred that the interested concerns would not enter into negotiations at the present time unless the Anglo-Franco-Belgian situation warranted such a course.